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E S S A Y S
AND
DISSERTATIONS
ON
VARIOUS SUBJECTS,

RELATING TO
HUMAN LIFE AND HAPPINESS.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

12 Ed
VOL. II

Ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡμετέρα ἐκμαλίσσεται τῷ ἐργαζέσθαι διὰ δαΐ, καὶ ἐκμαλίσσεται, ἵνα ὅσοι
ἀρετὴ καὶ ἰουστιτίαν ἐκμαλίσσονται.
EPICTET. ENCHIRID.

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L O N D O N:

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DISSEMINATION

PROGRESS OF SCIENCE

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DISSERTATION IV.

ON HAPPINESS.

PART I.

Man's true Happiness ascertained from an Estimate and Comparison of his various Enjoyments.

IF HAPPINESS be a subject that I can throw any light on, it is fit that my preamble be as short as possible. The subject is so interelling to every reader, that he may be excused for being impatient to know how it is to be managed, or what can be added to the many treatises, ancient and modern, that have been wrote upon it. To give an account of all these would be enough to make a treatise by itself, entertaining, perhaps, to some, but not very satisfying. Others will possibly make the same remark on what I now write: All I can say for it therefore is, that the view I am to give of the subject shall be such as best suits my own experience. I have found the benefit of it in many varieties of life; and if (by the Divine Blessing)

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others

others shall reap the same benefit, I shall have my end in the following disquisition.

It is too general and imperfect a definition of Happiness, to say that it consists in the enjoyment of *Pleasure**; for some degree of *Perfection*, as well as *Pleasure*, goes to constitute our idea of any kind of Happiness, and it bears proportion to the capacity of the being who is possessed of it. Thus the happiness of a *Brute* is suited to its nature, and requires only the perfection and satisfaction of sense; but that happiness which is suitable to the nature of *Man*, must be superior, as it implies the rectitude and perfection of his rational powers, with their exercise on objects agreeable to them. *Improvement* as well as *Enjoyment*, is here implied; nor is it only to a few acts or exercises that they have respect, but to the habitual frame and temper of the mind, and the objects best suited to administer to it that kind of pleasure, which goes to constitute the highest happiness of a being constituted and connected as man is.

I shall therefore suppose any man sitting down coolly and deliberately, to consider what objects, exercises, and enjoyments, were most conducive to his highest happiness, that he

* Who thus define it, say they more or less
Than this, that Happiness is Happiness.

POPE.

He might make his election, and regulate his conduct accordingly in the pursuit of it. What to me appears the most natural and distinct way for him to proceed, is as follows:

I. To consider the different ENJOYMENTS in which men commonly place their Happiness.

II. To lay down some MAXIMS, by which we may judge of the value of any Enjoyments, and compare them one with another. And,

III. To *apply* these to the above Enjoyments for determining their value, and in which of them true happiness lies.

I. The ENJOYMENTS in which men do commonly place their happiness, are to be enumerated.

What is meant by *Pleasure* and *Pain* in the general, every one's consciousness will best inform him. They arise from such perceptions as are either agreeable or disagreeable to our nature; and, according as any objects contribute to procure us either of these, they fall under the general denomination of Good or Evil: The *Enjoyment* of these objects, therefore, that is, the exercise of our

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faculties on them, according as they give such grateful or ungrateful perceptions, we call *Happiness* and *Misery* in the abstract; so that, as their essential constitution lies in an agreeableness or disagreeableness to our *Nature*, the manner of distinguishing them into different species or branches, depends upon the light in which human *Nature* is considered. If we consider it with some moralists, as having so many distinct powers of perception implanted in it, to be the inlets of pleasure and pain, and resembling in their exercise what are called the five external senses; in this view these objects, which, by giving pleasure or pain, are constituted good or evil, come to be distinguished into different classes, according to these different *Senses* or powers of perceiving them, such as the *publick Sense*, the *moral Sense*, the *Sense of Honour*, and the like.

For distinguishing the enjoyments in which men commonly place their happiness, others only consider human nature in the general as *Rational* or *Sensitive*; the first depending peculiarly on the *Mind*; the second on the union of *Body* with it; and intermediate betwixt these is the faculty of *Imagination*, receiving impressions from both, and forming them into images. In this view, as happiness lies in the enjoyment of objects agreeable to nature, it is either *Rational*, belonging to the rational and

and purely mental part of our frame, or *Sensual* to the Sensitive; to which a third species may be added, under the name of *Imaginative* Happiness, as being founded in the imagination, associating the forms of mental Happiness with those of sensual.

To the first of these belong more peculiarly all such enjoyments as are *Internal* or *Spiritual*, of which we shall have occasion to say more afterwards. To the second, such as are *External* and *Corporeal*; which are commonly divided into four kinds, viz. *Pleasure*, from the objects of sense and appetite; *Power* and authority over others; *Wealth* or Riches, to procure both the former, or perhaps even on their own account; and *Fame* or distinction in the world. According as one or other of these is the chief object of mens desire and pursuit, four different characters are formed, and their prevailing affections take the names of *Sensuality*, *Ambition*, *Avarice*, and *Emulation*; to which a fifth character might be added, of those in whom *Indolence* prevails, or love of ease, as the principal ingredient of their Happiness, were it not that their enjoyments are so near a-kin to the *Sensual*.

THE third kind of Happiness mentioned we called *Imaginative*, as it arises from the imagination or fancy, associating the ideas of *Mental* Good, such as Generosity, Publick Spirit, Dignity, and the like, with those of

External, so as to make the one more inviting and alluring, by a mixture of the other. Thus, that *Pleasure* which lies in gratifying the appetites, has joined to it the moral ideas of sociality and friendship, by receiving others to share in it, Generosity, and perhaps Charity, in supporting those who are not so received, by the expence at which such pleasure is purchased, and the like. *Riches* have associated with them, the ideas of that esteem they appear often attended with, and of all that publick good they may be the means of procuring; though, when the means are attained, the end is oft times forgot. *Power*, in the same way, is accompanied with the ideas of Dignity, Grandeur, and Worth, which belong to it only when well applied; *Fame* and Distinction with those of publick esteem, superior merit, and the like. Such are the delusive forms under which *External Good* is painted by the imagination, associating with it the ideas of something higher and more excellent, 'till by constant indulgence and repetition, the associations are so strengthened as to continue, even when we are convinced that they are wrong. Thus, though the *Miser* cannot answer for the folly of his conduct, he will not alter it: He has all the ideas of Good, of Excellence, of Merit, of Importance, and Enjoyment in life, confounded with his coffers, as the *Luxurious* man
has

has with his table, and the romantick Lover with his mistress.

BUT, for enumerating the different enjoyments in which men commonly place their Happiness, instead of any *philosophical* division of them, we may do as well to substitute a *practical* one, or to consult Experience, by looking around us to see what it is that men are generally most intent upon pursuing, and by enumerating the different objects of their pursuit, according to the degree of excellence commonly ascribed to them. These, therefore, will probably be found as follows:

1. *Sensual Pleasure*, or the gratification of those desires that respect the external senses and appetites, and avoiding whatever is offensive to them.

2. *Riches*, either for their own sake, or that of procuring other enjoyments.

3. *Honour* and Preferment, or what is called making a figure in the world.

4. *Fame* and Distinction, or the applause and notice of all we converse with.

5. *Speculative Pleasures*, from the acquisition of knowledge, and discovery of truth.

6. The *Social Pleasures* of friendship, company, and mutual intercourse.

7. The Pleasures of the *Imagination*, entertained with the works of nature or art.

8. The godlike Pleasures of *doing good* to
all

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all around us, by the offices of justice, charity, and improvement of their minds.

9. The resemblance of the *Deity*, in respect of his moral perfections, and that enjoyment of him which arises from a consciousness of devout affection towards him, a conformity to his will, and consequent *Sense* of his *Favour*.

THESE are the different *Objects* and *Enjoyments* in which men do commonly place their happiness, and which, though thus distinguished, and differing very much in their value, (as will soon be made appear) we are not to suppose entirely inconsistent with one another. There is indeed one kind of them superior to all in excellence, and in which we shall find that the supreme happiness of man consists. But some of the other kinds mentioned have likewise their excellence; nor is there any of them which may not, in a proper degree, be pursued lawfully and innocently. Our *highest happiness*, however, is what we are now in search of, that we may see in what species of enjoyment and improvement it consists. In order to this, therefore, we proceed.

II. To lay down some MAXIMS, by which we may judge of the value of any enjoyments, and compare them one with another. The

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1. We shall mention is one very commonly taken notice of, that all *Pleasure* is to be judged of by its *Intenseness* and *Duration*; and so, on the contrary, of *Pain*.

2. No *Pleasure* deserves regard that must be followed by the *Loss* of a greater one, or a *superior Pain*; nor does any *Pain* deserve regard that must be followed by a much *Superior Pleasure*.

3. That *Pleasure* must be always *Superior*, which belongs to the *superior part* of our nature.—Hence it follows,

4. That the true happiness of man must be such as is suited to the *Nature* of *Man*, and not to the nature of brutes; nor are we to judge of the nature of man in general, from what appears to be that of some, who may be said to have debased their nature, by giving way too much to the exercise and gratification of inferior principles and desires, but from what appears best suited to those principles which are acknowledged superior in our nature, viz. *Reason* and *Intellect*: And, as perfection, as well as pleasure, goes to constitute happiness.

5. It follows also, that the highest happiness of man must consist in such enjoyments as are most *perfective* of his nature, or most consonant to his hopes of higher happiness and perfection *hereafter*, and, as it were, *progressive* towards it, so that its value will be increasing, and

and not diminishing in our eye, the nearer that we approach to the verge of life. But,

6. True Happiness must be something level even to those of the *meanest* ability or capacity; that is, it must consist in some kind of enjoyments adapted to all, and attainable by them.

7. It must also be accommodated to all times, places and circumstances, not affected by the various changes and conditions of human life, nor such as will appear to us tasteless and insipid in the immediate view of death, when every false and fugitive species of happiness will vanish, or sink into that insignificance which belongs to it.

8. It must consist in something very *simple*, always accessible, easily comprehended at once, and made present to the mind, yet so *diffuse* or extensive, that there can be no opposition of one to another in the pursuit of it, but the contrary.

Such are the *Maxims*, by which we may judge of the value of the different kinds of enjoyment formerly mentioned, and the *Characters*, by which that kind is distinguished in which our highest happiness consists.—Let us now

III. APPLY these *Maxims* and *Characters* to our different enjoyments, in order to judge of

of their value, and which of them chiefly deserves our preference and pursuit.

This application may so easily be made by every one for himself, that we need not be particular in going over the various enjoyments formerly mentioned with this view, further than to observe in general,

1. That, as all of them are, in some degree, suited to our nature; all of them are, in a proper degree, justifiable in their pursuit: But

2. None of them can go to constitute our highest happiness, whose object is *external*, and not perfective of the soul, so that, by all the preceeding maxims, the four kinds of Pleasure first mentioned, are secluded.

3. It is easy to see, that the three kinds of Enjoyment next mentioned, *viz.* those from acquisitions of *Knowledge*, from *Society*, and from the entertainments of the *Imagination*, though all more refined, and more nearly allied to mental happiness than what went before, yet, being easily interrupted and impaired, and not being adapted to all capacities, nor accommodated to all times, places, and circumstances, they are, by these last mentioned maxims or characters, excluded from being *essential* ingredients of our chief happiness: They are, however, so consistent with, and conducive to it, that they deserve very much of our attention.

A search

A search after knowledge, and inquiry into truth, physical and moral, as well as religious, is not only allowable, but highly commendable, especially when it is such as does not rest in speculation, but extends to practice; by this the improvement of the mind is promoted, its faculties exercised and strengthened, its veneration and gratitude to God, when contemplating his works increased, and the accommodation of the present life in many ways advanced. There can be no doubt, therefore, that exercises of this kind, when rightly conducted, are conducive to our highest happiness, though from Maxim 6. it is plain that they do not constitute it; and much more may such a favourable testimony be given of the pleasures of society, or social intercourse, in the way of receiving and communicating mutual improvement and entertainment. Put all other outward enjoyments together, and they will not make up for the want of this. We may, and do differ very much as to the choice of those whose company or society we relish; but there is no man alive, unless the principles of his nature be some way vitiated, who can pass his life comfortably without some society or other; and without it indeed there would not be scope for the exercise of many virtues which adorn and perfect our natures. To suppose, however, that our supreme happiness depended upon this, would be resting it
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on a very mutable foundation, and is particularly contrary to the seventh maxim mentioned. This objection lies much stronger against the entertainments of the imagination, whether arising from the beauties of nature, or the imitations of art, in the way of resemblance, refinement, expression, description. These are sources of pleasure, both innocent and ornamental, but they are neither suited to all capacities, nor to all circumstances, and therefore come not up to what we mentioned in the sixth and seventh maxims, as preconceptions of the sovereign good.

4. The eighth species of pleasure mentioned, is indeed essentially *necessary* to the pursuit and attainment of our chief happiness, but not what *constitutes* it. An eminent modern writer * on this subject has said a great deal to prove, that happiness consists in *rectitude* of conduct; but there are many reasons for considering this rather as a mean or qualification necessary to happiness, than as happiness itself. A rectitude of *temper* or disposition is still more necessary, but who can say that he ever fully attained either of these, however much he endeavoured it; and, though they may well be called god-like pleasures, which arise from doing good to all around us by the offices of justice, charity, and improvement.

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of

* Harris's Treatise on Happiness.

of their minds, yet how many are there, whose sphere of doing good is too narrow and depressed to admit of their having much enjoyment in this way? Acts of strict justice and duty they may endeavour to practise, but, in respect of charity and mental improvement, they must rather be indebted to others, than hope to communicate; and though, amidst many blemishes and imperfections, some may attain a higher degree of that consciousness of rectitude which some suppose sufficient for happiness; yet, besides that those who have the best title to it, may often, through their humility and self-denial, be more backward than others in taking merit or comfort from it, there are cases of calamity and distress, to which the very best of men are liable, in which the mind of man requires something more to support it, than what depends on its own natural strength, rectitude, or fortitude. From all this we may infer,

5. That, either there is no such thing as true happiness to be expected and attained (a supposition which both reason and experience condemn) or else that it must lie in the last species mentioned, *viz.* the resemblance of the Deity in respect of his moral perfections, and that enjoyment of him which arises from a consciousness of devout affection towards him, conformity to his will, and consequent *sense of his favour.*

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The nature of this happiness, therefore, and means of attaining it, must be considered as the most important subject our inquiry can extend to, and we shall soon enter upon it: But here it may be fit to take notice, how fully all the characters or essential properties of true happiness belong to it. Take its intenseness, its duration, its consequences into the account, and, in all these respects, it will be found superior to every other species of enjoyment that takes the name of happiness; it is suited to the superior part of our nature, is perfective of it, corrects every inferior principle, is conducive to higher happiness and perfection hereafter, adapted to the capacities of all, and attainable by them, accommodated to all times, places, and circumstances, yet not affected by the various changes and conditions of human life, nor confined, as all external enjoyments are, so as to occasion any opposition of interests in the pursuit of it.—On the contrary, the more it is pursued and attained, it will be still the more diffusive in its influence on all around, as a heart properly regulated and disposed with respect to God, will most certainly be so as to men, upon the surest foundation, namely, *a regard to the will of God*, which will operate more uniformly, and produce benevolent dispositions and actions with respect to men, more effectually

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than

than any regard to their merit, approbation, or subserviency to our interest.

The character which some will probably think least applicable to this species of happiness, is that of its being simple, always accessible, easily comprehended at once, and made present to the mind. Instead of this some will say, that the happiness we now speak of, as superior to every other enjoyment, is something so abstract and refined, that they can form no idea of it. Abstracted from sense indeed it is; refined also and spiritual in its nature; but its appearing distant and difficult to be attained, is what may reasonably be expected from its superior value, and that indisposition for such enjoyments which arises from the mind's being either too much engrossed or polluted by sensible objects. But, lay aside all immoderate attachments to these and you'll find that no idea more easily enters the mind, or seems more congenial with it, than such an impression of the divine presence and favour, as, however imperfect and incommensurate to its object, will be sufficient to fill the whole capacity of the human soul, and, in an ineffable manner, diffuse its influence through every faculty, at the same time that it is accommodated to all circumstances, conditions, and capacities; as the supreme Author and immediate object of this happiness.

happiness must always have the nearest access to our minds, be always intimately present with them, and know how to communicate or withdraw that *sense of his favour*, which gives happiness to the soul, according as it advances in purity, conformity to his will, and resemblance of his moral perfections; the nature of which, so far as they are to be comprehended by us, shall be afterwards considered.

6. One inference more that may be drawn from the application we have made of the maxims formerly laid down to the different kinds of enjoyment mentioned, is, That, if our highest happiness lies in the last of these, it ought to be considered as our *chief good*, as the ultimate end of our life and actions, and the intrinsic value of all the other enjoyments, estimated according to their tendency or relation to this. Hence it will follow, that, though some of them may be pursued in an entire consistence with it, yet, as others of them lead us off to sensual and external objects, a *disengagement* from these must be cultivated and attained, before the mind can be properly disposed for the spiritual exercises and enjoyments which have respect to our supreme good. Such a disengagement is, indeed, the first step towards it, but, as to the *degree* of this, no rule can be laid down, that

will suit every situation in life, further than that, the more compleat it is, in a consistence with the necessary offices and engagements of life, or, the more that the mind is abstracted from every thing sensible and corporeal, the disposition for the highest mental enjoyments will be the more compleat, and, whatever is renounced on account of them, amply compensated.

PART

PART II

The plain way of attaining that which appears to be Man's true and ultimate Happiness.

THE first part of our inquiry is now finished, and the various enjoyments, from which happiness is commonly sought or expected, have been enumerated, estimated, and compared. The result of all is, that the *highest happiness of man* consists in the *resemblance and favour, or enjoyment of God*. He has, in this respect, put all men more upon a level than is commonly imagined, as he has not left their true happiness depending upon any external circumstances or advantages, in respect of which they differ very much from one another; but, be their stations, talents, and outward circumstances what they will, this happiness is put within their reach. If they attain it, they will not regret the want of any thing else: If they attain it not, no other advantage can compensate it. Our next inquiry therefore, shall be, *How that resemblance and enjoyment of God is to be attained, in which our highest happiness consists?*

Meaning

Meaning by his *resemblance*, a conformity of heart and life to his will, in respect of purity, rectitude, and participation of all moral or spiritual perfection; and by his *enjoyment*, a sense of his love and favour, communicated by him to the soul; and always consequent upon the former. So that the important *question* now before us is, How these may be attained to such a degree as is consistent with the present infant state of our being and faculties? the full attainment of them being reserved to a future period of our existence, a state of higher purity and perfection.

HAPPINESS, in the light in which we have considered it, is so perfective of our nature, that it may be said to be the great end of our being, *to make ourselves and all around us happy*. Our own happiness and that of others have a mutual influence on one another. It all centers in God; the very *essence* of it lying in that *sense* or *persuasion* of his favour, which arises from the *resemblance* of him mentioned, and *conformity* to his will. The main scope, therefore, of our present disquisition must be, to take as clear and succinct a view as possible of the conduct we are to observe with respect to the DEITY, in order to obtain his favour and enjoyment, in which lies our *chief* HAPPINESS, or the ultimate end of our being, as now set forth.

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The great importance of settling this point, in such a manner as that the mind may have it, *i. e.* the impression of it, always present, may be kept from fluctuating, and the whole of our life uniformly regulated by it, will now be evident; so that all possible accuracy and perspicuity is necessary. It must be done agreeably to the dictates of reason, and discoveries of revelation; and, if it is so done, to the best of our knowledge and ability, we should rest satisfied with the issue of our inquiry, without any uneasy doubts or anxious fears to embitter our lives, while conscious that we do our best, in the present imperfect state of human nature, as to what concerns either knowledge or practice. Even when we endeavour this, indeed it must be acknowledged, that we are in many respects defective as to both; but this our merciful Creator foresaw, and made such provision for redressing, as that, in consistence with his justice and authority, he may receive us into favour, in the way that shall afterwards be mentioned.

The order, in which it is now most natural for us to proceed, in our way to that happiness which has been described, is by considering attentively the three following particulars.

1. What

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I. What *ideas* or *conceptions* we are led both by reason and revelation, to have of GOD.

II. What *ideas* or *conceptions* they give us of *ourselves*, and of the *relation* in which we stand to the DEITY.

III. The *duties* and *dispositions* with respect to him which *result* from *these*, and are necessary in order to our being *approved* by him.

I. We begin with laying down these *notions* or *conceptions*, which we are led both by reason and revelation, to have of the DEITY. And these are as follows.

1. That he is an intelligent immaterial Being, who existed from all eternity of himself, without limitation or dependence on any thing external to himself, for his *being*, *happiness*, and *perfection*; and that from him all being, happiness, and perfection are derived.

2. That he being thus self-existent, independent and intelligent, his happiness consists in *self-enjoyment*, i. e. in the enjoyment and contemplation of his own nature and operations, regulated and approved of by the *reason* of his own all-perfect and eternal mind.

3. That
• From this *eternal reason*, every inferior intelligent being

3. That this *self-existent, infinitely happy* Being must possess in the highest degree all the perfections that are to be found in created beings, and can be excelled in them by none.

(1.) He must have all possible *natural perfection*, viz. the most perfect power, knowledge, and wisdom. And,

(2.) The highest *moral perfection*, in respect of, 1. Goodness and benevolence, or a natural inclination to communicate his happiness and perfection. 2. Holiness and purity, or a disposition to be pleased with the resemblance of his perfections in such beings as he has made capable of them, and displeased with the contrary. 3. Justice and righteousness, or a disposition to reward and punish such beings accordingly.

4. Reason informs us, that, as this *supreme, self-existent, infinitely happy and perfect* Being has created inferior intelligent beings, of different orders and capacities, but all in some measure

ing derives such a measure of *reason* as is necessary for the direction of his conduct, according to his order and sphere in nature: This is what we commonly call the *light of nature*, in a conformity to which lies the *law of nature*; and the unprejudiced testimony of *reason*, when thus exerted or applied for the direction of our own conduct, is what goes by the name of *conscience*; which impartially and unavoidably passes judgment on all our actions and affections, approving or disapproving of them at first sight, even, before any deliberate reflection on them intervenes; but, with much more violence, when this takes place, and gives leisure for bringing them more nearly to the test of reason.

measure capable of the above resemblance, of whom the only beings that fall under our notice are those called *men*; the end of his creating them must have been to *communicate* to them of his happiness and perfection, to which (as was observed) his goodness inclines him.

5. From his goodness, and the end of his creating men, reason concludes, that, though he has allotted them different capacities, spheres and circumstances in life, he must have afforded every one of them *originally*, sufficient powers of attaining a degree of happiness and perfection suited to his capacity; and, though every one has so much freedom in the use of these powers, that he may make himself miserable, yet the perfections of God are not thereby sullied, nor the general good of his creation impaired.

6. By reason we are further assured, that this SUPREME BEING, who exerted his perfections in creating mankind, that he might communicate to them happiness and perfection, and who has allotted them the capacities mentioned, and circumstances of being, with free powers of action to improve all for this end, must continue still to exercise these his perfections, by *superintending* them, in the way of his *providence*, for their preservation and direction in order to this end, so far as is consistent

consistent with the original free powers and constitution he gave them.

Thus, 1. He must be in all times and places intimately *present* with every one of them, and acquainted with their most secret thoughts and actions, and the use they make of their several powers and advantages. 2. His

power is always exercised in ordering circumstances, and what we call second causes, for their behoof, in a way agreeable to their natural liberty, so far as he sees that they are proper objects of his favour. 3. His

goodness, or benevolence, must be continually exerted, for contributing to their happiness and perfection in the way just now mentioned, as long as they carry on the order and end of nature, and retain any of those resemblances of his moral perfections which he enabled them to acquire. 4. His *Holiness* must be

manifested in a continual complacency and satisfaction with such of his rational creatures as, in the use of their free powers and capacities, carry on the order and end of nature, by cultivating a resemblance of his moral perfections; and in a displeasure with such as counteract or deviate from all these. 5. His *Justice* must be displayed by rewarding or punishing, either in the present or in a future period of their being, such as thus study to please or displease him; nor can we imagine it agreeable to his perfect holiness,

and to the justice of his moral government and administration of the world, to pass over the smallest transgression of his law, without a *satisfaction* proportioned to the demerit of the offence.

As therefore all men must be conscious to themselves of many failures, trespasses and offences against God, and of their coming far short of that rectitude, purity, and conformity to the divine will necessary to happiness; (whatever has been the original cause of this impotency and depravity,) notwithstanding which, we cannot suppose it agreeable to God's goodness to make us all unavoidably miserable: In this case, I say, our *reason* is at a stand, and unable to discover how God's goodness can be exercised towards us, in a consistence with his justice and the order of his government. A particular *revelation* from himself is the only thing that can satisfy us here, nor is there any other *revelation* but the CHRISTIAN that does it effectually. The light, therefore, which it gives us, in this intricate case, is as follows:

1. That God created mankind with powers sufficient for obtaining that happiness and perfection which were the end of their being; but that these powers were disabled by a great and *universal depravation* in the persons of our primogenitors, the influence of which, both by
natural

natural and positive appointment, reaches all their posterity.

2. That, to repair this *breach* in the moral world, occasioned by the abuse of the original free powers with which God endowed mankind, and to enable them, on their present footing, to obtain that happiness and perfection, which are the end of their being, without counteracting the order and justice of his government; He sent his SON, the *second Person* of the adorable GODHEAD, to appear among us, that, by submitting even to a painful and ignominious death in our nature, he might give him satisfaction for our offences, and us an example of a holy and unblameable life, with a clear, distinct, and forcible account of our duty and way to happiness through him, setting before us the *terms* on which we are to have an interest in his satisfaction for our undeniable offences against God, and transgressions of his law. These *terms* are as follows,

(1.) *Humility*, or a due sense of our own inability, in the present state of our nature, to obtain happiness in the favour and enjoyment of God; acknowledging our many deficiencies, and even our wilful, deliberate disobedience and neglect of what we know, or may know to be his will. In consequence of our having a sense of all this, *christian humility*

implies our not relying, for the attainment of the ends mentioned, on any *merit* * or abilities of our own.

(2.) *Sorrow and contrition*, or a hearty concern for this our disobedience and offences, in consequence of the sense and acknowledgment of them now mentioned.

(3.) A *sense* of our *need* of God's interposition in an extraordinary way, for rectifying the depravity of our nature in its present state, providing an atonement or satisfaction to his justice for our disobedience; and so, in fine, enabling us, notwithstanding all our deficiencies and offences, to obtain happiness in his favour and enjoyment.

(4.) A full belief and persuasion, that the *extraordinary person*, who appeared in the Jewish nation near eighteen centuries ago, under the name of Jesus, who led a virtuous, devout, and unblameable life himself, publickly taught and enjoined the same to others, professed himself to be CHRIST, the MESSIAH, (long before prophesied of, and then expected by the Jews) the SON OF GOD, co-eternal

* The most perfect and innocent creature can *merit* nothing at the hand of God, from whom its faculties and perfections are all derived; much less can a sinner *merit* his *favour*, so that, when any conduct or duties are mentioned as necessary in order to it, they are to be considered as qualifications or conditions of obtaining it, and not as giving any claim of right to what is much more free and unmerited than ever any *act of grace* was from an earthly sovereign.

eternal, and co-existing with the Father, and appearing in the nature of man, that therein he might satisfy God's justice for the offences of mankind, make them reconcileable to him, notwithstanding their transgressions of his law, and give them an example of a virtuous and holy life, with precepts for cultivating it; who wrought many undeniable miracles to prove his mission, and finally died and rose again, in completion and confirmation of it: We are, I say, to have a full belief and persuasion of his divine mission, as the SON OF GOD and SAVIOUR OF MEN. But to have only heard of these *Terms* of Salvation thro' him, and to have no objection to them, is not sufficient (as some would seem to suppose) for recommending us to the favour of God; there must also be a cordial acceptance or application of these terms, and compliance with them.—We must therefore

5. *Acquiesce in*, and *rely* upon the atonement and satisfaction he has made to God's justice, and his consequent mediation or intercession for us; as without this the effect of it can never be applied to us in particular.

6. All this must be accompanied with a constant, uniform, and sincere resolution of *Obedience* and *Amendment*, in conformity to his doctrine and example, (both in what respects the *Precepts* of his law, and the *Institutions* of

his gospel) to the utmost of our power, tho' we are not to rely on such obedience for attaining the favour and enjoyment of God.

3. By the *Christian Revelation* we are further taught, that, as there is but *one Godhead*, or Divine Nature and Essence, in this there are *three Persons*, to whom all the perfections already mentioned belong; but that they have different offices or relations with respect to mankind: The 1st, that of their common *Father, Creator*, and Preserver: The 2d, that of their *Redeemer* (as formerly explained): The 3d, that of their *Sanctifier*, applying to them all the effects or benefits of Redemption, and recovering their nature from its present depraved state, to a resemblance of the divine, in moral rectitude, and evangelical purity.

To these peculiar doctrines of the Christian Revelation, we might likewise add (in the sense that shall be explained in our last Dissertation) the assurances we have not only of the *Immortality* of the soul, but likewise of the *Resurrection* of the body, with a more particular account of the nature and manner of our future *Judgment*, and the different events or conditions of good and bad men, in consequence of it.

II. The notions which reason and experience, as well as revelation, give us of OURSELVES, and our *Relation* to the DEITY, are as follows:

I. We

1. We are conscious to ourselves that we are beings endowed with certain *Powers* or *Faculties* of perceiving, thinking, acting, reasoning, discerning, distinguishing betwixt actions and dispositions, and reckoning some of them good, and others evil, both in a natural and moral view; also chusing or refusing, pursuing or avoiding them accordingly.

2. We are convinced that our being and faculties mentioned, had a *Beginning*, and must have a higher original than any series of second causes we can trace, so that they must be derived from that FIRST CAUSE, or supreme, infinitely perfect Being, whom we have described, and likewise continually preserved and superintended by him, in all their circumstances and operations, in such a way as that (tho' we cannot conceive the manner of it) his regard and direction does not encroach upon the free powers of action he has given us, as necessary for the ends of trial, improvement, and government, in our present state; hence then it follows, that we depend on him for all that we have and hope for, and that, in ourselves, we are utterly weak and destitute, insufficient for our own support, happiness and perfection.

3. From the ideas or conceptions we have of the supreme Being (as formerly mentioned) it appears that the *end* of his *creating* us, with such powers and faculties, must be to communicate

communicate to us his own happiness and perfection in different degrees, according to the different capacities he thought fit to endow us with, or the rank he gave us in his creation, and thereby to make the glory of his attributes, natural and moral, the more conspicuous: So that, from the account given of the divine nature and will, it appears,

4. That the great *End* we should have in view, above every thing else, is, to *please or serve God*, by such an employment and improvement of the faculties he has given us, as appears most agreeable to him, most perfective of our natures, and of that system he has placed us in, and most conducive to that happiness which lies in his favour and approbation; the sense of which, or that reflex pleasure from it, necessary to the enjoyment of him, does, in this state, result from the impressions or intimations made of his favour, through his influence on our own *Reason and Conscience*, giving testimony, as to the state of our minds, that they are properly affected, or disposed with respect to God and man, and our conduct regulated accordingly, in an entire conformity and submission to his will; but, so far as, in the present state, we are wanting in this conformity, so far our happiness must be incomplete, and therefore the completion of it is reserved for a future period of our existence.

5. From

5. From these natural notions of our being and faculties, of the Author of them, and his end in giving them, it follows, that we must suppose every man to be endowed by him *originally* with those powers and capacities that are *suited* to his *State*, according to his order and sphere in nature, however much he may differ from other men, or from superior intelligent beings in the extent of these. The powers, by which men are distinguished from inferior beings, go under the common name of *Reason*; this every man is endowed with, and has a natural impression of its right to direct him, and superiority over his other principles of action; nor can we doubt of its dictates (when fairly and impartially exercised) being agreeable to the will of our Creator, who imparted it to us. The *other principles* implanted in us are called Senses, Appetites, Affections, and Passions, which have all their usefulness in our present frame and state, for discerning the qualities of objects, or exciting to action, but so as they must be kept under the government of reason, improved and exalted by religion; that is, by the regard due to God in the whole of our conduct, agreeably to the manifestations he has made to us of his nature and will.

6. From our ideas of God's justice, and the order of his government, we cannot but conclude ourselves to be *accountable* to him for the manner

manner in which we use those powers and advantages we derive from him, for the ends for which they were given; so that he must *reward* or *punish* us accordingly, which, as he does not in this, he must do in a future period of our being.

7. Thus far man has been considered as to his MIND or SOUL only, and its powers; from a view of which, and their operations, we must conclude, that the intelligent principle they belong to, must be of a different substance from those material beings we see around us, and in its nature permanent and immortal; but we find it intimately connected with, and as it were, infused into a material composition, of a changeable, perishing, and corruptible nature, which we call a *Body*; by whose organs and members, it perceives and operates upon *outward* material objects, and, from the use of them, can derive *inward* moral improvement, but which is, of itself alone, incapable of those moral habits that constitute true happiness; adventitious, as it were, to us, and not what we properly call *ourselves*; nor can we, for one moment, be secure against its change or dissolution.

8. Tho' we cannot pretend to assign all the *reasons*, for which our Creator thus united rational and immortal souls, to gross material and corruptible bodies, for a certain time;

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one of them, that concerns us most, is obvious, *namely*, that having, by this *union*, senses for discerning, with appetites and propensities for pursuing things external, all tending (if not properly regulated) to lead us off from our supreme and ultimate good; our reason, or superior mental powers, might be put to the *trial* and exercised, in governing aright these inferior principles, and turning our attention to those moral habits and exercises, in which true happiness lies; in disengaging us from external sensible things, with which we are connected only by our *Bodies*, and directing us how to value and pursue them, in subserviency to the happiness and perfection of our *Souls*.

9. Whatever the condition of human nature was, when first formed by its Creator, in respect of the rectitude of all its powers and principles, and their proper subordination one to another; it is plain that now the authority of the governing faculty *Reason*, for the direction of our conduct, is so much impaired, that complete happiness, in the present state, is unattainable; nor can we, without a supernatural interposition of the DEITY himself, for the renovation of our minds, and expiation of our offences, expect to arrive at it in a future state; from which, therefore, appears the necessity

cessity of the *Gospel Revelation*, and compliance with the terms of it, as formerly set forth.

III. Thus far we have been only endeavouring to investigate the nature of true happiness, and to clear the way to it, by considering what ideas or conceptions we are, by Reason and Revelation, taught to have both of God and of *ourselves*, and the consequent *relation* in which we stand to the *Deity*: But we must now come somewhat closer to the point, and consider what duties and dispositions, with respect to him, result from this relation, and are necessary to be attended to and cultivated by us, if we would be approved of by him, or obtain that sense of his favour*, in which true happiness consists.

The duties which have respect to our fellow creatures, shall also be considered, as having the divine sanction to establish them, and the discharge of them never better secured and encouraged, than when a regard to the divine will influences to them.

1. Then, what deserves to be recommended here, as a proper preparative for every duty that has respect to God, is, our maintaining

* Not as meritorious of his favour, or giving any title to it, but as conditions or qualifications necessary for enjoying it.

raising an habitual VENERATION, Reverence, and Regard for him, and every thing that concerns his worship and service, giving him that esteem and adoration, due to the supreme Lord and Sovereign of the Universe, supreme (as we saw) in perfection, as well as in authority, and laying instantly aside all such regard to any of his creatures, as interferes with what is due to him.

2. HUMILITY is necessary, or a just sense of our own meanness, weakness, and utter insufficiency for what respects either our own being, support or happiness, without the assistance and influence of the Deity, on whom we depend for all we have and hope for: Such a sense of this as, tho' it does not lead to any thing mean and debasing of our nature, yet hinders the overvaluing, or thinking highly of ourselves, for any advantages we may be thought to enjoy above others of our fellow-creatures, in respect of natural endowments of mind or body, birth, fortune, honour, and the like; as considering, that we owe none of them to ourselves, but to the unmerited goodness of our Creator; and that, whatever share of these we have received from him, there are others to whom he has given more, and yet we do not think they have any merit by this, but rather the more to ac-

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count for, in respect of its application to the great end of their being.

This *Humility* becomes man in his most perfect state, and so differs from that kind of *Humility* formerly described, which becomes us as *Sinners*, in consequence of our offending God, is previous to repentance, and attended with shame and sorrow, not here implied. The *Humility* here described, is one of the most natural and becoming dispositions any limited being can be possessed of, and most necessary to his happiness, as being an excellent foundation for every devout disposition and duty, particularly these we are next to mention, as

3. **CONTENTMENT**, or an intire complacency and satisfaction with that rank or sphere of existence which God has thought fit to assign us in his boundless creation, the natural powers and capacities he has given each of us for acting in it, and all these outward circumstances of life, pleasant or painful, which he sees fit to allot us, being convinced that he orders every thing for the best, in respect of the whole, and in respect likewise of ourselves in particular, if we endeavour to use aright the powers and advantages we have, which, however small they may seem, are intirely unmerited, and might, we must own, have been smaller.

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This *Contentment* lies chiefly in the restraint of our *desires* after every kind of outward good, and the difficulty of practising it arises either, on the one hand, from the want of that humility formerly mentioned; or, on the other, from the difficulty of moderating such desires, without abating the diligence necessary in the way of duty; but this will be sufficiently secured, if the happiness formerly described, becomes the chief object of desire, and consequently a regard to God, and desire of pleasing him, the chief motive to action.

As contentment has its foundation in humility, it leads to

4. **TRUST in GOD:** His presence, his providence, his perfections, (as formerly represented) all concur to make him the proper object of our highest trust, without that danger of disappointment which we often meet with from weak, changeable, and limited beings like ourselves; from these, therefore, it must be withdrawn, if we would place it aright upon God, and look, in every thing, to his ever-ruling hand and invisible influence, reposing ourselves (as it were) intirely on him, and resting satisfied, not in clear cases only, (for here it is an easy matter) but also in such as are dark and intricate, of his attention to our interests, by ordering every thing that

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respects us for the best, in the way formerly mentioned.

This trust in God will lead us to banish all unnecessary cares, and moderate these that are necessary, to fix our attention on the great end of our being, and lay aside anxiety about inferior and temporary interests, as what will most certainly be provided for, so far as is consistent with this end ; so that, even when duty calls us to the use of means for our own relief or supply, we should trust in providence for the event, and be prepared for, and reconciled to it, whether seemingly favourable or not, as in all temporal pursuits we are uncertain which of the two may, in the event or issue, be best for us, *success* or *disappointment* ; but an entire reliance on God for this, and firm persuasion of his knowing and appointing always, what will, in the issue, be best for us, leads us to

5. RESIGNATION, or *Submission* to his will, in all the appointments of his providence with respect to us, acquiescing in them as always wisest and best, and exercising *Patience* and *pious Fortitude*, under all the seeming evils, disadvantages, and distresses we suffer, or are liable to ; as being persuaded, that the all-wise and merciful Ruler of the world, knows best, and pursues most steadily what is for the general good, and for the interest of each individual ;

vidual; that the happiness of a good man, will be secured in all events, and these incidental evils compensated, and made means of promoting it; chearful *Resignation* to them is, therefore, both our interest and duty; as, on the other hand, the consideration of our deliverance from them, and of all the comforts we derive from God, should engage us to

6. GRATITUDE, or a sense of the divine goodness, manifested in *giving* us the being and faculties we have, also, in *preserving* and supporting them, and still more in administering what is necessary for our happiness and perfection, without any merit that can be pleaded on our part for engaging to it.

Such are the distresses, which many labour under in this life, and which all are liable to, that our grounds of gratitude to God must be extended beyond the mutable objects of the present life, and must have respect to mental or spiritual enjoyments, present and future, before this gratitude can be steady, uninterrupted, and well founded; but when it is thus founded, and affectionately exercised, it is a motive to obedience, most amiable in the sight of God, and most delightful to ourselves, for it leads to, and is inseparable from that principle, habit, or disposition, which is, of all, the most conducive to our resemblance and enjoyment

enjoyment of God, and union with him, and that is,

7. **Love to God**, operating in the way of desire, delight, complacency, and acquiescence in him as our supreme good and portion, and arising from the consideration of his unbounded and unmerited goodness, which is so diffusive in its influence, and communicative of happiness and perfection to all intelligent beings; arising also from the devout consideration of his other amiable moral perfections formerly mentioned, and the expressions or manifestations of them in his works, as distinguished into those of *Nature*, of *Providence*, and of *Grace*; the last of which, having respect to our souls, and the recovery of their happiness and perfection, through the mediation of the **SON of God**, and influence of his **SPIRIT**, it must, of all, be the most worthy of our attention, and the importance of all the rest to us must depend upon their subserviency to this.

From the due contemplation therefore, of all these, and their effects, as extending to each of us in particular, that *love* to God arises, which engages, unites, and assimilates the soul to him, disposes for obeying, and qualifies for enjoying him; that is, for enjoying that happiness, which arises from a sense of his favour, or reciprocal evidences of his
love,

love, impressed upon and manifested to the soul: But in order to its being thus engaged and devoted to God, and an ascendancy given to his love, there must be

8. A devout *disengagement* * from the world, that is, from all these outward sensible and transient enjoyments, whose influence extends not to our future happiness or misery, and which, even at present, are not satisfying to the soul, nor perfective of it; yea and also a disengagement from, and superiority over, all those pains and calamities, which are of an outward nature, have respect only to this life, and can neither hurt nor pollute our souls. It is not by starts, nor from some particular objects, (which perhaps lie not much in our way) that this disengagement is to be practised, but it must be rational, habitual, and unreserved, not so as to forbid any attention to the necessary offices, or even innocent amusements of this life, but to raise our minds above it, to make us look down, with a kind of indifference, on every thing external to the mind, with which we are connected only by its union with the body, and the passions and appetites that have respect to it; and from which consequently we must be separated by our

* The nature of this religious disengagement from the world, is treated of more particularly in the sixth Dissertation.

our disunion from the body, so that all those pleasures and pains which extend no farther, scarcely deserve any regard, while our supreme happiness in the favour and enjoyment of God, is not affected by them.

In this habitual *disengagement* from external things, as sensual pleasure, wealth, power, fame, and every false species of happiness formerly mentioned, so as not to indulge the desires after them, nor be elevated by the acquisition, or disquieted by the loss of them. In being thus, as it were, superior to all outward pleasures and pains, consists the two cardinal virtues of Temperance and Fortitude, or the just government of those appetites and passions, pleasant or painful, here given us for exciting to action; but which are safe and useful only so far as they are thus governed by reason and conscience. Hence then we come to mention another duty, which is of particular consequence to happiness, and on which all the rest depend, *viz.*

9. The right use of our superior powers or **REASON**, in regulating all our actions, and affections, or motives to action. This is the voice of God within us, and obedience to it is obedience to him who gave us it, and who will require no more of us than it requires and discovers (either by itself, or through the light of revelation) to be agreeable to his will.

will. The proper exercise of it lies in inquiring into, and being well acquainted with our own *nature**, and the Author, and end of our being, (as above traced) examining fairly the nature of every object of pursuit, and its tendency to this end, so as to pursue or reject it accordingly. Thus, for instance, we shall find, upon such a rational examination or inspection, that external good and evil have no intrinsic value, and deserve no regard, further than as the improvement and true happiness of the mind is affected by them.

How reason is to be exercised, in all the particular occurrences of life, needs not, nor can it be specified, but its dictates will always be obvious, if attended to, even with that deliberation which is consistent with action; and when it is exercised with respect to the morality of our own actions, it takes the

name

* This implies knowing the end of our creation, and; not only the nature and powers we have in order to this, in *common* with others, but likewise that *particular* character, constitution, and temper of mind in which we differ from them; it being, perhaps, as rare to find two persons agreeing in this, as two plants or trees, or any two natural bodies of the same form and magnitude. Our infinitely wise Creator has given every one of us his peculiar talents and capacities in life; these we have reason given us to find out, occupy, and be satisfied with, and though they should seem to be inferior to those of others, yet, when properly applied, they may lead equally to that happiness, which consists in the *favour* of God who gave us them, and who never will call any man to account for a talent that was not given him.

name of *Conscience*, without the approbation of which there can be no happiness.

Notwithstanding, however, these *occasional* dictates of reason and conscience, it would be of no small use for the rational and consistent conduct of life, to lay down some fixed principles of conduct for yourself; either more general, running through the whole of life, or particular, respecting particular parts of it, easily deducible from the former, and adapted to particular circumstances and conditions in which you may be placed. He that does not thus act from fixed principles of reason, or according to its uniform, and even occasional dictates, but is determined by variable motives of humour, fancy, passion, or caprice, can never depend upon himself, nor be depended on by others; being, as it were, the sport of every temptation. But the acting thus habitually, steadily, and uniformly, from a regard to reason and conscience, requires,

10. Resolution and steadiness, for adhering firmly to their dictates, in every action and circumstance of life: Without such resolution and steadiness, neither the best laid schemes, nor the best natural dispositions will be of use to us; and a man may make himself very unhappy, even in this life, from an immoderate desire or aversion to things, which
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reason would teach him to despise. The best way of acquiring such resolution for acting rationally, conscientiously, and consistently, is by frequent reflection on the superiority of reason to every other principle of action. *Faith*, indeed, rises higher, but must be founded on it. We may also reflect on the superiority of that happiness, which arises from the approbation of reason, to that which arises from the gratification of passion, fancy or appetite, when leading off from it, or even to that which arises from the approbation of the world; for it speaks the testimony of God himself in our favour, and is a kind of participation or resemblance of his own happiness, which consists (as was formerly described) in the contemplation of his own perfections and operations, regulated and approved of by the reason of his own all-perfect and eternal mind.

In these two, *reason* and *resolution*, accompanied with a nice and quick discernment of the propriety of actions and characters, lies the whole art and conduct of life, and particularly, that *self-command*, which consists in giving reason the command of all our thoughts and actions, and which, where the discernment or sagacity above mentioned has respect to common life, constitutes the cardinal virtue of PRUDENCE.

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MOST of the duties above mentioned have a more immediate respect to the DEITY *; but those that respect our *fellow-creatures* in society, are equally required by him, and consequent on the former. They may be all comprehended in the general term of BENEVOLENCE † to all around us, or a constant desire and endeavour to promote their happiness. If this god-like disposition, this true resemblance of the divine goodness prevails, it will not fail to exert itself in the following acts.

1. JUSTICE in giving every one his due, or what he has a right to, and shunning every thing that has the least appearance of unfair dealing or injustice.

This comprehends *equity*, or doing to others as we think it would be reasonable they should do to us in like circumstances, whether law obliges to it or not; also *sincerity*, a virtue that has chiefly respect to men, and requires a conformity betwixt our sentiments and the outward expressions of them, so far as others have a right to their being communicated, without desiring to impose upon others, in respect of our own character and conduct, even where faulty or blameable. The practice of this sincerity is also recommended with respect

* See more of all these Duties in the first Dissertation.

† Loving our neighbours as ourselves, as our Saviour expresses it.

spect to God, because that, though it is evident to all that nothing can be disguised or concealed from him, yet when insincerity grows into a habit, it will insinuate itself even into our conduct towards God. Under the head of justice we might further mention *veracity*, or a regard to truth, *i. e.* to what we believe to be truth; also *Integrity* and *Honesty*, which have respect to rectitude of intention in general. As for what is commonly called *Honour**, it seems to consist in a regard to Character; rather than Conscience, Law or Interest, and is a virtue only so far as it falls in with our ideas of justice in any of the other forms mentioned. Next to justice we may mention,

2. *CHARITY*, as implying not only a disposition to relieve the indigent and distressed, but likewise the being kindly affected and disposed with respect to all men in general, rather favourable than harsh in judging of them, and ready to communicate to them according to our ability and their necessity. Thus under the head of charity, we may comprehend

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sympathy

* The dictates of *conscience* (when rightly informed) are fixed and immutable, the laws of honour fluctuating and variable. Baron de Montesquieu's idea of these laws, and of the importance of this principle in monarchical forms of government, deserves attention and further examination; it does not however fall much under our present notice, but the nature and office of *conscience* is of such importance, that we have made it the subject of our first Dissertation.

Sympathy with the afflicted, *compassion* to the miserable, *meekness* and *forbearance* towards the injurious, *good-will* and *humanity* to all without exception. These have all respect to such duties, as, though not strictly binding on us, yet are natural, becoming, and necessary to make human life comfortable. Of the same nature, though in a less degree of obligation, is *generosity*, when we go farther than even justice or charity requires in communicating; or, in dispensing sometimes even with our own rights in favour of others; in which may be comprehended *liberality* and *bounty*, and to which may be added that disposition to pay others all the respect due to them according to their distinctions of rank or merit, and their relations to us, which some express by the name of *courtesy*, and which, in this view, may be considered among the offices of justice due to others, though the right to it is not so perfect as to amount to a moral obligation.

When mention is made of *communicating* to others, as a part of the offices either of justice or charity, we must always consider it as comprehending whatever has respect to the *improvement* of the mind, as well as to the outward accommodation of life, it being no less acceptable to God, and conducive to the real interest and happiness of men.

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The duties which result from the various relations natural or incidental, in which we stand to others, are evidently comprehended under some of the heads or branches already mentioned, and their obligation plainly founded in the will of God, who placed us in these relations, and has therefore made a regard to them necessary, in order to our having that enjoyment of him, or sense of his favour, in which true happiness consists.

After thus enumerating the duties and dispositions, which do most naturally result from those notions of God and of ourselves formerly laid down, and a regard to which is necessary to our being happy in his favour; the following *considerations* will be found of no small importance, in order to our obtaining the happiness mentioned in consequence of them.

1. In order to the uniform discharge of our duty or regulation of our conduct, it is necessary for us to have some *one rule or principle* always present with us, for directing and exciting to action, in such a way as appears most conducive to our attaining that sense of God's favour, in which we saw that the true happiness of all his intelligent creatures consists; and that principle, which, of all, seems most effectual and conducive to this, and which we may always, upon the smallest reflection, call to our aid, and have present with us, is an

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uniform desire of *pleasing* God, or a regard to his will, as always intimated to us, by the reason of our own minds, or conscience, assisted and enlighthned by revelation: While we have the testimony of this in our favour, it should be our endeavour, to have our happiness as independent as possible on all outward circumstances, events, or advantages, and particularly on the opinions of men, which, though a restraint very useful to society, where no higher principle takes place, is, by no means a moral or virtuous tie, or a proper foundation of happiness.

2. Another consideration, of the high importance to happiness, is, that as, after all our endeavours of conforming our hearts and lives to the divine will, by such a regulation of our temper and conduct as has been described, we must all be sensible of many shortcomings and offences against God; there must therefore be a humble and incessant application to him for *pardon*, in the manner formerly mentioned, as set forth to us in the *christian revelation*; and, upon such an application for pardon, and consequent return to our duty, and reconciliation to God through the merciful offices of our Redeemer, we should beware of questioning his favour, and thereby impairing or interrupting that happiness which arises from the sense of it.

3. As the highest perfection of an intelligent being consists in the conformity, chiefly of its moral powers; *i. e.* the will and affections, to the *will* of God, the sense of whose favour thereupon, constitutes its happiness; it is necessary to observe, that this conformity has a respect, not only to the *doing* but likewise to the *suffering his will*; for there may be cases assigned, of such depression and distress, as scarcely to leave room or ability, for the exercise of any active virtue, with respect to others, and yet, we cannot suppose, that, even in these cases, true happiness is unattainable; it must therefore here arise, from that conformity to the divine Will, which may be called *Passive*; *i. e.* in the way of suffering or submitting to it, with that patience, resignation, and dutiful acquiescence in the Will of God, which becomes his reasonable creatures,—and which, we may be assured of his beholding with an eye of favour and regard.

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2. Another consideration, of the highest importance to happiness, is, that as, after all our endeavours of conforming our hearts and lives to the divine will, by such a regulation of our temper and conduct as has been described, we must all be sensible of many shortcomings and offences against God; there must therefore be a humble and incessant application to him for *pardon*, in the manner formerly mentioned, as set forth to us in the *christian revelation*; and, upon such an application for pardon, and consequent return to our duty, and reconciliation to God through the merciful offices of our Redeemer, we should beware of questioning his favour, and thereby impairing or interrupting that happiness which arises from the sense of it.

3. As

3. As the highest perfection of an intelligent being consists in the conformity, chiefly of its moral powers; *i. e.* the will and affections, to the *will* of God, the sense of whose favour thereupon, constitutes its happiness; it is necessary to observe, that this conformity has a respect, not only to the *doing* but likewise to the *suffering his will*; for there may be cases assigned, of such depression and distress, as scarcely to leave room or ability, for the exercise of any active virtue, with respect to others, and yet, we cannot suppose, that, even in these cases, true happiness is unattainable; it must therefore here arise, from that conformity to the divine Will, which may be called *Passive*; *i. e.* in the way of suffering or submitting to it, with that patience, resignation, and dutiful acquiescence in the Will of God, which becomes his reasonable creatures,—and which, we may be assured of his beholding with an eye of favour and regard.

PART III.

Means of forming the Temper for Happiness, and avoiding these occasional Disquietudes, by which it is often impaired or interrupted.

WHAT we have to suggest on this head, shall be in the way of *Directions* drawn from *Experience* and *Observations*; for more of which, we beg leave to refer, not only to the *Sacred Writings*, but even to some ancient moralists, particularly *Epictetus* and *Seneca*, and to what every one may gather from his own experiences in life, if carefully digested and reflected on.

As much of our happiness, or unhappiness in life, depends upon the government of the *Passions*; we have, in another *Treatise**, of a different form, endeavoured to bring all that is material on this subject, into one connected scheme or system; and have likewise subjoined a *Dissertation*† on such of them

* A view of the Human Faculties and Passions, entitled, *The Heart Displayed, &c.*

† See the following Dissertation on Desire, &c.

them as have most connection with the subject of this.

In the view in which we considered the *supreme happiness* and perfection of Man, as all centering in the DEITY, i. e. in resemblance and obedience to him, and consequent impressions of his favour, it seems abundantly evident, that true happiness is, in this light, more accommodated to men of all circumstances and capacities, than in any other light in which it can be considered; it does not depend upon the number or superiority of our talents, but on the proper exercise and improvement of them; it is therefore within every man's reach, it is attainable by all; but, from this we must not conclude, that there is no difficulty in the attainment; the more valuable any object is, there is commonly the more difficulty in this; let us see therefore by what means this *difficulty* may be surmounted, in the pursuit of an object, which is, of all others, the most valuable.—The

1. Mean which we shall mention, and which is indeed of all the most effectual for this purpose, is PRAYER, or humble, sincere, and devout applications for the influence of that merciful BEING, from whom all happiness and perfection are derived, who is always intimately present with us, knows the various avenues to our hearts, can, in an ineffable manner,

ner, diffuse into them happiness or misery, has compassion on the weak, takes vengeance on the wicked, offers pardon to the penitent, sees and encourages every motion in our souls towards him, and requires our making such applications to him, but communicates his aid in such a manner, as not to supersede our endeavours by doing violence to our mental faculties. Doubt not therefore the efficacy of *Prayer*, through the mediation of your Redeemer; scripture declares, reason testifies, and experience confirms it.

Not that we can inform God of any thing he knew not before, or move him to act otherwise than he has determined, and is agreeable to the eternal rules of right and equity, but as it evidences the feelings of our own minds, and tends to establish them in a humble and firm dependence on his providence, conformity to his will, and resemblance of these perfections we adore, so far as they are communicable to us.

It is not, therefore, any outward posture or expression of devotion, however becoming in their own place, or any long stretches of spiritual contemplation, (which some perhaps may be incapable of) much less a repetition of certain forms, however elaborate, which we here distinguish by the name of *Prayer*, but every effort of the soul to maintain a *spiritual*

ritual intercourse with its Creator, in the way of humble prostration before him, adoring his perfections, contemplating his works, acknowledging his mercies, confessing and lamenting every act of undutifulness to him even in our thoughts, studying an habitual regard and conformity to his will, and imploring his pardon, direction, assistance, and acceptance, through the mediation of our adorable Redeemer, (in the manner formerly explained) even the eternal Son of God, and Saviour of the world.

It may, however, not be improper to observe, that, even with a firm belief of three persons in the GODHEAD, we should carefully maintain such an idea of *Unity* in the object of our worship, as may prevent its being divided, weakened, or corrupted.

Next to that frequent, humble, and habitual intercourse with God, now spoken of, in acts of mental or verbal devotion, by which some prelibation (I may say) of the joys of Heaven is poured into the soul; a

2. Mean of elevating it towards God, and forming it for that happiness, which arises from the sense of his favour, is MEDITATION, not such as requires always retirement from the world and its occupations, (tho' this also may sometimes be necessary) but the accustoming ourselves to think rationally, seriously, and devoutly, on the various objects or events

events that occur to us, particularly such occurrences as respect ourselves, so as to draw from them some mental improvement, or such habits and impressions as may be any way conducive to the due regulation, the comfort, and happiness of our souls.

Let reason be never so much convinced of the importance of any object, yet till it is often viewed or dwelt upon, so as to make an impression on the mind, it will never have any practical influence, in the way of forming the heart, or regulating the life. That these truths, therefore, which we all acknowledge, may make such an impression, and have such influence, every reflection must be indulged that casts up for this purpose, either from your present course of thoughts, or the objects you happen to be conversant with.

Thus, there is seldom any thing you can be employed about, or conversation you can be engaged in, but will afford you an opportunity (if you attend to the light in which right reason represents them) of reflecting on the shortness and inconstancy of all that can be enjoyed or suffered in this life, on the blindness, folly, and weakness of the wisest men, and their need of a firm and habitual dependence upon God; on the corrupt state of mankind in general, and their partial, imperfect, and often unjust views of things, arising

sing from the prevalency of ungoverned passions, wrong habits, and corrupt inclinations, and their attending to the light in which these represent objects, rather than to the dictates of right reason and revelation, with respect to them.

Take all occasions of reflecting on what is the real state of your own mind, and establishing it in a right temper, avoiding what may unsettle it, and taking care that self-partiality or passion, prevent not your having a just view of yourself, of what needs to be corrected, and what to be confirmed, and bringing your temper, affections, principles, and motives of action, to the test of reason and religion; consider how your time and thoughts are generally employed, in what light your present employments and pursuits will appear to yourself at any future period? how they would now appear to others whom you esteem, and, above all, whether they are pleasing or displeasing to God? For on this depends your happiness; and what avails even the success of your pursuits, if it does not increase your happiness here or hereafter: Or what think you, are the pursuits and attainments that do now most avail those who were once your fellow sojourners in life, and are now removed before you?

However

However enthusiastick it may appear to those who are much immersed in sense, yet it is certain that reason itself, and much more revelation, will justify your looking to the divine interposition in all that concerns you, past, present, and future; that is, your looking above all second causes or instruments, to that supreme, intelligent over-ruling cause, by whom they are all regulated and influenced, (in an intire consistence with the laws he has established, and the powers he has given his creatures) maintaining an habitual sense of his presence and providence; *feeling*, as it were, his *Divinity*; taking, asking, and hoping every thing from him, aiming at nothing so much as a conformity to his will, and consequent sense of his favour, and making no account of any other object of Love, of Trust, of Hope, or Fear, in comparison of him.

Improve every opportunity of impressing your mind with just notions or apprehensions of God, and your relation to him, with the duties flowing from these, (as formerly set forth) think often on the nature and condition of your life here, its end, value, and importance with respect to a future and eternal state, for which you are designed; on the powers, capacities, and circumstances God has seen fit to allot you, for acting your part in this life; how much it is your duty and interest

to be contented with them, and make the best use of them, which is all that falls to your share, God having ordered the rest as he saw for the general good.

For establishing your mind in a right habit, it may be of use even to extend your reflections to the invisible world, the certainty of your removal to it, and the different conditions of men there. Reflect on the scripture representations of all these, as being not only agreeable to reason, but like wise the language, as it were, of God himself to us, explaining what reason was at a loss for, viz. the nature of his kingdom, government, laws present and future, dealings with mankind, and the manner of being reconciled to him, through the mediation of his Son.

Much might be said on each of these particulars, but it is not our present design to enlarge on them, but to suggest them as instances of what subjects it may be proper for the mind often to reflect on, till they make a due impression upon it, give you right apprehensions of things, and raise affections suitable to these; and if once the proper affections prevail habitually in your mind, you need not fear their influencing practice, and you will have that reflex enjoyment of them which arises from a consciousness of right affections;

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and consequent approbation of God and your own mind.

We may further observe, as to these, and the like subjects of reflection, which are most improving to the mind, and form its temper for true happiness, that no refined speculations, no bright efforts of genius, much less any outward distinctions or advantages are necessary to our having the proper apprehension and impression of them; they are rather the subjects of sentiment than speculation, and are level to all conditions and capacities.

Nor will the indulging such reflections encroach so much on your time and necessary engagements in life, as may at first be imagined, if you only keep your mind ever open for entertaining them. Attend to whatever may suggest them, and dwell on them, when any way suggested, till they become more familiar to the mind, make some impression on it, and have more easy access to it afterwards. For this purpose, you may at least allow them the several intervals of time, in which you will be sensible that the common concerns of life do not require your immediate attention, or give much employment to your thoughts, (which you will always easily judge of) and if, to make way for them, and allow them proper time, place, and influence, you endeavour to banish all the trifling, vain, useless

less thoughts and reflections, that offer to intrude themselves, and to suppress immediately such as your own mind condemns as displeasing to God. How these are suggested it is not our present business to enquire; but experience sufficiently testifies how liable the unwatchful mind is to them, and how much time and thought are thus thrown away to its ruin, which, if rightly bestowed, might make us wise, virtuous, and happy.

After all that has been said upon the subject of Happiness, and our endeavour to bring it, as much as possible, into one point of view, clear and comprehensible to all, founded in reason, and established by scripture and experience; yet, as there may be some, to whom our method of proceeding hitherto may appear too formal and systematick for a subject of this kind; and who, having no doubt of the truth of all that has been said on it, want, not so much to have their reason further satisfied, as to have something suggested in the way of advice or direction, and suited to allay, though not every disquietude and disorder in life, yet at least some of them to which they are more habitually liable; or which may stand more particularly in the way of their improvement and happiness;

Book

For the satisfaction of this class, therefore, we shall now depart a little from the methodical way of proceeding; and, what may be farther offered, shall be in the way of

MISCELLANEOUS Observations and
Directions, respecting the comfortable and consistent Conduct of Life, with practical Conclusions and Resolutions in relation to it.

In this way of proceeding no further connection is necessary, than that whatever is suggested have some relation to the principal subject in our view, to *Happiness*, as our ultimate end; and that it be justified by experience, without having recourse to any nice deductions of reason with respect to it; what has been advanced in the first and second parts of this Dissertation, being sufficient in the argumentative way.

Here we may add further, that, as much of our comfort or disquietude in life arises from our intercourse, in the way of conversation and society, with one another, it may be expected, that a good many of the following observations shall have particular respect to this. But we shall offer any thing that occurs
in

in the way of advice or direction promiscuously, tho' thereby the same subject may sometimes seem to be repeated, or represented in different points of view; according as in one or other of these, it may seem most likely to strike or impress the mind.

1. LEARN never to consider any thing that has respect to *this life alone*, as *essential* to your happiness, not even *life itself*, if a higher end requires your resigning it, and so you will never be uneasy in the want, or transported with the possession of any thing in it. But

2. When, after all, any thing in this life is like to disturb, delude, or ensnare you; reflect on the shortness and uncertainty of its continuance, and the infinitely small proportion it bears to the whole of your duration.

3. Allow nothing to disturb your quiet, while your own *Conscience* approves you, for this is God's testimony in your favour, and it is he only who can make you happy.

4. When you enjoy most of outward *Prosperity*, you are in most danger of misplacing your happiness; but, if even then you give

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God

Hic murus abineus esto,
Nil conscire sibi, nulla pallescere culpa.

Hon.

Be this thy brazen bulwark of defence,
Still to preserve thy conscious innocence;
Nor e'er turn pale with guilt.

FRANCIS.

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Be this thy brazen bulwark of defence,
Still to preserve thy conscious innocence,
Nor e'er turn pale with guilt.

FRANCIS.

God the preference, you will have the more easy access to him, and confidence of his favour in your distress.

3. It is of unspeakable consequence to your happiness, improvement, and the proper regulation of your conduct, to form just ideas of the SUPREME BEING. Some think their natural notions of him are so refined and exalted, as to have no need of any assistance from Revelation; but it is remarkable, that, whatever ideas might have been attained of his other perfections by the light of nature, it never led, even the wisest philosophers, to form just notions of his *unity* and *holiness*. Infidels may now refine as they please, and inveigh against any thing that looks like a limitation of the divine mercy, nor indeed ought we to limit what the most innocent and perfect of mankind have so much dependence on; but it is certain, that whoever believes that the eternal Son of God underwent the most grievous sufferings, for which no sufficient reason can be assigned but that it was to expiate the sins of mankind, must be convinced, that there is in *Sin*, or *moral evil*, something of *malignity* and *contrariety* to the divine nature, will, and government, beyond what the refined moralists we mentioned, are at present willing to admit, and which behoved to be removed, before way could be made for

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for the exercise of mercy to the transgressors of God's law.

6. As we cannot account for what we feel in ourselves, or, the existence of what we see around us, without supposing the existence of God as the cause or author of all, no more can we account for the existence of the *Christian revelation* and its effects, without supposing that the author of it existed, and did many extraordinary things for establishing it; if this therefore be a fact, past dispute, and, if any one of these things, much more if the whole of them be admitted, How can his testimony be rejected, or what need we go about to argue, whether such a revelation be necessary and fit to be submitted to? unless we suppose that God did what was unnecessary, and what deserved no regard or submission to it.

7. True religion does not consist so much in abstract reasoning, as in sentiment and feeling, not in speculation, but in affection, in the impressions and emotions of the heart. The least grain weight of *improvement* as to the heart, is of more value and consequence to happiness, than the highest attainments in science, honour, reputation, or any worldly acquisitions.

8. The best support under the seeming evils or afflictions of life, is to consider that they are

are from God, and most certainly designed by him for wise and good ends.

9. If you would have your ease and happiness in this life durable and steady, you must build it upon a durable and steady foundation, such as you are sure God has put always in your own power, and enabled you to secure. It cannot therefore be any outward attainments, such as power, wealth, and human applause, nor even any personal advantages of health, strength, wit, beauty, and the like; for these are all precarious, and may fail you, after you have done your utmost to secure them; but the only sure foundation of happiness and joy, is to have God approving you, through your own conscience, or the reason of your own mind, calmly and impartially reviewing itself, and testifying that you are rightly affected or disposed with respect to God and man, and have endeavoured to regulate your life accordingly, in the use of these advantages, abilities, and opportunities, which God has given you, or seriously repented and implored his pardon through Christ, where you came short.

10. The resolution, therefore, which you should lay down to yourself, for the direction of your conduct in life, is to have always a steady attention to the great end of your life, that end for which your Creator gave you the being.

being, faculties, and advantages you have, and which you must be carrying on through infinite ages; of this you may now possibly have but a very imperfect conception, but you have all that is necessary in your present state; you know that it requires your loving, honouring, and serving God, conforming in every thing to his will, and studying to promote his wise and merciful designs among men, to *do them all the good* you can according to your abilities and opportunities; in a word, to endeavour the making yourself and all around you happy in the justest sense; and, for this purpose, consulting and strictly obeying reason and conscience, as the informer of what is good on all occasions or emergencies, and what not; and, in fine, trusting in God's pardoning mercy through Christ amidst your many deficiencies and offences.

Some of the following reflections are founded on this; for;

11. If *doing and being good* be the end of your life, and you do your best in pursuit of it; Why should any disappointments, as to other things, that have no connection with this, (such as power, fame, health, riches, honours, and the like) give you uneasiness? God knows best in what station and circumstances you can get *most good* done to yourself and others, and will infallibly place you in them, and distinguish

guish you finally, not according to your present circumstances, but your behaviour in them; not according to your present talents, but your improvement of them. For the same reason,

12. You need give yourself no uneasiness on account of any defects or disadvantages that are consistent with innocence, and which you cannot remove. Every one has the same in some shape or other; perhaps they are necessary to your higher improvement or accomplishment, and that God gave them for that end.

13. *If doing and becoming good* be the great end of your life, and you want to have your attention steadily fixed on it, learn to keep your mind disengaged from every thing that either draws off from this, or has no relation to it, and let transient incidental events and pursuits have only a transient attention given to them.

14. You may depend upon it, that no criminal pleasure will ever balance the pain, even of remorse that succeeds it, especially in times of future distress and affliction, when the dark side of every thing casts up.

15. If you be sensible of your improving in the habits of virtue and goodness, formerly mentioned, let not the want of inferior attainments

tainments (for which perhaps you are not naturally fitted) give you any pain.

16. If you be sensible a thing is right, and that you can and ought to do it, what a shame and weakness is it to let any passion, indolence or want of resolution hinder you from doing it? But,

17. When you have *done your best* in this or any other way, never be uneasy that you could not do more.

18. No man can help his natural disadvantages, but he may make the best of them, and for encouraging to this, it may be warrantably asserted that,

19. Instruction, industry, and good management have (by the divine blessing) oft-times been more successful than great natural abilities and advantages, both in what respects the improvement of the mind, and the accommodation of life.

20. Trust in God, and fear nothing but sin.

21. Follow reason, if you would be thought a rational being.

22. Lay your account with many disappointments and inconveniencies, especially in what depends on the humours of others, and they will the less discompose you.

23. It is a miserable thing to have your ease and happiness in the power of others.

24. Trivial

24. Trivial events are often readier to discompose the mind, than those of greater importance, because it is generally at less pains to prevent or avoid discomposure from them; but,

25. The mind is always in danger when unsettled, hurried, or discomposed, and it is much easier to prevent this than to remedy it, easier to keep the heart in a right frame, than to recover it when lost.

26. The love of God, and regard to his will, are the best and steadiest foundations for all the social and amiable affections towards men; for, even in doing good to others, an apprehension of merit or returns of service, gratitude, and approbation on their part (which are all uncertain) will never be a constant and invariable motive of action, unless there be a regard to God, and our common relation to him.

27. Cultivate an entire insensibility or indifference to the praise or dispraise of any but God and your own mind.

28. If ever you would please God, or have access to him, banish these three, pride, insincerity and impurity.

29. Humility is one of the most necessary qualifications for true happiness, and for every kind of improvement: We are not however to understand by it, any thing mean or

abject,

object, but such a sense of our own weaknesses and imperfections, as may make us bear with those of others, and view ourselves in the same impartial light that we do them.

30. *Humility* is likewise one of the best supports under afflictions or disappointments.

31. Cultivate an habitual good-will, complacency, and kind affection to all around you, and, if to this you join humility and disinterestedness, you'll not probably fail of gaining their affection and regard, as all duties are reciprocal. But,

32. Be noways concerned about the opinions of others, while you are conscious to yourself that you do what appears to you right, or follow reason; so that, whether they approve of you or not, they *ought* to do it.

33. Let not even your *miscarriages* discourage you from renewing your endeavours after higher improvement and happiness; a *partial* reformation will rather lay a foundation for more disquiet, by one passion succeeding another, and often reviving it, and rendering former resolutions abortive.

34. Expect not to attain *self-government* without *self-denial*; this is that *moral aversion* or restraint of the vicious passions, recommended by the antient moralists, as necessary to clear the foundation for virtuous affections

and dispositions, and that pleasure which arises from their exercise.

35. An *equal temper* of mind is necessary for leading life quietly, comfortably, and consistently; it lies in having your mind ever steady, composed, and master of itself, its thoughts, desires, passions, and pursuits; regulating them all by reason.

36. If you can get rid of your passion for *praise* and distinction, you'll get rid of most of the uneasinesses and disquietudes of life, without lessening your ability for acting your part in it, or really lessening your share of esteem and affection from others: This passion may be allayed, by considering how ignorant, inconsiderate, and changeable they often are, whose favour and regard is thus courted, and how little even their unmerited neglect deserves to be minded, if the approbation of God and your own conscience be secured.

37. No desire is more universal than that of *pleasing others*, and yet too great an anxiety in this way very often counteracts its own purpose; for no man ever appeared to advantage, who was over-sollicitous about it. But,

38. The more you seem *pleased* and happy *yourself*, on rational grounds, you are the more likely to *please others*; but if you are *not* in good humour with yourself, you can-
not

not easily be so with others, nor will they be much gained by any compliances that seem forced and unwilling.

39. No man is always in the humour of pleasing others, or conforming to their humour; but, so far as he can do it innocently, he shews a superiority over them.

40. The more favourably you are disposed to think and speak of others, it is the more likely that they will do the same as to you.

41. Be not too fond of yourself, your own possessions, pretensions, &c. and you'll the more easily bring yourself to any reasonable compliance with the humours or interests of others.

42. Consider every passion as *unnatural*, which would make your happiness arise from the misery of others, such as envy, malice, &c. which, like unnatural tumours of the body, ought to be extirpated: How much more natural and amiable is it to have the happiness of others contributing to yours? If those whom you envy or hate have good qualities, they are proper objects of your love; if not, (which is seldom the case) they are objects of your pity; before you use them as you think they deserve, consider what would become of yourself, if God should deal with you as you deserve.

43. Be attentive to the *beginnings* of any affection or passion: Various affectionate emotions seem sometimes to arise spontaneously, or at least a tendency to them, when their cause or occasion cannot easily be traced; care should be taken therefore, to cherish the first motions of any virtuous affection, and immediately to check the contrary, in whatever way they arise, or when there seems to be any disposition or tendency towards them, for the work may become much more difficult afterwards.

44. Virtuous principles and affections have this advantage, among many others, over vicious, that a consciousness of the former (even when disappointed of their aim or effect) is so agreeable as to make them their own reward, and that of the latter makes them their own punishment.

45. The fewer passions or interests you have of your own to gratify, you'll interfere the less with those of others, and are the more likely to please them.

46. Vanity, conceit, and immoderate self-love, are the most universal passions, and yet the most condemned by one in another; these therefore you must neither betray nor entertain, if you would be easy in yourself, and agreeable to others.

47. It

Miscellaneous Observations, &c.

47. It is dangerous both to yourself and others, to endeavour stopping the torrent of any passion too suddenly; even when unreasonable and extravagant, it is safer, and more effectual to justify it in some measure, so far as it will, in any light, admit of this, before you positively cross or condemn it; for the extremes of any passion are to be raised or moderated by degrees.

48. Beware of the returns of any passion that has foiled you formerly, but be not discouraged from renewing or continuing your efforts against it, by its revival, after being seemingly mastered, or by an apprehension of your coming far short of the attainments of others in this way; for perfection, in any valuable improvement, is not easily or quickly to be attained.

49. Study to know exactly the real temper, character, and views of those you are most connected with, as well as your own, their good and bad qualities, perfections, and weaknesses; what there is in them to imitate or avoid; approve or condemn, and regulate your conduct to them accordingly, making, however, all the favourable allowances possible, as you would wish them to make for you.

50. Beware of judging rashly with respect to characters, national or personal, from single

acts or habits, for there must be a series or combination of these to constitute a character.

51. Beware of *self-deceit*, and *partiality* in judging of your own actions and character, for the judgment is apt to lean to any side on which the passions are engaged; and they generally are so in our own favour: This makes frequent self-examination necessary, and our considering in what light actions will appear to enemies, as well as friends. In order to judge impartially of our own actions, it will also be necessary, not only to put others sometimes in our place, and consider what we would think right for them to do, but likewise to put ourselves in the place of others, and consider how we would feel or be affected by it.

52. Cheerfulness, contentment, and benevolence, flowing from a good conscience in yourself, and charitable opinion of the affections and actions of others, will always make you easy in yourself, and agreeable to others; but

53. Your cheerfulness will never be well founded unless you have a consciousness of your highest interest being secured, and the divine favour obtained; without some reasonable hope of this all cheerfulness is foolishness, and mirth is nothing but madness.

54. Generally

54. Generally speaking, young people are most disposed to please others, old people to please themselves. Both these dispositions (if properly regulated) have their foundation in nature and reason: The young have their character, and perhaps their fortune to acquire, and have thereby the more dependence on others, and must conform the more to their humour; but it is at an age when their own is more easily moulded. The old, on the other hand, are weary of this task, and have less occasion for it.

55. The desire of pleasing is a very useful and amiable principle, when it is properly regulated; but, when not, may be a very corrupt and pernicious one. You may sacrifice your own humour, and even your interest, to others, but beware of sacrificing to them the interests of religion and virtue.

56. Endeavour to be really what you would have others think you to be, and sensible of your deficiencies where you come short. These two particulars will recommend you more than the most plausible and artful mask you can wear.

57. While you court the favour of the foolish, the vicious, or corrupt, beware of becoming so yourself.

58. Most men are generally seen in some disguise; but there are times when they are apt

apt to forget it or lay it aside, it is then that their real characters are to be discerned; and hence some advise the examining or observing them over a glass, when there is most of unguarded freedom imagined in dependence, and security from the consequences of a discovery; How to make a proper use of such opportunities as these, let the men of the world, the men of art and dexterity, determine: I would only observe, that there is no way in which such information will best be obtained, as may give light into mens real characters, than, after a more numerous company breaks up, by associating yourself with one or two of the most intelligent and sagacious among them; reckoning themselves to be then in a manner alone; after leaving the crowd, they will be apt to disclose their real sentiments of the actions and characters of those in whose company they had been.

59. Last night your midnight slumbers were disturbed by the city watchman's* rap at your door, followed by the disagreeable call of *twelve o'clock in a cold cloudy night*: your blood thrilled at the sound, and any pleasure it gave was from the thoughts of your not being exposed, as he was, to the inclemency of the season: What a different sensation did you feel,

* This refers to the nightly call of the watchmen in London, and some other cities of England.

feel, when, a few hours after, you heard him pass in the same way, and, with a voice seemingly enlivened, notify to you the approach of *three o'clock in a sweet May morning*. If you are not formed for contemplation, you will not think of connecting or moralizing on these nocturnal intimations, so different from one another; if you are, you will naturally think on their quick succession, and consider them as emblems of the varieties of providence.

60. The seeds of *virtue* and *vice* are originally in every mind, and its being determined towards the *former* rather than the *latter*, seems to depend upon a vigorous effort of *reason*, divinely, as it were, influenced, and pushing it to the summit of virtue; where, the longer it maintains its ground, it stands the easier and firmer.

61. There seems to be, as it were one, and but one, particular point or station, from which our view of human life, through all its windings and vicissitudes, together with the propriety of conduct suited to these, appears always uniform and consistent. This may be called the station or summit of *truth*, elevated, clear, and serene, from which you may, calmly and safely, take a prospect of the wanderings, mists, and tempests, in the vale of *error* below.

62. It argues a noble mind, to disdain low artifices in prosecuting your designs.

63. The gains of falsehood will never compensate the meanness of soul contracted by stooping to it; it is like alloy in coin, may make the metal work the better, but embaseth it.

64. To bear sudden and unexpected shocks, without seeming to be startled or discomposed, indicates a stayedness and firmness of mind, fit to be cultivated and admired.

65. Nothing tends more to cramp and corrupt the mind, than the idea of a servile dependence on the humours and passions of others; where superiority of understanding, or real merit appears, such dependence on it, and submission to it, is a great mean of improvement; but an impression of dependence, that has respect only to things external, to favour, power, or profit, debases the mind into a mean compliance with even the false views, and corrupt sentiments of others, and naturally throws an air of mean slavish constraint and dependence on the outward behaviour; there is no avoiding all this, if a great value be put upon these external acquisitions or prospects now mentioned; as no man, however elevated in station, can avoid some dependence on others for such objects as these; so that, the only way to prevent the above consequence

consequence effectually, is to banish all ideas of the importance of outward things, unless so far as the use of, or attention to them, contributes to the improvement of the mind, and conforming it to the will of God.

66. The man who flatters himself with the hopes of drawing a prize, when there are ten blanks against him, has almost as much reason to expect success, as the writer or public speaker, who expects universal, or even general applause, as the reward of his labours; for, besides the different views and interests that may be against him, a few imagined inaccuracies or inelegancies of expression, or even a few instances of uncouth pronunciation, will be enough to draw censure from many, and take away the merit of all he has done. What then? you will say, Should I never attempt to write or speak, with a view to the benefit of others, or my own? Yes, sure, when duty calls, but seek only the approbation of God and your own mind; and if, in a consistence with this, you can have any approbation from the sober, the virtuous and intelligent, let it not be despised.

67. To that religion, in the way of which I expect eternal salvation, there is not at present one objection in my view, to which I have not such an answer as it admits of, or at least such as satisfies me, after all the enquiry
I could

I could make. What a treasure then am I possessed of? Had the same over-ruling providence, which appointed my birth and habitation in Britain, ordered its being in Lapland or Tartary, it could, no doubt, have likewise put me in the way of getting the same information, but the obstacles to it would have been so many, as to make my attainment of it very improbable; and, even granting that all the evidences for Christianity, now engaging my belief of it, had been there laid before me, it is probable I would have had many more objections to it, and be much less disposed to have them answered; I would then, in that case, have wanted what I now consider as the highest treasure upon earth.

Is the Laplander, therefore, or Tartar, to curse the Author of his being, because he gave not this treasure to him? No, sure! he sees no grounds for this, he sees cause to bless him; but have not I more? or may I make light of my advantages, as being what I could acquire for myself? or because others can exist without them?

The man who, without any labour of his own, comes to the possession of a vast fortune, acquired by the wisdom and industry of his father, may possibly say, Had I not thus come by it, I would have acquired it myself; but is there not a much greater

greater probability that you would not? and, if I should not, you may reply, Is a man to curse his father, because he did not acquire an estate for him? No, sure! in this you are not mistaken; but, if you should squander the estate he has left you, in hopes of making up another, if you should despise and abuse it, because you came so easily by it, I would pronounce you a fool. Whatever way, therefore, you have come by the evidences of *Christianity*, in its purity, if you thus despise and reject it, I pronounce the same sentence on you.

68. One night you surveyed the moon, when moving in nocturnal majesty, you saw the heavens beautifully bespangled, with innumerable shining orbs around, to the utmost extent of your view, your heart seemed to exult at the prospect, you adored the hand that formed them, and felt serenity and peace.

Next morning you saw the sun, rising as it were from his chambers in the waters, clad in all his radiant glories, and shedding his bright enlivening influence on the inferior world; you found yourself still more transported by this, no thought remained but of happiness and joy: You know, indeed, that it is, in itself, but a lifeless mass; and what you admire and celebrate, is the Almighty

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hand that formed it for your use, and adorned it in all its gorgeous array.

Another night soon succeeds, and brings with it a cruel fit of the cholick or asthma, the day comes on apace, and finds you labouring for life; the moon moved, and the sun rises as formerly, but they are no more to you than if they did not exist, in respect of the transports of viewing them. What are you to learn from this? many things, particularly three:

1. That true happiness is within, and the influence of every thing outward various and fluctuating.

2. That God is to be blessed for having made us capable of deriving intellectual enjoyment, with innocence, from outward objects; and, still more, when he prevents or removes whatever may mar our relish for them.

3. That tho' even the pleasures of fancy, properly governed, may be innocent and transporting, yet there must be supposed a happiness beyond them, less liable to interruption.

69. Twixt meanly sinking into a level with the brutes, by subjection to every appetite, and emulating the angels by a superiority over them. Twixt taking the side of the infernal spirits, by yielding to every diabolical passion, and cherishing the beginnings of hea-

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even in your soul; the original difference lies only in this, To which side is it your *will* to turn? One vigorous beginning, one act or effort of your *will*, divinely, as it were, influenced, casts the balance in favour of all that is God-like, virtuous and glorious. There is no doubt but this act of the will must be reiterated, and the divine aid implored, till habits of virtue and true goodness are formed, yet let one manly effort be thus made to emancipate yourself, and every repetition of it will make the work easier.

70. Many fall into more blunders and mistakes in the conduct of their affairs than others, not so much for want of foresight and knowledge, as for want of a quickness and firmness of resolution in regulating their conduct according to the foresight and knowledge they have. I thought so, say they, from first; true! but you acted as if you had no such thought.

71. For pleasing in conversation scarce any general directions will much avail; The doing and saying every thing naturally and easily, without either affectation, presumption, or diffidence, never fails of success; but for directing to this, your own judgment and discretion, or a certain natural taste of what is decent, becoming, and agreeable, in even the minutest circumstances of your conversation

and behaviour, is the best guide you can get, and will direct to what suits your own character and humour, and those of others, according to the difference of times and circumstances; but there must be a quickness in exercising this, and steadiness in conforming to it; for an opportunity lost cannot be recalled, or an impropriety in conduct easily forgot.

72. *Diffidence of yourself* may be as hurtful to you, tho' not so intolerable, as *Contempt of others*. The former may be prevented, by thinking on the failings of others, the latter by reflecting on your own.

73. The knowledge of the world consists in a nice discernment of different characters, and suitable management of them, chiefly in the way of observing what it is that you approve or disapprove in others, and either cultivating or avoiding the same yourself.

74. When another throws out any reflections against you that give you uneasiness, consider fairly, whether they be just or not; if they are just and well founded, why should you blame the person who makes them? Perhaps he exaggerates, or at least your self-partiality may make you think so; but still,

if

* Nothing is a greater hindrance to our behaving with that ease and propriety now mentioned, in all cases, than a servile imitation of others, whose manner of speaking or acting may be natural to themselves, but not to us.

if you have a consciousness of some foundation for them, apply yourself first to remove this; or, if it is rather your misfortune than fault, and what you cannot remedy, learn to bear it with patience and equanimity, drawing from it all the moral improvement possible to compensate it; and, if it is an error in conduct, resolve to retrieve, rectify, or repair it, when future opportunities offer: But, if you are conscious of no just foundation for the reflections thrown out against you, the approbation of your own conscience should prevent their giving you any pain; and if it prevents this, your enemy will be disappointed, and your superiority over him testified by forgiving and disregarding, though not always despising him.

75. While you are conscious to yourself of exercising fairly and honestly that share of *reason and common sense* God has given you, for the direction of your common behaviour in life, you need never doubt of their suggestions being agreeable to the *common reason and sense* of mankind in general; nor allow any diffidence of this, or fear of the event, to hinder your venturing to act agreeably to them, and enjoying that satisfaction you may have in *self-approbation*, even when you are not successful, or encouragement when you are; for,

76. There is a certain *conscience* (as it were)

or faculty of discerning what is fit and un-
fit to be done in the *common conduct of life*, which
is given every one for directing him even in
the smallest offices or concerns of it, whose sug-
gestions seem as it were intuitive, which can
be always easily consulted, and ought to be
so, and whose approbation should satisfy him,
as much, in the management of these *lesser*
concerns, as that of his *higher* conscience (if
I may so call it) should do, in those of higher
and moral importance. But,

77. Beware of such *long deliberation* about
lesser matters as may draw off your attention
from *higher*, and, where conscience plainly op-
poses you, all *deliberation* is dangerous*.

78. Though a proper confidence in your
own reason and judgment be necessary, and
to may prevent your losing *opportunity* by wait-
ing for advice from others, yet neglect not
any occasion of receiving proper information
and advice from *others*, resolving at the same
time to judge and act for yourself, as you
can scarcely expect, that another will enter
in to your views, or have sufficient attention
to your character and interest where his own
are in no way concerned.

79. If

* It is the observation of an ingenious and elegant Poet.
The *Woman* that *deliberates* is lost.

This observation may, in many important cases, be ex-
tended to all persons, without exception of sex or station.

79. If you are conscious to yourself of your having the proper *affections* towards those with whom you have any intercourse or connection, you need be in no pain about your *actions*, nor fear their corresponding with these affections that most prevail in you, and discovering them to others, who will rather be suspicious of your not having them, if you appear too attentive to the outward expressions of them, and will seldom approve or disapprove of you for any action, but according as it appears to indicate your affection: Thus, if you are conscious to yourself of *benevolence* and *good-will* to all around you, never mind what you do, in the way of anxiety about its acceptableness to others; you may depend upon it, the affection itself will lead you to such actions as are the indications of it. Thus it is with cheerfulness, contentment, complaisance (or a desire of obliging in the most minute things) respect, deference, gratitude, and the like; when any of these possess the mind, they will lead to suitable actions and expressions of them; but when they do not, it is vain for you to expect that you'll be thought to have them, or be judged of from what you *are not*, but from what you *really are*: nor have you a title to any more. On the other hand, if the odious passions or affections, as pride, ill-will, sourness, peevishness, discontent, and the like, prevail,

prevail, you may be assured, they cannot long be concealed or disguised, your very looks, gestures, and expressions will betray them.

80. When you want to meditate on what is *spiritual*, abstract your thoughts, as much as possible, from every thing *sensible*; I had almost said, endeavour to consider yourself as a *pure spirit*.

81. Whatever derives its importance to you only from its connection with the *body*, deserves little attention unless so far as the *mind* may be either corrupted or improved by it. In any other respect,

82. Let it be an established maxim with you, in what respects your *body*, to give yourself no manner of pain about the management of it, further than to be conscious to yourself, that you have, in every particular instance, done what appeared to you best (or, at least, the best you could) to keep it in a proper state for executing the commands of the *mind*, or making it subservient thereto. In every other respect, resolve firmly never to entertain an uneasy reflection on what is *past*, or an uneasy apprehension of what is *to come* in relation to it.

83. Upon a proper estimate of the real importance of outward things, it may be said, that tho' one must often comply, in some measure, with

with the apprehensions commonly entertained of them, yet there are some objects and events which attract much the *temporary* attention, and even admiration of many; and yet, being of no lasting value or real moment and importance, they should rather be considered by a wise man as objects of *amusement* than of *serious regard*. Some entertainments of the *imagination* and *political* projects, or pursuits are of this kind.

84. Beware of arguing *seriously* about *trivial* things, or *trivially* about these that ought to be always *serious*, as where the interests of religion and virtue, and the supreme happiness of men are concerned. If you attempt to argue with *triflers*, let it be about *trifling* things; for, when once engaged, you must either fall insensibly into their way, or draw them over forcibly to yours; the last of which, however honourable, is too difficult to be often expected.

85. The mention of *faith*, *grace*, and *love to God* will appear strange to some, that of *virtue* and *morality* to others, but a candid inquirer into truth will use such expressions as appear to be most proper for illustrating and unfolding it.

86. If any work be useful and practicable, never let the view of its taking a *long time* hinder your attempting it; for this is an obstacle

state that will be always lessening and removing.

87. As our dependence is on God for the the dispositions and feelings of the *soul*, as well as for our outward circumstances; a humble and constant sense of this dependence on him, an entire devotion to his will, and sincere application for his *grace*, or the aids of his *spirit* to regulate the temper of the *mind*, is the best way of improving in every good habit.

88. It is only in the way of God's free *grace* and mercy through a mediator, that a sinner can expect any of these blessings he stands in need of; but they may, upon proper application for them in this way, be as firmly depended upon, or more so, than even what we call *natural endowments*.

89. Men's *humours* and views are *variable*, but the qualities of actions and objects invariable; that your view of them therefore may be uniform and consistent, let it be taken at such times as you are most disengaged for this purpose; or when you are sensible that you are most likely to judge coolly, clearly, and impartially: At such times, therefore, accustom yourself to write down the deliberate deductions of your reason, and your observations on these subjects that are most important to your happiness in general, and to the proper discharge of the duties of any particular

lar office or station you are placed in; such remarks, though they will not always have the authority of rules for your conduct, yet will help to give you always just views of persons and things, and lead you to act accordingly.

What is here recommended might be exemplified as it suits a variety of conditions and offices in life, but one *example* will suffice for rules, which those who are in the *ministerial office*, and who have its great ends sincerely at heart, will be naturally led to collect, and they will find the benefit of them.

As the proper regulation of the *affections* is what we have all along had chiefly in view, what we are now first to adduce for illustrating and exemplifying our last observation, is the *affections and views*, which one who is engaged in the sacred and important office now mentioned, will, upon mature and serious deliberation, be led to consider as suited to him, particularly in his *public ministrations*, and fit to be cultivated accordingly.

Your own mind, if you are thus engaged, will approve or suggest to you such as these.

An *ardent zeal* for the honour and glory of that God, in whose name you are called to speak, and whose will you declare, your adorable Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier,

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A *servant love* for your hearers, and desire of instructing and converting them, rather than getting honour or applause to yourself.

An *intire disregard to yourself*, and your own glory or interest, in comparison of the above exalted aims.

A *consciousness* of your having something to say, that is truly of the highest consequence to your hearers.

A *consciousness* of your practising, or sincerely resolving and endeavouring to practise, yourself, what you recommend to them.

A *consciousness* that you have done your utmost to *prepare* yourself for this important exercise.

An *ingenuous candour* and openness in all your sentiments, principles, and behaviour, so as you would not be ashamed or afraid to lay open your heart and conduct before all who hear you.

A *strict attention* to every minute particular you proceed to speak of, and *affections* answerable to it.

A *fearless indifference* arising from no vain conceit of yourself, or contempt of your hearers, but from the firm persuasion of God's *presence* and *assistance* in his own work, after you have done your best to prepare for it, and from your regard to the *censures* or *applause*

plause of men being intirely swallowed up in your regard for the honour and glory of God.

Other *affections* might be mentioned as fit to be cultivated by a preacher of righteousness, upon gospel principles, according to the various *publick exercises* in which he is engaged, but the above (with what we had formerly occasion to suggest) will suffice, as *examples* of what every one may for himself collect and digest, putting together in the same manner such particulars in the way of direction as are suited to the above exercises; a few of which may likewise be here added, as follows,

Spare no pains necessary in preparation, but in all your preparations, let *prayer* be your chief resource; let every word flow from your *heart*, and your heart be committed to God. Thus,

Conscious of having done all you could in the way of *preparation*, repose yourself intirely on him, and seek only to approve yourself to him.

Let all the burden or toil of *preparation* be ended in such *time* as that your mind may be quite easy, free, and disengaged, when you come to deliver your sentiments and instructions.

Deliver your mind on the subjects proposed, as if you had never wrote on them, but had

only considered them thoroughly, was much impressed with their importance to yourself and hearers, and left it to the affections and sentiments of your heart to dictate suitable expressions. Beware of suffering your *thoughts* to wander, or your *attention* to be in the least dissipated, or drawn off, by any thing foreign to the work you are about.

Never, if possible, allow yourself to be in the least *hurried* or *discomposed*, whatever should happen; but while you are in the way of *duty*, be assured of the *divine aid* and protection. Never proceed one step farther, on any point, than as you see the way *clear* before you; nor think that, by many words, you can illustrate to others that of which you have no clear ideas yourself.

As little can you expect to bring others to the practice of what they see yourself disregard.

Throw off all other regard to men except the sincere desire of doing them good.

Let a sense of the *divine presence* lessen the importance of every other object in your eye.

Give the glory of any success you have entirely to God.

If you would be in a *right frame* or disposition for preaching or any religious exercise, endeavour to keep in a good frame at other times. 1. Let nothing engage you to do what may in the least wound your conscience.

2. Suppress

2. Suppress and resist even every thought that seems to have a tendency this way. 3. Be watchful over your *senses* or the avenues to the soul, lest any thing enter that may deface good impressions or communicate bad. 4. Let no worldly thing have any more than a *transient* reception or admittance to your heart, and (if possible) be intirely indifferent about the event of it, only, when you are called to act any part in relation to it, consider and do what appears to you best. 5. Let God be in all your thoughts and an *union of soul* with him maintained. 6. Let all your addresses to God and expectations from him be through CHRIST your REDEEMER.

90. What *principles* or *rules of conduct* you have once thoroughly established, and approved of, in a clear, composed, and unprejudiced state of mind, and are conscious to yourself that you have exercised your reason fairly and impartially in considering; never, if possible, allow yourself to *doubt* or deliberate further about, but let them be steadily adhered to and followed, without calling them in question at any time, much less when your mind is not in the same cool disengaged state.

You cannot begin too soon to form your temper and conduct in this way, for it will be infinitely easier to do it before bad habits are acquired, or indolence and irregularity

indulged, than afterwards; nor can you be too careful, after gaining some ground in this religious and moral improvement, to maintain it, it being unspeakably easier to go on equally and uniformly, than to recover, when fallen from your former diligence and steadfastness.

You should also endeavour to enjoy the *comfort* of those reasonable principles and rules which you lay down and follow, by being (as indeed you have cause) perfectly *easy* in yourself, when you act or think according to them, (be your outward success as it will) or, with penitence, resolve on immediate reformation, when you have at any time neglected it.

Nor should you be in the least uneasy, tho' your method and rules should not be universally proper and agreeable, or always approved of by others, if you be but conscious to yourself, that to you they appear most suitable to your particular circumstances and condition. You must however resolve, not to content yourself with barely *thinking* over these principles, but you must, in the different circumstances that occur, resolutely persist in *impressing* them on your *heart*, and, by steady practice, confirming them, and making them, as it were, *natural*, which will not be so difficult as may at first be imagined; for
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the outward circumstances and inward state of mind, to which these principles are suited, do often recur, and point out the same measures of conduct to be often practised or repeated. It may however not be improper, on some occasions, to bring them into a narrow compass as possible, and form such *practical resolutions* thereupon, as appear of most importance to your happiness here and hereafter. For *exemplifying* this likewise, we shall conclude this *miscellaneous* part of our dissertation (as was promised in the beginning of it) with collecting the

SUM, &c. of the *religion, faith, and practical resolutions* which any serious inquirer may draw from the whole, and digest for himself as the *deliberate deductions* or conclusions of his reason on these important points mentioned, in manner following :

I am firmly persuaded that I *exist* and *act*, and have an inward principle of *thinking* and reasoning given me for the direction of my conduct.

If I follow the direction of my *reason* (assisted by the *revelation* given me of God's will) in believing and acting, I can do no more, and know that there will be no more required of me.

Upon examining how I myself and every thing around me came to *exist* and *act*, I must, according to the fairest exercise of reason I

am capable of, conclude, that there is a *supreme*, intelligent, infinitely powerful, wise, just, and good BEING, to whom we are all indebted for our being and support, whom we call God, and whose very name should be mentioned with the most profound reverence and awe.

I am persuaded that this God is, every moment, *present* with me, and with every part of his works; and, as he has given me powers and rules of action, that he *observes* how I apply and follow them, and will call me to *account* accordingly.

I am persuaded that *this state* is but, as it were, the *infancy* of my being, in which I am to improve and prepare for *another*, by doing whatever I have reason to believe God requires of me, and I am sensible that all the view I can expect of God in this state, or intercourse with and direction from him, is by my own *reason* and *conscience* leading to the proper exercise of *faith* towards him, and influenced by his *spirit*, agreeably to the revelation he has made of his nature and will.

Agreeably to these views of God and of my relation to him, and his regard and attention to me, I am resolved to devote myself to him, walk with him, and make his *will*, as discovered to me in the manner now mentioned, the supreme rule of my conduct.

I am

I am persuaded that he wills, and does every thing for the good and order of his *universal kingdom* or system of intelligent beings, and that every thing therein is ordered by him for this end in such a way as is consistent with the laws he has established in it, with his own perfections, and the capacities of action, enjoyment, and perfection he has given to his creatures.

Though I see not the various links of that *chain*, by which the good and order of this *universal mental system* now mentioned, of which I am a member, is advanced, yet the inward approbation which I find myself necessarily determined to give certain actions and dispositions as *good*, makes me conclude that they have a tendency to the end now mentioned, and are, as it were, *anticipations* of the *supreme good*, which I consider myself as bound to pursue, by following the dictates of my own reason and conscience.

I am resolved to *submit*, with cheerfulness and contentment, to whatever the supreme Ruler of all, orders and appoints with respect to me, *satisfied* with these circumstances and talents he allots me, sensible that they are from him, and resolving to improve them in the way that appears most agreeable to his will.

I am

I am resolved to place my happiness in a *first* of his favour and approbation alone, as attainable through the mediation of his son; and, as it is the heart and affections which he regards, my study shall be to have these properly regulated with respect to God and man.

As I thus place my happiness in the favour of God, I am resolved to shake off all other regards that interfere with it, and, as long as my own mind, upon a just review of it, gives me any evidence or impression of this, nothing else shall disturb me.

I am resolved to maintain such a trust in God for all that concerns or awaits me, as shall silence all fear and anxiety on my part with respect to it.

Being fully satisfied as to my *articles of faith and rules of life*, after the strictest examination I am capable of, I am resolved never more to call them in question, but to proceed agreeably to them, in a humble dependence on divine grace. “ Do thou, O God
“ of all grace and comfort bring all these
“ home to my heart; inspire me with
“ every disposition thou approvest of; *forgive*
“ give; for my Redeemer’s sake, my many
“ offences; discover to me, and remove a-
“ ny insincerity in my *resolutions*, and keep
“ me ever steady and uniform in my adhe-
“ rence.

“ rence to them, so as I may never return to
 “ folly. Whether outward comforts are af-
 “ farded or denied, let not my HAPPY-
 “ ness depend upon them, but let God
 “ (who is now the deliberate choice of my soul)
 “ be the strength of my heart, MY PORTI-
 “ ON, AND HAPPINESS FOR EVER.”

DISSER.

DISSERTATION V.

On DESIRE

PART I.

The Origin of DESIRE, and its Modifications, or the Affections most nearly allied to it.

AMONG all the subjects of man's knowledge and speculation, none seems to puzzle him more than what passes *within himself*: His fancy may carry him through all the regions of nature, from the centre of the earth to the most distant spheres, yet lose itself at home, where he is most concerned to know how all is ordered and carried on: To direct him in the pursuit of such useful knowledge, has been always among the chief aims not only of true *Religion*, but likewise of its handmaid, *Philosophy*: By these we are led in-

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to the most retired corners of the mind, to investigate its nature, and the first principles of its operations.

In doing this, though the various enquirers have, according, perhaps, to their different tempers and circumstances, gone into different opinions; this on all hands is agreed upon, that the object of the mind's pursuit, and in which its faculties do all concenter, is **GOOD** or **HAPPINESS**: To this our Maker has implanted in us a certain tendency or inclination, which we call **DESIRE**, in its first and simplest form, as he has also a disposition to fly from and avoid evil or misery, called **AVERSION**: But as we reckon freedom from evil a good, we may, without any impropriety, sometimes speak of them both under the name of *Desire*.

These two may perhaps be justly enough said to answer the same purposes in the moral world, as the opposite forces of attraction and repulsion do in the natural. How necessary ingredients they are of human nature, when under due regulation, and how much they do in some shape or other, influence our actions, needs no proof: What deserves our attention most is, the manner of regulating them for the attainment of the proposed ultimate end, *Happiness*.

The nature of this *happiness*, or what constitutes the sovereign good of man, together with

with the means and manner of attaining it, has been the subject of the preceding Dissertation*; and from what was there advanced, it appears that there are other subjects, nearly connected with this, which deserve more attention than is commonly given them; some of these, therefore, we shall likewise endeavour to illustrate;—but our present enquiry shall be confined to the *Affections*, or various motions of the mind towards Good or Happiness; and one of the distinctest views we can have of them is by tracing that principle, or simple original affection, we call *Desire*, from its source, through all its various modifications, and according to the degrees of strength it acquires in the pursuit of its object; after which the proper regulation and restraint of it shall be considered.

The simplicity of the idea of *Desire*, seems to render it incapable of definition; some call it uneasiness in the absence of good, while others, seeing the impropriety of this definition, have confounded it with the act of volition or chusing, in consequence of this uneasiness; but, so far as we can, from a narrow inspection of the order of our ideas, distinguish these which are so nearly related;—Methinks they may be thus ranked.

First,

* It may be mentioned as a particular recommendation of the account we have given of Happiness, that, by this, it appears to have an inseparable connection with, and in-
 fluence on Duty.—Vide page 36,—53.

First, we have a perception of the object conceived to be good; on this, if often repeated, or much attended to by the imagination, there follows an *uneasiness* in the absence of it; which uneasiness always and necessarily raises an inclination of the mind towards it, or *Desire* after it, if it is thought attainable; and when, by this inclination or desire, the mind is moved in any particular direction towards it, or exercises its faculty of willing in any particular action for the attainment of it, it is called *Volition* or willing.

Thus, when one sees a beautiful house, which he thinks he can acquire the possession of, his perception or idea of it, by repetition, attention, and other causes engaging the imagination, comes to be accompanied with an uneasy sensation in the want of it: On this follows *Desire*; by which, when the will is determined to any action for obtaining it, as buying or asking it of the owner, this exercise of the will is called *Volition*.

All the description then we can give of Desire is, that it is a certain inclination or affection of the mind towards an object or end conceived good and attainable, raised by uneasiness in its absence, and followed by volition, or the exercise of the will for attaining it.

Aversion being the opposite of *Desire*, the nature of it may be understood from what has been said of the other.

These two, *Desire* and *Aversion*, are the only affections, in a strict sense (as distinct from all sensation) but according as the objects of them differ in their nature and circumstances, and are present or future, (for good or evil past raise no affection, unless when the former is considered as a present evil, the latter as a present good); these calm affections come to be diversified, and often attended with confused and violent sensations of pleasure or pain, together with certain natural propensities or impulses towards the object, and perhaps bodily motions, with such an engagement and commotion of the mind as excludes every thing else, even any deliberation and reasoning about our conduct; when therefore any, or all of these, accompany the calm affections, they are modified into what we call *PASSIONS*; because, where these animal emotions prevail, the mind is not reckoned equally free, but rather passive in its determinations. The chief* of these modifications, and to which all

* The whole of them (or, at least, all for which we have names in the English language) are brought into one point of view, and their nature, relation, and government, briefly set forth in our scheme of the Human Faculties and Passions, entituled, *THE HEART DISPLAYED, &c.* to which, by reason of the similarity of the subjects, and for

all the rest are reducible, seem to be *Love*, *Hope*, and *Joy*, and their opposites, *Hatred*, *Fear*, and *Sorrow*; the object of the first three being good, of the three last evil, either real or imagined.

When the object we *desire* * to obtain or preserve, is so reflected on, and its engaging qualities so represented to the mind, that an approbation † of it is raised, and an impression made on the imagination, attended with sensations of pleasure, and some inclination or propensity of the mind towards it as good, we call it *Love*. Of Love there are two general

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general

for avoiding repetitions, we are here sometimes obliged to refer.

* Desire and Aversion are sometimes so simple and uncompounded, that in any scheme or analysis of the affections, it seems indifferent whether they are classed after Love and Hatred, or (as is here done) before them; nor can it easily be said which of them in respect of its extent should be ranked first; for as we love many objects which we do not desire, because not thought attainable, nor any uneasiness felt in the want of them, so we desire many objects, without such a particular contemplation of their amiable qualities, as is necessary to raise Love; and the same may be said of the extent of Hatred and Aversion.

† Approbation and Disapprobation are (in our scheme of the faculties and passions) for the sake of tracing more clearly their different modifications, considered as affections; but they are the simplest of them all, and therefore placed first, being very little removed from mere perceptions. These, with Love and Joy, are the only affections that seem to be suited to a state of complete happiness and perfection.

neral branches, according as we ourselves, or others, are the objects of it: When we ourselves are the objects, it is *Self-Love*, when others are so, it is *Benevolence**. The first the desire of our own happiness, the second of the happiness of others, each of which come to be modified as above, according to their various objects or degrees of intenseness.

The first of these, *Self-Love*, appears under different forms and names, according as the object or means differ which are pursued by it, in subserviency to that private good or happiness which is its ultimate end. Here the happiness of others might indeed be reckoned one of the objects fit to be pursued from self-love, as subservient to private happiness. But as we see that by those natures, in which self-love is found without any indication of benevolent affections, as in most brutes, *External* sensible good is the only object pursued, and that, with rational beings, the more self-love prevails, the more is external good † pursued, while

* As this is not intended for a compleat scheme of the passions, but only such of them as have any relation to Desire and Aversion, we have here made no mention of Complacency, Esteem, Admiration, and many other affections, whose use, abuse, government, and outward indications, are set forth in the large scheme or plan of the faculties and passions, formerly published, of which we endeavour to repeat as little as possible here.

† Hence we find in fact, that no man, whose heart is much set upon external good of any kind, was ever found susceptible

while the happiness of others, as the means of their own, is seldom or never thought of; from this, I say, we may conclude, that the common object of Self-love is *external* good; and though the true happiness of others infallibly promotes our own, yet, wherever it is pursued, even in this light, we may take it for granted, that Benevolence prevails, that the temper is formed to virtue, and consequently the affection of Self-love, as well as every other affection rectified *, and made to co-operate with one another for the general good. It is in this sense, therefore, we must suppose that the learned and pious Bishop Butler takes Self-love, when he makes its object *internal*; for in this sense it has the good and improvement of the mind for its principal object, and labours to promote the same in others, so that it coincides with Benevolence; but when we consider them in the way in which they generally operate, as different from one another, we may take *external* good for the common object of Self-love, in which

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view

susceptible of true friendship, or of any benevolent kind of affections towards others.

* There seems to be one seminal principle (if I may so call it) of vice, as there is of virtue, however numerous their effects; according to the prevalence of the first, the whole habit is depraved; and, where the second prevails, it is in some degree rectified, in respect of every affection and disposition, tho' not complet in each.

view it has four different forms, answering the four different kinds of external good.

When the object desired and pursued is sensual pleasure*, it is called *Sensuality*; when honour, power, and authority, among men, *Ambition*; when riches, it is *Avarice*; and when fame or distinction is the object, it may be called *Emulation*, a word commonly used when we are desirous and active to obtain the same sort of good another seeks after, so that it is applicable enough in this case.

These four modes of Self-love, *Sensuality*, *Ambition*, *Avarice*, and *Emulation*, may be justly considered as general affections; by the prevalency of which four different selfish characters are formed, the general objects of whose pursuit are *Pleasure*, *Power*, *Riches*, or *Fame*; which, according to the different circumstances we are placed in, give rise to, or occasion many different passions, to be afterwards considered.

The other general form or direction in which Love operates is, when *others* are the objects of it, and then it is called *Benevolence*; which appears in many different forms and degrees of intenseness, according to the extent

* With respect to the passions of different ages, it is observable, that the love of pleasure prevails most in youth; love of power and fame in manhood; of riches, and often of life, in old age.

rent and circumstances of its object. Thus, when it is extended to all mankind, yea and all sensitive natures, it is universal calm good-will; when the object is more confined, as to one's native country, the nearest term we have for it is *Patriotism*; if you restrict it further to a family and relations, it is called *natural Affection*. If the object be one who hath bestowed any good on us, and we incline to requite it, our affection takes the name of *Gratitude*. If our benefactor be one who is heartily disposed to do us good, as we are reciprocally to do him, and that we are attached by a similarity of taste and manners, and pursuit of the same common end, virtue and true goodness, the affection is formed into *Friendship*.

Again, the benevolent affection varies, not only according to the extent of the object, but likewise according to the different circumstances in which it is placed, and which may be either good and joyful, or bad and sorrowful. If it is in *joyful* circumstances, we have no word expressive enough of the affection. *Congratulation* being rather a mode of outward civility than of inward affection; nor perhaps

* It was necessary that we should be more affected by the misery of others than by their happiness, because we have it much more in our power to promote the former than the latter.

perhaps is there here any other affection than joy: But when the object is in bad or *sorrowful* circumstances, it is called *Pity*, Sympathy, or Compassion*. Here we may observe the same of the objects of Benevolence, as we did of those of Self-love; that, according to the different circumstances they happen to be placed in, they give rise to, or occasion various other passions, which we shall afterwards consider.

From Love we proceed to trace the modifications of Desire in the Passion of Hope. Thus, when there is a probability of obtaining the object of our desire, there seems to be mixt with this affection some degree of that joy which arises from the actual acquisition and possession of the object. This mixture of desire and joy, accompanied with the confused sensations and propensities formerly mentioned, is called *Hope*, which, when in a fluctuating state, by our being at a loss for the means we should use to acquire the object, making the probability of our acquisition low, is called *Suspense*; but when the probability is thought very high, it rises to *Assurance*.

Thus

* There seems to be a pleasure in the very exercise of compassion, arising partly from the consciousness of feeling a right affection; this pleasure appears from the inclination most people have to see objects of compassion, even when they cannot relieve them, but which puts them in the way of doing it when they can.

Thus may *Desire* be pursued through its various modifications, to the acquisition of its object; after which our affection cannot be said to have in it any mixture of desire, unless we are threatened with the loss of it; when with our fear is mixt a desire of preserving it: But, upon such acquisition of the object, it is succeeded by the pleasing, I might say, passionate affection of *Joy*; for, tho' in its simplest form it be calm, and attended with little perturbation, yet, when it rises high, scarce any of the passions have more of this, or is accompanied with more violent sensations; so that it may be questioned, whether it and *Sorrow* be not peculiar mental sensations of pleasure and pain, rather than affections, and differing from the immediate perceptions of pleasure and pain from the objects themselves, in this, perhaps, that the pleasing sensation of joy comes not so much from a perception of, or a reflection on, the qualities of the object acquired, but from the desires being gratified, and the uneasiness that raised it removed, and so, on the other hand, of sorrow.

We shall not attempt to reckon up the various forms of this affection of *Joy*, they being as numerous and various as the passions, whose gratifications raise them, tho' few of them have got distinct names. The Joy arising from the real, or imagined possession of honour,

honour, or claim to it, if attended with a contempt of others, is called *Pride**. When joy arises from some comical occasion or amusement, it is called *Mirth*; when from a conquest over some considerable opposition, *Triumph*; when it rises high suddenly, *Exultation*; when settled into a habit, *Gaiety* or *Cheerfulness*.

FROM DESIRE, and its Modifications, in the pursuit of good, we come to consider AVERSION to Evil, implying uneasiness at the presence or approach of it, and an endeavour to remove or avoid it. This, in effect, is no more than a desire of being freed from it, such freedom being looked on as a real good, so that Aversion might be comprehended under Desire; but, for deducing the painful passions more distinctly from it, we shall take it separately; and as it is variously modified into the passions of *Hatred* and *Fear*, according to the nature and circumstances of the object, while distant, till its arrival or presence, when *Sorrow* and its modes take place.

When the object of Aversion is often reflected on, and its disagreeable qualities frequently represented to the mind, till the imagination is impressed with them, there arises
a *disapprobation*

* This is only one species of pride; our other scheme (formerly referred to) contains a fuller account of this and the passions related to it, with remarks on them.

a *disapprobation* of it, attended with sensations of pain, and a natural propensity to avoid it, which we called HATRED, and which may be considered with respect either to the object, or to the measure and degree of it. Of this we ourselves never are the objects; the self-tormentor, from this principle of self-hatred, being an uncommon and unnatural character among men. Nor can we imagine others ever to be the objects of this passion, under the form of disinterested *malevolence* or ill-will, when no evil is apprehended from them. The transports of the unnatural passions have indeed some resemblance of such disinterested malice, but are not really such. The proper object then of Hatred is not ourselves or others, but whatever is thought to occasion evil to ourselves or others; and it takes different forms according to the nature and circumstances of the object, and according as the evil apprehended from it is natural or moral: In the first respect, it is modified in the same way as love is, though its modifications have no distinct names, as being easily reducible to those of the other. Thus our Hatred of whatever brings on us pain, dishonour, poverty or contempt, is a consequence of, and falls in with, our love of their contraries, pleasure, power, riches, or fame; and, in the same way, our Hatred of what is hurtful to others, answers the different modifications

erations of love to all beings, to men, to our country, relations, benefactors, and friends.

This passion has likewise different appearances, according as the evil apprehended to ourselves, or others, is natural or moral. If it is the former, we call it *Natural Aversion* or *Hatred*; and when, from any one's particular constitution, this comes always to rise very high in him, immediately on the perception of an object agreeable enough to others, it is called *Antipathy*. If the evil apprehended to ourselves, or others, be moral, the aversion, or hatred to it, is called *Moral*; and when it rises very high, *Abhorrence* and *Detestation*. Thus may Hatred be considered as to its object.

The other modifications of it are according to its measure and degree, when the object or agent occasioning good or evil to ourselves, or others, is intelligent. Thus, if the offence or injury* done us appear great, and our hatred rises all of a sudden, attended with violent uneasy sensations and commotions, perhaps

* As some sensibility of injuries done others is allowable, it cannot be denied that the same is allowable in our own case, to such a degree as would be proper for a disinterested spectator to have, or for ourselves to have, if the case was another's. "Thus far may we have anger without sin;" but when it rises to the degrees after-mentioned, it is sinful and unlawful. Anger is rash or hasty resentment, and resentment is deliberate anger.

haps of body and mind, with a desire of reparation, security, and repelling the injury, it is called *Anger*, and our sense of the injury received, *Resentment*. When anger is attended with a propensity to occasion misery to the offender, without any desire of his recovery, it goes by the name of *Revenge*; which, when settled into a habit, especially if without any just foundation, and if all reconciliation is refused, is called *Spite*, *Malice*, or *Rancour*. In the same way, when an habitual proneness is contracted to anger and resentment on every little occasion, it is called *Peevishness*, and a sudden fit of anger, when it rises to a very high degree, becomes *Rage* and *Fury*.

Some of the modifications of anger, according to the circumstances of the offender, have also got distinct names. Thus, if he is conceived to be inferior to us, an injury from him is termed an *Indignity*, and the sense or resentment of it, *Indignation*. If he is in miserable circumstances, and our passion carries us to insult and afflict him, it is *Cruelty* and *Inhumanity*.

The next general modification of Aversion, and consequent upon Hatred, is FEAR. Thus, when there is a probability apprehended of that evil's coming upon us, which was formerly considered as the object of aversion, there appears to be mixt with this affection some

degree of that sorrow, which arises from the actual arrival or presence of the object. This mixture of aversion and sorrow, accompanied with the confused sensations and propensities formerly mentioned, is called *Fear*, which, when suddenly raised to a high degree, by some unexpected evil, is called *Terror*. Again, when there is any probability of another's obtaining that good which we are afraid to lose, our fear takes the name of *Jealousy*, and, when he obtains it, our *envy* arises, which is a modification of *Sorrow*, that will be taken notice of afterwards. In fine, when we find the object of our fear and aversion, whether loss of good, or arrival of evil, to be unavoidable, it turns into *Despair*.

It is upon the arrival, or certain prospect, of that evil which was the object of our aversion, hatred, and fear, that the third general painful passion of *SORROW* takes place. What we have said of *Joy's* being a peculiar mental sensation rather than an affection, and of the number of its modifications, may be likewise applied to *Sorrow*: Its object, or rather the occasion of its rise (for the respect that good and evil have to joy and sorrow, seem to be rather that of raising or occasioning certain sensations, than being objects of affection): The occasions, I say, on which sorrow is raised, are the presence or approach of evil to ourselves or others. The different forms of

Sorrow

Sorrow arising from the presence of natural evil to ourselves, have no fixt names; and I know only two that have such, even when moral evil is the proper source; these are *Remorse* and *Shame*: *Remorse* arising from a consciousness of our having done any action immoral and unlawful, and, when it rises high, taking the name of *Anguish*. *Shame*, again, from an apprehension of having done something dishonourable, and deserving the contempt of others.

When our sorrow respects *others*, it is either natural or unnatural; *natural*, when it arises from a sense of the evils and sufferings of others, and is called *Sympathy*, *Condolence*, and *Compassion*, which have been already considered as a branch of benevolence: *Unnatural*, when it arises from a view of the happiness of others, enjoying a good which we ourselves desire, and think we deserve better, which is called *Envy*. This, with the passions of *Malice* or *Rancour*, *Jealousy*, and *Cruelty* or *Inhumanity*, are justly called *Unnatural*; and are, with great propriety, compared to tumours and cancers, to feverish heats, and unnatural indispositions of the body; the proper management of which shall be afterwards taken notice of.

PART II.

On the Regulation of DESIRE, and the AFFECTIONS allied to it.

AFTER thus endeavouring to describe DESIRE, and its various modifications in the most considerable pleasing and painful passions, from the perception of good, to its attainment, it remains now that we inquire into the best manner of *regulating* these in order to attain that *happiness* which is their ultimate end and object.

What seems chiefly necessary therefore for this purpose, is,

1. That, by the superior discerning and determining faculties, viz. the understanding and imagination*, the passions and affections be directed to proper objects and ends, in subserviency to the ultimate one mentioned, and duly proportioned to them.

2. That the *balance* and *economy* be kept
up

* From our being obliged, in any treatise of this kind, to mention the provinces or offices of each of those powers or principles separately, we must beware of being led to consider them as so many distinct agents in the soul; which should always be looked on as one single indivisible agent or principle operating in all these different ways.

up among them which nature originally established.—*First*, As to the proper *objects* of our affections and passions, we have already shewn how, in *general*, they are good or evil, present or future, and different as to their kinds and circumstances: But further, as to every *particular* object of pursuit, which may occur, it is likewise necessary that the *discerning* and other powers* be, in some degree, employed for regulating our affections with respect to it, viz. The *understanding*, in discovering, from its qualities and tendency to happiness, of what affection it is the proper object: And the *imagination*, in raising this affection towards it.

Thus then, the first thing necessary is to be fully satisfied as to what is really our *chief good* or *ultimate end*, in the attainment of which our highest happiness consists, and then to discover the relation or tendency of any particular objects or ends to this, (as being what constitutes them good or evil) with the affections, in different degrees, proper for and proportioned to each of them.

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So

* For a fuller account of these as to their nature, conduct, use, abuse, &c. see the *other scheme* of them formerly mentioned: All we need here observe is, that by the *understanding* and *imagination*, we mean, the powers of discovering and disposing to truth and good, by the *will* and *affections*, the powers of chusing and pursuing them.

So far we may reckon the province of the *understanding*. But before the affections towards any of these (though thus discovered proper for them) can be raised, the *imagination* must be engaged, both in favour of what is thus found to be the supreme good itself, and of any objects or ends subservient to it; which is done, by the frequent representation of their qualities, tendencies, and effects, till an impression is made upon it, and an image formed of all these ideas blended together. This brings them as it were home in their full dimensions to the mind, which now comes to feel an uneasy sensation in the want of them, and on this the affection of *desire* immediately arises, either simple, or in some of its modifications, which can no longer be supposed misplaced or applied to improper objects, if the previous operations of the understanding and imagination have been rightly carried on.

Thus if mental or spiritual happiness, lying in a conformity to God's will, and consequent sense of his favour, is found to be man's ultimate end, it must be acknowledged to be the only proper object of his most intense desire; sin or moral evil, mental misery (if I may so call it) or contrariety to God's will, and a consequent sense of his displeasure, the proper object of man's highest aversion.

When,

When, therefore, these affections are thus directed by the *understanding* to their proper objects, its office next is to discover the tendency and relation of any particular object to these two, that the passions may be suited and proportioned to it accordingly; so that, on its perceiving the tendency of a generous, pious, publick-spirited action, or any benevolent, kind, devout disposition, to procure happiness in any degree (especially, if of the kind now mentioned) to ourselves or others; it also becomes the proper object of desire, in its various forms, the contrary of aversion; and so far as any external advantages or enjoyments of pleasure, wealth, power, or fame, appear to have this tendency, (as when rightly applied, they may have, though not in a way so powerful and immediate) they deserve the same affections in a lower degree; but if they are considered, without any respect to such a tendency and application of them, but only to their intrinsic value, and oft-times mischievous effects, by the wrong use and pursuit of them, they become the proper objects of moral aversion and hatred, from which they cannot be excused even by the borrowed aids of an incorrect *imagination*, associating moral ideas with them while pursued, but dropping these, in their application, when attained.

This

This leads us to inquire more particularly into the province of the *imagination* in the instances now mentioned; that of the *understanding* being all that we have as yet considered.

It has already been observed in general, that the office of the *imagination* is to raise or move the affections, towards what the understanding finds to be their proper objects, and that the *imagination* is engaged for this purpose, by frequent representations of the discovered qualities, tendencies, and effects of the objects, till an impression is made on it, and an image formed of all these ideas blended together, in consequence of which the affection immediately arises, and is increased, or altered as much, by the increase or alteration of this inward impression, as by that of the outward object.

Thus, admitting that conformity mentioned of temper and conduct to the will of the Supreme Being, and consequent sense of his favour, to be the proper object of our highest *desire*, in order to raise this affection towards it, its sublimity, permanency, and advantageous effects, as being most productive of true happiness, and most perfective of our natures at present, as well as most conducive to higher happiness and perfection hereafter; all these must be often viewed or contemplated by the *imagination*, till an impression or image is formed

formed as above, and the mind becomes uneasy upon any apprehension of the want of it; on which *desire* immediately arises, in various forms and degrees of intenseness, according to the strength or weakness of the impression made on the imagination, and excites to the diligent use of every mean necessary for attaining or securing its object.

This process towards the raising desire or any other affection to an object, according to the tendency and relation it is found to have to the ultimate end, may be easily applied in the other instances above mentioned; but as here the influence of the *imagination* is so great, and its proper government of such importance, some of the *mistakes* it is liable to, deserve to be considered.

The most remarkable of these will be found to lie in its being too strongly impressed with the images of *present* objects, and too faintly with those that are *absent*, to which we may add its not attending sufficiently to the consequences and future tendency of either, as discovered by the understanding. For as the mind is scarcely capable of more than one sensation at once, either of pleasure or pain, and apt to receive this from the nearest object; such a sensation, if pleasant, is ready to satisfy it as long as it lasts, and to prevent any impression from what is absent. If painful,

ful, it has a still stronger effect, and sets the mind on work to remove it, as imagined greater than any absent evil, whilst the good consequences of the latter, and bad consequences of the former, though never so certain and evident, not having the same advantage of nearness, make but a faint impression on the imagination; it is intirely engrossed by the present object, as external pleasure, power, riches, or fame; and to justify, as it were, to the superior faculties, its raising towards them an affection, whose proper object is a higher kind of good, it associates with them the ideas of this higher moral or spiritual good, and, by habitual indulgence, so blends or unites their ideas together, that it becomes at length very difficult to separate them; hence arises the difficulty of bringing the ambitious, the covetous, or the voluptuous man to relinquish their pursuits, even when their reason is convinced of their being wrong.

One of the first steps, therefore, to the government of the passions, is correcting the *imagination*; which is done, by breaking off these associations now mentioned of moral qualities with things immoral or indifferent, to which wrong habits and inattention may have led us, and by applying our minds to the nobler pursuits of such objects as need no foreign

reign ornaments to set them off, till a contrary and more rational habit be acquired.

The only way to surmount the solicitations of any objects of affection that are present and disapproved of by the understanding, is by frequent and lively representations of their destructive qualities and consequences, together with the desirable qualities and consequences of such as are absent, and their tendency and necessity to true happiness; by bringing, I say, all these so near the *imagination* as to appear in their full dimensions, and make the same impression on it as if they were present; till thus, uneasiness following in the want of what is found to be truly desirable, the proper affections are immediately raised towards it; for it is in this *indirect* way that affections can be raised, and not by any positive or *direct* act of the will itself, as might be exemplified in all its modifications or affections: Thus when the imagination is impressed with the notion of another's undeserved misery, our *pity* is raised, when with that of his power and inclination to hurt us, our *fear*, and when with the amiable and engaging qualities of our fellow-creatures, *benevolence* may be raised, though formerly suppressed by the force of opposite habits and affections, or perhaps partial views of its object, publick good, or confined to some particular sect or party.

To

To run over again all the different modifications of desire, and shew, what are their proper objects, and how they are to be raised towards them, would be unnecessary, the general process above laid down being easily applicable to particular instances. If sufficient care be taken to keep up a constant attention of mind, and habitual discipline over ourselves, with a fixed resolution, in such cases as are any way dangerous or delicate, to stop all action until there be a proper examination of the circumstances, qualities, and tendencies of the objects about which our affections are exercised. The confused sensations and propensities that raise them into *passions* are, indeed, when for any time indulged, very difficult to be restrained, but may be so, in some measure, by frequent consideration of their calamitous consequences, till an habitual suspicion and dread of them be raised, which recurring always along with them may remind us of the necessary discipline.

What makes this the more necessary, is, that the long continuance and frequent returns of any passion, as anger, fear, sorrow, &c. creates a proneness to them for the future, which may be confirmed into habits very destructive of happiness, and pernicious to the whole constitution.

The

2. The *other* thing necessary in the management of the affections, when raised as above, is to keep them in a due proportion to their objects, and in a just balance and oeconomy among themselves. What seems necessary to such a proportion is, that, according to the discovered nature and qualities of any object, the affection to it be raised higher when too weak, and moderated when too strong: How this is to be done in an indirect way, may be in a good measure understood from the preceding observations: It may be of use however, further to consider, and, as it were, frequently represent to the imagination, the consequences and effects of having our *desires* of outward good, or *aversion* to outward natural evil, too strong.

Thus, it may be observed, that the violence of *desire* and *hope*, does not proportionally enliven our sensation in the enjoyment of good, (unless in the transient raptures and first confused hurry of our success) though it increases the pain of disappointment; so that he who, by no wrong opinions or associations of ideas, raises his desire above the real moment of good in the object, though he may want the first transient ecstasies on acquisition of it, yet he enjoys all the permanent good the object can afford, while he escapes the miseries of violent desire and torments of dis-

appointment to which persons of irregular imaginations are liable.

On the other hand, the stronger our aversion and fear of evil is, we shall be the less able to bear it, whereas, by undervaluing and laying our account with it, our fear will be diminished while it is in suspense, and our sorrow or grief upon its arrival.

But here I must be understood to mean, as was suggested, *natural* good and evil; for that desire and aversion, which have respect to the *moral* or *spiritual* objects formerly mentioned, cannot be too strong.

Thus then, in some measure, may a proportion be kept up betwixt our various affections and their objects; the keeping up a just *balance* and oeconomy among themselves remains yet to be considered.

In this perhaps as much art is requisite, and acquaintance with human nature, as in any part of the religious or moral government of the mind; the keeping us in exercise and action, and putting our obedience and virtue to the trial, being probably one end our Maker had in giving us principles of action, leading, in appearance, to opposite marks, yet in reality, in their primary state, balanced against one another, like the antagonist muscles of the body, either of which separately would occasion distortion and irregular motion, yet jointly

jointly form an admirable system or composition; the voluntary mangling and dismembering of which is not more cruel, unnatural, and destructive to it, than the straining any affection or indulging a wrong passion is to the inward fabrick and constitution.

The general rule then for balancing the affections, is to indulge or strain none of them, so far as to occasion disturbance and disproportion to the rest, but to let each of them have its due scope and force.

Thus is that balance to be kept up betwixt the *publick* and *selfish* affections, which seems to be originally established, though custom, habit, associations of ideas, and perhaps other preternatural causes, oftentimes turn the balance to the side of the latter, and makes it necessary to add the more weight to the former, by engaging the imagination strongly on their side. And even the selfish affections themselves may be sometimes too weak, when they do not answer the provisionary care of nature for every one of its offspring, in which case they will need the same management.

In this way the *pleasing* and *painful* passions must be balanced against one another. The desire of present good must not be raised so high as to surmount the aversion to its consequent evil, when it is such perhaps as would prove destructive to the constitution. *Hope*

raised high grows into security, *far* into despair, on any of which a cessation of action follows, but the due mixing and balancing hope and fear with one another, makes us vigilant and active. Where the power of resisting or repelling evil is weak, the fear of it should be strong; where the sense of pleasure and pain to ourselves is very lively, the kind affections of love, compassion, and the like, leading to the good of others, would need to be lively likewise. Immoderate *joy* intoxicates the mind, and suppresses other affections, but the turning to objects that may raise a proper degree of *sorrow* to balance it, sobers the mind, and opens it to sympathy and kind affection. Thus we may obtain command over the *particular* passions by strengthening the *general* desires into an habitual superiority over them.

In fine, all the art of mechanics, in raising, weighing, and balancing weights, and removing opposite forces, cannot surpass what is necessary in this moral mechanism of the human mind.

As for the *unnatural** passions, already taken notice of, and compared to inveterate bodily ailments, it is justly observed of them, that

* No passion can be said, when in a proper degree, to be intirely *unnatural*; it is the *extremes* of certain passions that are so called.

that their cure must be similar to that of the latter, no lenitives are sufficient, without entirely eradicating them, and this can be done, only by rectifying the whole habit of the mind; to effect which in some measure, it may be of use to dwell always on the most lovely side of every character, to consider the injurious, who are objects of those passions, as our fellow-members in this great intellectual system, their real springs of action, as at worst only self interest, or mistaken self-love, and their injuries, as proceeding from a weakness of temper, to be pitied rather than re-sented.

To what has been advanced about the government of the passions, other *general* directions might be added, as, The not letting them determine our opinions of persons and things; their province not being to discover truth and good, but to pursue or excite to the pursuit of them: The guarding particularly against that ruling or master passion in the breast, which, (as an ingenious Poet expresses it) "like Aaron's serpent, swallows up the rest;" guarding also against the other passions that attend our particular constitutions, tempers and stations, and the incentives to them in company, occurrences, and the like; but these are, in a great measure, deducible from the preceeding observations.

How far the passions depend on the temperament and constitution of the body, with their outward expressions in its features and motions*, though a curious enough inquiry, is not of such importance as to understand their nature and regulation now spoken of: How necessary the study of this is to our ease and happiness in this life, though no respect should be had to a future, and much more when this is taken into the account. I need spend no time in evincing, nor in further recommending it, from any other topics, than the description already given of the daily instances that occur of the woful effect which unrestrained passions and inclinations have on human life and happiness.

But however hurtful the *passions* are found to be when *abused* or misapplied, it must not, from what has been here advanced, be supposed, that they have not likewise their *usefulness* and importance; so that, instead of being subservient to sense and appetite (as they often are) they may be made conducive to that improvement, which is necessary in order to our present and future happiness.

Man's present circumstances and constitution are indeed such, that the *passions* are not only *useful*, but even *necessary*, to him in various respects, as for exciting sometimes to action,

* For this also, See THE HEART DISPLAYED, etc.

tion, before there can be a deliberate process of reason for this purpose, also for engaging reason or the superior faculties to attend to, and examine any object, and for giving it a proper importance, and thereby quickening us in the pursuit of it, after examination; some passions are likewise useful for *balancing* other passions in ourselves, and for securing against those of others.

The reasons of our being thus constituted, and standing in need of principles or forces seemingly opposite, are indeed what we cannot fully explain, more than we can do the reasons why light and darkness, heat and cold, and various contending elements are intermixed in the manner in which they are in nature; the whole must be resolved into the depth of divine wisdom unfathomable by us at present, but which may, by such a contest or opposition of principles, bring about, in the issue, a harmony and perfection of the whole intellectual and moral system, so much the more astonishing, when seen to arise from the most unlikely causes and beginnings.

For more of this, and what else appears most material in relation to the human faculties and passions, see the *Heart Displayed*, or the *Anatomy of the Human Mind*, &c.

DISSER-

DISSERTATION VI.

ON

ACTION, CONTEMPLATION, and DISENGAGEMENT from the World.

AN eminent writer*, whom we had occasion to quote in our fourth Dissertation, considers the life of man as of four different kinds, according to the prevailing objects of his choice and pursuit; these four kinds or species of life, he calls the *Political*, the *Lucrative*, the *Pleasurable*, and the *Contemplative*; and he thus distinguishes them, to show that none of them fall in intirely with his preconceptions of the sovereign good or happiness; but tho' he has sufficiently evinced this, yet it may still continue a question, What kind of life falls in most with these preconceptions, or is most conducive to happiness, and thereby most eligible?

In this view the division is commonly shortened, and the competition made to run betwixt what we call an *active life* and a *contemplative*,

* Harris on Happiness.

plative, which indeed comprehend the whole; and nature itself (if carefully attended to) points out one or other of these to every man, according to the form and extent of capacity given him; but it is certain the general taste is for *active* life; for, however much many speak of their satiety or fatigue by it, yet how few instances are there of its being renounced, without a desire afterwards of resuming it? The good of society will not admit of its members giving much way to such *Contemplation*, as excludes all *Action*; nor will action be rightly directed for this end, without some mixture of contemplation.

It can never, therefore, be a matter of dispute, which of the two, *Action* or *Contemplation*, society could subsist without, as both are * necessary to its support and improvement; nor can it be doubted that in both ways many virtues are displayed: But there may be a question of some nicety with respect to their proper limits and mixture, as well as which of the two (when properly ascertained and distinguished) gives scope for the exercise of most virtues? which of the two contributes most to the good and improvement of society? or, in fine, which of them

a wise

* *Natura nos ad utrumque gemit, et contemplatione acrum et actione.*

SENECA.

a wise man, who has the entire command of his own temper and way of life, should chuse, with a view of becoming happy in himself, and useful to others? for as to a man who has no command of his own temper and way of life, so as to accommodate them to what his reason most approves, there can be no question, as there is no room for choice on his part, he must go wheresoever his disposition and circumstances lead him, whether it is to the busy scenes of public life, or to the private retreats of contemplation.

It is plain, therefore, that the common question, Whether an active or contemplative life be most eligible? must be very indeterminate, if taken in a general view, without bringing into the account the person's temper and circumstances who is to make the choice; it is just as if any should dispute about what sauce or fruit is best, without considering the taste or constitution of the person who is to use them.

For determining, therefore, as to the merits of the two different kinds of life mentioned, it is fit to begin with laying down the two following positions.

1. That the person, whose election of a manner of life we are to consider, must be such a one as really has an election or choice; that is, such a one as has the command or direction

rection of his own way of life, by having the command of his own mind as well as of his outward circumstances, so as to be capable of prosecuting either of the courses proposed; for if his passions are so little under his government, as to carry him violently to any one of these courses, or his fortune so fixt as to leave him no choice, he must be excluded the present question: It may be said, that a man who has thus the command of himself, can be happy in any way of life; and I confess he may be so, if that command be compleat; but the question is, What way of life he would judge most favourable to the establishing this command, and making a proper use of it, for obtaining the greatest degree of happiness to himself or others, whether the active or contemplative would be his choice? This leads to

2. Another position, which will be easily admitted, and will prepare our way for determining as to the point in question, and that is, that whatever way of life favours most a man's *happiness in himself, and usefulness to others*, is the most eligible.

After laying down these positions for directing our enquiry, it will be proper to begin it with defining what we mean by an *active*, and what by a *contemplative* way of life.

I believe

I believe it will be found that, for the most part, in speaking of these, we mean by an active life, that which engages us most in the commerce of mankind; and by a contemplative, that which withdraws us most from it. Not that these two are to be considered as opposites, or that any way of life can be devoid of some share of both these, Action and Contemplation; but according as either of them most prevails in any course of life, and engages a man more or less in the busy world, we call him Active or Contemplative, without considering that, where there is any degree of life and reflection, some degree of action is inseparable from it; and that many whom we rank amongst the active world, as being more than ordinarily engaged in crowds and public transactions, are often more inactive or indolent, than the obscure inhabitant of the cottage, or the philosopher in his museum.

Tho' therefore, the common notion of a man's being active or contemplative, according as he is more or less engaged in commerce and conversation with the rest of mankind, tho' this may afford us a tolerable definition of these different ways of life, yet it may not be improper to try, whether, from considering the common nature of the species, we

we may not find a definition more to our present purpose.

That the human constitution is made up of two parts, *Body* and *Mind*, intimately connected together, is universally agreed: These two have their several powers, *sensible* and *mental*; the object of the first being the concerns of the body; that of the latter, the concerns of the mind, and its improvement: The exercise of these powers on their different objects, we call *Action*, which thus comes either to respect the body, and is called *Sensation* or *Motion*, or to respect the mind, and then it has the name of *Reflection* and *Thinking*: but tho' in both these *Action* is implied, yet, as the former is generally more attended to than the latter, we commonly call these operations which respect our *sensible* concerns, *Action*, and those relating to our *mental* pursuits, *Reflection* and *Contemplation*.

May we not, therefore, in this view, define a *contemplative* way of life to be, such as turns our attention most to *mental* objects, and an *active* way of life, as distinguished from the former by common use, to be such as turns our attention most to *sensible* objects and pursuits.

If these definitions are admitted, the superiority of the *contemplative* life to what is called the *active*, will be as evident as the supe-

riority of mind to body, of spiritual enjoyments and pursuits to such as are merely sensible. But, before we determine finally as to this, let us look back a little to these characters or preconceptions, we proposed to apply to each of these two, for discovering their value and excellency.

The characters we laid down for this purpose in our second position were, that whatever course of life puts a man most in the way of being *happy in himself, and useful to others*, that course of life undoubtedly deserves our preference.—Apply this, therefore, to the case in hand.

A man who has the command of his own temper and fortune, as much as is here attainable, so that he is not unalterably fixed by either of them in any particular course of life, but at liberty to chuse and follow whatever scheme his reason, upon careful examination, approves. Such a man, I say, has these two schemes proposed to him, either to lead an *active* life, chiefly attentive to outward *sensible* objects, or to lead a *contemplative* life, in attention to *mental* interests and improvement; that he may determine which of these two schemes of life he should chuse, he considers which of them will put him most in the way of being *happy in himself, and useful to others*. In the active course he may have

have a prospect of every enjoyment that is *external* to the mind; for the reward of his industry, he may promise himself riches and honours, pleasure and renown; nay, and he may hope that he shall be enabled to procure the same *sensible* enjoyments and advantages to others, for whom he is concerned; he may expect to raise himself and his family to the highest offices in the state, to fill them with honour and applause, and even to carry the commerce and conquests of his country to the utmost extent they are capable of. All those outward flattering prospects of *sensible* or *imaginary* enjoyments he may have for himself and others; but will these, even when the possession of them is attained, bring either him, or them, one step nearer these *internal* and *spiritual* enjoyments, in which (as we elsewhere made appear) the *true happiness* of man consists, or will it enable him to procure them to others, and so make him useful to them in the highest sense, in what respects the true improvement of the mind, and therefore the true interest of man? will they, by an *activity* and attention, still directed to something *external* to the mind, be ever brought nearer *self-enjoyment*, and rendered more truly wise, virtuous, and happy? We have instances enough of those who feel and acknowledge their disappointment in this way; high in
N 2 their

their expectations of outward good, and active in the pursuit of it, the happiness they vainly grasp at flies their embrace, or disappoints their hope.

It is plain, therefore, that in the *active* way of life, as directed chiefly to what is *sensible* and *external*, we find not these characters necessary to determine a wise man's choice in favour of it alone; we see that however much it may procure him all those *external* gratifications of sense or imagination, which are foreign to the mind, yet it can never, by this alone, render him truly happy in himself, or truly useful to others; such happiness and usefulness depending not on material and sensible, but on mental or spiritual enjoyments and improvements.

Let us next consider, therefore, how far these are affected by what we called the *contemplative* scheme of life, or how far any man, deliberating as we now suppose, would find that a *contemplative* life, engaged chiefly in what concerns the mind, would contribute to render him happy in himself, and useful to others.

That it would make him much *happier in himself*, is too evident to need reasoning upon it; for as the *mind* is by all acknowledged the noblest, the *superior* part of man, the happiness belonging to it must also be superior.

Here

Here it must be observed, that the enjoyments of every being are in proportion to its powers; two states may be happy in their kind, and yet the one far preferable to the other; tho' therefore, the gratifications of sense, or these enjoyments which respect the body only, be called Happiness, and is the highest kind of it we can conceive brutes to attain to, yet is it as far excelled by the other, by what we call *mental* or rational happiness, as these gross, material, and corruptible bodies in which we are involved, are excelled by the active intellectual beings which animate and inform them: As, therefore, an attention to the enjoyments and improvement of the mind, bids fairest for procuring true mental happiness; and, as the contemplative man's attention is chiefly turned this way, his course of life bids fairest for making him truly *happy in himself*; that it will not make him so *useful* or serviceable to *others*, in the way formerly mentioned, by helping them to the *outward* gratifications of vanity and sense, will easily be granted, for this is not what he considers as of most consequence

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• ———— And Wisdom's self,
Oft seeks to sweet retired Solitude,
Where, with her best nurse, Contemplation,
She plumes her feathers, and lets grow her wings,
Which, in the various bustle of resort,
Were sometimes ruffled, and perhaps impaired.

MILTON'S MASK of COMUS.

quence to himself or others; but the improvement of their minds, in every moral, virtuous, and devout disposition, he is, by this way of life, led to promote, just as much as he is led to promote his own interest in this respect; for, such is the nature of true *mental* improvement, that it cannot but *diffuse*, or, at least, endeavour to diffuse itself. No man can truly improve his own mind without improving in good-will to mankind, and raising every possible desire and endeavour to promote what appears to be their true interest: Not that the contemplative man's desire of being useful in this way, will lead him officiously to mingle with the crowd of mankind, and to lavish his instructions upon them indiscriminately and promiscuously; but he chuses proper opportunities for this, and must not therefore be supposed to exclude himself entirely from their society; when, however, his verbal admonitions cannot extend to them, the world is edified and improved by the literary productions of his philosophic solitude; and I hope it will be allowed, that to be useful in this way of promoting inward mental improvement, in any degree, very far transcends the highest degree of that kind of usefulness which lies only in procuring or heightening the external delights of sense or fancy.

Before

Before we quit this subject, it may perhaps not be improper to subjoin a few hints for illustrating it, according to the other acceptation we mentioned of the terms in debate; that is by considering an *active* life to be only such as engages a man most in the *common commerce* of mankind, and a *contemplative*, such as withdraws him most from it; so that the question here would be, Which of the two, publick business or solitude, outward occupation or study, a wise man would chuse, in order to become happy in himself, and useful to others?

That the studious or *contemplative* man has, when his studies are rightly directed, to the regulation of his own mind in the first place, and, after that, to the cultivation of whatever branches of science appear most conducive to the improvement and entertainment of himself and others, that in such contemplations as these, I say, however solitary and reclusive, a man has more truly the enjoyment of himself, than when engaged in the busy scenes of life, seems to be generally agreed: They may indeed, to a mind not formed or disposed for such contemplations, appear joyless and insipid; but the objection that might arise from this dislike of some to them, we obviated in the beginning, by laying it down as one of our positions, that the person whose election

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we were to consider must be supposed such as had the command of his own mind, so far as to bring it to a relish of what he found in itself most eligible.

The other consideration we reckoned necessary for determining his election was, in which of the two ways of life he might expect to be most useful to others, whether in the active course or in the studious and contemplative? and here, if any where, must the men of business and action be supposed, by some, to have the advantage, because many cannot so easily see, or at least will not acknowledge a man's usefulness to the world, while he appears wrapt up in himself, immured in solitude and abstract contemplation; this mistake arises from that common prejudice formerly mentioned in favour of outward sensible objects, as if they were the only proper objects of activity; without considering that the mental world, the proper field of contemplation, affords exercise to our faculties, in a way much more useful and extensive than all that is comprehended within the regions of sense. To prevent, however, all foundation for any objection of this kind, to the contemplative man's usefulness, it may not be improper to add the following *observations*.

1. That

1. That however entertaining abstract speculations may be to himself, yet they will never render him so useful to others as these branches of science, which have a respect, either to the improvement of the *heart*, or the accommodation of life, particularly the former; to these, therefore, his application should chiefly be directed, if he would prevent all foundation for that self-condemning reflection with which the learned *Grotius* is said to have closed his life and his studies, "*Vitam perdidit operose nihil agendo.*" I have lost my life in painfully doing nothing.

2. For the same reasons that the man of study and contemplation ought to apply himself chiefly to these branches of science now mentioned, he should also study the most effectual way that his circumstances will permit of communicating his sentiments and instructions to others, though it should be sometimes at the expence of his own ease, by mingling more in their society than would otherwise be agreeable to him.

3. The contemplative man would likewise do well to observe, that he has much more need than the man of business and action, to have all well regulated within himself, so that he may calmly bear his own review, because he is more in the way of looking sometimes into himself, and having many self-approving

or condemning hours, than those whose attention is generally engaged by things without them.

To all this it may be added, that as the good of society requires a mixture of various characters and occupations, however much some of these may appear superior, or, at least, more eligible than others, yet the man who applies to contemplation and improves by it, will have no such opinion of his own superiority, as will lead him superciliously to despise the meanest mechanic whose talents are made any way subservient to the general good; superior knowledge will justify such contempt, even less than superior riches and honours.

The all-wise Author of our being has not designed all of us for philosophers, politicians, or lawgivers, he has endowed us with a variety of talents and capacities, according to the various spheres and circumstances in which he has appointed us to act, with a view to the great end of our being: In all these, however, there is a certain degree of disengagement from outward things, which he has made necessary to our relishing or attaining that *higher happiness* described in our fourth dissertation, which consists in an *intire conformity of heart and life to his will, and consequent sense of his favour.*

Before

Before we dismiss this subject, therefore; we shall offer a few hints (as promised in the fourth dissertation) with respect to that *Disengagement from the world* which religion requires, and which (when considered in a just light) has the testimony both of reason and experience in its favour, as of the greatest importance to our present and future happiness.

All men would wish to be happy. Whence is it then that they come to be so oft in misery and disquiet? Experience will direct to an answer: They are generally taken up in the pursuit of things which they expect to be happy in, and find themselves disappointed, being neither able to secure the possession of them, nor meeting with the looked for returns of enjoyment and satisfaction while they have them; though an elevation of the soul to God, the Author of its existence and happiness, might seem natural, easy, and agreeable to its original dignity and derivation of all perfection from him, yet so much is it fallen from its original date, that we may almost say of it now, that, instead of the heart's ascending naturally to God, and uniting easily with him, it seems rather natural to it to gravitate, as it were, towards these inferior objects now mentioned, so that we must meet with many disappointments from them and
many

many instances of their insufficiency for our happiness before we can be brought to renounce them, and look for happiness in him in whom alone it is to be found. The things which thus delude us are sensible and worldly things, the pleasures, the honours and the riches of this world, courting our senses, and ingrossing our hearts in a thousand different forms, according to the difference of our natural dispositions and manner of life; but the insufficiency of these for our happiness will appear from the slightest view of them. For,

First, As to what are commonly called the pleasures of life, the gratifications of mere sense*, whether of a grosser or more refined nature, we all own there is nothing in them that can give any satisfaction solid and lasting, and suited to the capacity of a rational being. Had not, indeed, our wise and merciful Creator indued us with reason and understanding above the fowls of the air and the beasts of the field, had we been made capable of relishing no higher happiness than that of the brute creation around us, then might sensual pleasure have been reckoned suitable enough to our nature, and high enough for us to aspire after: But is there any man so mean and degenerate as to think that God has not design-

* True happiness ne'er enter'd at an Eye;

True happiness resides in things unseen.

ed and qualified him for something higher than the brutes? Is there any so vile and corrupt as that he would not be thought to have a relish for any higher pleasures than (to speak in the emphatick language of scripture) those of the dog, who delights in his vomit, or the sow that wallows in the mire? Such meanness as this is what none of us, I dare say, would wish to be charged with, we have generally so much sense of the dignity of our nature, or, at least, so much natural pride, that we would be thought to have souls above such brutal enjoyments and pursuits. But alas! whatever way men would be thought of, it is certain they really are often, if not generally, engaged in seeking after those very pleasures of sense and appetite which they so much pretend to despise, and by which they are set on a level with the beasts that perish. We may use a great deal of subtilty and take great pains in justifying to ourselves or others such an attention to the concerns of the body, as necessary or unavoidable in our present state of connection with it, but I am afraid most of our reasonings to this purpose are only self-delusion; for, however much they may justify a moderate attention to the simple demands of nature for our present comfortable support, they will never justify an anxious concern about our future ease and

conveniency, or our taking up so much of our time and thoughts in this way as may in the least encroach upon the nobler offices of this life, or divert us from the improvement of our minds into a fitness for the next.

It is true indeed, we are not all equally gross and sensual in our desires after what we shall eat or what we shall drink, we may, by our particular circumstances, education, and natural constitution be led to temperance and moderation, in respect of some of the *pleasures* of life, and may therefore flatter ourselves that we are sufficiently *disengaged* from the world, even while we allow other vanities to take up that place in our hearts which is due to God only; but, before he can be said to have the reception due to him there, we must break off all engagement to every earthly pleasure that seems to *rival* him in our affections, so as our chief, our highest delight may be in him, his enjoyment, worship and obedience.

And not only must we be, in order to that disengagement we are speaking of, indifferent to the pleasures of life, but likewise to its *pains* and *calamities*, so far as to let no childish fear of them deter or discourage us from what we know to be our duty: Here I am afraid, we shall find still more difficulty than in the former case, as the patient en-

countering

countering or bearing any hardship and distress appointed us, requires more resolution than restraining our desires, and renouncing any superfluous pleasure we are possessed of; and yet it is certain we shall never get our affections steadily fixt on God, if we are too easily disconcerted and discomposed by the common afflictions of life, unless we fortify our minds against any slavish fear of *pain*, at the same time that we moderate our desires to every worldly pleasure and delight, without exception, that threatens to draw us off from the love and obedience of our merciful Creator, our never-failing Friend and Benefactor; “He that loveth father or mother more than him, is not worthy of him, he that loveth son or daughter more than him, is not worthy of him, and he that taketh not up his cross and followeth after him, is not worthy of him.”

But there are many who can say that they are *disengaged* from the world, so far as not to be solicitous about what we commonly call the *pleasures* of sense and appetite, and yet they have other worldly pursuits that draw off their attention from the sovereign good; their aim may be at *honour* and preferment in the world, at the *favour* and vain applause of men, thereby to gratify their pride and ambition, and set themselves above others about

them ; this we mentioned as a distinct branch from the former, but which we must also be *disengaged* from, before we can get the desires of our souls turned towards that object who is truly worthy of them ; for in this, as well as most other cases, it is not the affection itself that religion disapproves, but the injudicious choice of its object ; so far as *ambition* leads us to distinguish ourselves for wisdom and goodness, and to promote the honour and glory of our Maker, it may be reckoned one of the noblest principles implanted in the human breast ; but it is the *abuse* of it, into a desire of gaining the favour, respect, or servile submission of others, even at the expence of our integrity, piety and virtue, which religion requires our being *disengaged* from. Many of us may possibly be very much strangers to these wild projects of pride and ambition, by which the affairs of mankind are often distracted, and the minds of many others, in higher stations of life, disquieted and taken off from the pursuit of true happiness ; but, however low a man's rank may be in the world, the occasions of being thus disturbed, and engaged in the pursuit of worldly honours and preferment, are not wanting to him ; the meanest of us may have desires above his circumstances, and, by a vain endeavour of distinguishing himself, and gaining the praise, admiration

admiration and favour of men, may make himself very unhappy here, and very unfit for relishing or obtaining that spiritual happiness proposed to us hereafter in the love and favour of God.

There remains however a *third sort* of worldly desires still more inconsistent with the love of God and goodness than any thing we have as yet mentioned; and that is the extravagant pursuit of *wealth or riches*, which, however evidently insignificant in themselves, and unable to make us happy, are too often seen to ingross the minds of many to a degree of devotion or worship; nor is there any affection of mind that separates more between God and us than this inordinate concern about amassing together worldly wealth of any kind; to provide, we may pretend, for a family, or to secure against future events, as if we were not under the continual care of an all-ruling providence, whose goodness we may ever trust to, so far as to take no thought about heaping up its present gifts, for fear that it may afterwards prove less liberal to us than it ought to be.

Thus then we see what kind of objects we must be *disengaged* from, before the true happiness of the soul can be relished, pursued or attained by us, and a *disengagement* from these is the *first* step to be taken, and perhaps the

most difficult, in our advancement to the reſemblance and enjoyment of God; the moſt difficult, I ſay, in ſo much that however clearly it may be underſtood by thoſe who have felt or practiſed it, it cannot eaſily be conceived by thoſe who have not; and of this laſt ſort there are, I'm afraid, too many, who look upon a *religious diſengagement* from the world, ſuch as we would here wiſh to recommend, either as a thing intirely chimerical and no where to be found, or as an enthuſiaſtick degree of goodneſs, that would ſink the buſy enterprizing part of mankind, into an ignominious ſtate of inactivity and reſt. On the other hand we'll find there are who think, that, if they have renounced a few of thoſe worldly things they were formerly taken up with, they have ſufficiently practiſed this duty.

To remove both theſe miſtakes, let us conſider further the *nature and reaſonableneſs* of that diſengagement required from ſuch objects as were juſt now deſcribed, with the *properties* belonging to it, and *means* of acquiring it.

By a *religious diſengagement* from the world, that is, from the worldly objects and purſuits juſt now mentioned, muſt be underſtood, not any unſocial retirement from it, nor any indolent diſregard of the neceſſary callings and connections appointed us by providence; this, if ſome extraordinary circumſtances do not call

call to it, would be impiously to defeat the very end of our being; it would be deserting the post appointed us by the Almighty Sovereign of the universe, and we may be assured true religion is far from leading to this; so that wherever any man appears idle and remiss, in the necessary affairs of life, any pretence of religion as the cause of it, is only to cover his own indolence or weakness, and will never justify him at giving an account of his stewardship to the all-knowing Searcher of hearts. To be religiously disengaged from the world, is to be taken off, not from any part of our duty in it, but from every thing that is inconsistent with duty, it is to have our affections elevated above this life, to consider it as of no further value than as we have therein the opportunity of preparing ourselves for a better, and to be disengaged from every thing in it that can any way disqualify us for this, ever ready to resign our all with cheerfulness when called for, to his hands who gave us it. This is the only way of being superior to the world, and avoiding an ignoble subjection to it.

The *reasonableness* of practising and cultivating this habit of mind, of endeavouring to draw

* A man on earth, devoted to the skies,
Like ships in seas, while in, above the world.

YOUNG.

draw off our affections from an immoderate attachment to earthly and sensible things, is a subject which we cannot too often, and seriously dwell upon, as it will take our utmost care and pains, to get our minds so deeply impressed with it, as that we may stand our ground, and steadily pursue that which appears to be our true interest and happiness, amidst the ensnaring delights of sense which continually surround us. There are two ways by which we may reason ourselves into that religious *disengagement* from worldly and sensible things just now described; the one is by taking a just view of their intrinsic *value* in themselves, and the other by reviewing our own *experience* of their vanity: The *first* consideration may appear somewhat subtle and refined, but it will pave the way for the other, and weigh much with every thinking person.

First then, I say, the reasonableness of raising our minds above the things of this world, will appear evidently from considering their real value and importance to our happiness as rational beings. The least attention to the condition of our natures must convince us, that, as we are endowed with rational and immortal *souls*, whatever contributes most to their happiness and perfection, deserves the *first*

first place in our attention and regard, so that the things of this life, with which we are connected only by our *body*, and from which consequently we must be separated by our separation from the body, deserve to be valued and pursued by us no further, than as they contribute to the good and improvement of our *minds*, in order to some higher and more durable happiness, challenging our highest attention; for, in our present state, we are so placed as to have our attention divided between sensible and spiritual things, between the concerns of this life and those of the next; these two make a kind of competition for our regard, and we are left to chuse which of them we will prefer, tho' it is impossible we can long doubt which of them deserves our preference, whether the gratification of our bodily senses and desires, or the improvement of our souls into a conformity to the divine nature and will.

Nor are these two, when considered in a just light, inconsistent with one another: When our Creator placed us in such a state as requires some attention to the ordinary concerns of life, we may be assured he never will require of us a thing so inconsistent with our condition as the being intirely abstracted from these, or giving up all manner of intercourse and connection with the world, for this would prevent

prevent our answering the purposes of his providence in sending us into it; what he enjoins us is, the putting no more than a just value on it; what he plainly intends, by placing us in such a state of connection with, and dependence upon outward and sensible things, is to exercise our inward graces and virtues, to put us to the trial, and make us draw some inward mental improvement from every outward circumstance we are placed in. Thus, when we are in want or outward distress, it is to try our submission to his will, to teach us humility and patience when afflicted, and prepare us for the exercise of gratitude when delivered: When we see others in want or distress around us, is it that God could not easily have prevented this, and appointed a way of having them all supplied and relieved immediately by himself, or so ordered men's condition as that none of them should stand in need of any such occasional successive supplies and relief? all this he could easily have done, but he chose to make the intervention or instrumentality of their fellow-men necessary for this purpose, for the sake of cherishing habits of charity and compassion in them. Thus also when we are surrounded with all the pleasures and conveniencies of life, our christian fortitude is exercised in keeping our minds unpolluted by and disengaged from them,

them, as well as attentive to something higher, and ready to be resigned when deprived of them; it was for such purposes as these, that we were involved in bodies perishing and corruptible, not for the sake of any addition that their enjoyments can make to our happiness, but that we might draw inward, moral, or spiritual improvement, from the intercourse by them established with things without us, if we consider them in the right point of view, as deserving no further attention than as they are made subservient to this end.

The unreasonableness and folly of any stronger engagement than was now mentioned, to this world and the things thereof, will yet further appear from

The *other* consideration we took notice of, namely our own *experience* of their vanity, that is, of their changeableness, inconstancy and insufficiency, even for giving us present happiness and satisfaction, subjects often spoken of, and plain from every one's experience, but whose influence on practice is too little to be seen. It is indeed one strong proof of our being designed for something higher than can be obtained or enjoyed in this life, that we never meet with any thing in it which can give us that enjoyment or improvement of which we find ourselves capable, or that even continues to give us so much

much pleasure and satisfaction as we may have once expected from it; when we receive any new addition to our wealth and fortune, any preferment perhaps, or settlement in the world, much desired for ourselves or for our friends, then we think all will be well with us, and that it will always give us the same pleasure as at first, yea and though we find ourselves disappointed in some instances, yet we still go on in the same round of folly and self-deceit, until at length it become extremely difficult, and almost impossible for us, to get our minds disengaged from what we know to be undeserving of our esteem; our wisest method, therefore, would be to resolve, that if we have been once deceived in this manner, we shall not be so a second time; that we shall lose no time in disengaging ourselves from these vanities, in quitting our attachments to every thing that has the least tendency to draw us off from the paths of virtue, from the love of God and true goodness: The consciousness of this will be a never-failing source of joy and delight, while every thing else is found to disappoint us, even in this life, and will much more be found to do so in the next, when the condition of our souls shall be laid open, and an eternal separation put between us and those perishing delights.

delights of sense, by which we had formerly allowed ourselves, even against the conviction of our own minds, to be corrupted and enslaved.

Many things more might be said to recommend that religious and devout *Disengagement from the World*, which we are considering; the persuasives to it in scripture are innumerable, particularly in the whole of our Saviour's life and doctrine. One of the most celebrated enemies of our religion was forced to own, that there was no argument in defence of Christianity more difficult for him to answer than this, That after all his enquiries into the life of CHRIST, he could not find one instance of his being engaged in any worldly designs and pursuits; and, indeed, whoever considers aright our Saviour's life and doctrine in this view, must see something in them more than human; some features of divinity not to be found in any fictitious or political scheme of religion, that ever appeared in the world; for (to prosecute this argument a little further) as our condition and continuance in this world, is by all owned to bear very little proportion to what we look for in the next, we must, however ignorant of the nature of our future condition, always suppose its interests and enjoyments to be such as concern us infinitely above every thing in this

life; so that any messenger to us from the other world, may naturally be supposed to bend his chief care towards the giving us a high opinion of it, and drawing off our affection from all these perishing things in this life which are inconsistent with it, when he sees us set on them to our own destruction. The interests of another life are evidently our highest interests; the advancing them therefore, in preference to all temporal concerns, must be the peculiar province of true religion, and the peculiar design of any instructions or manifestations to us from that God, who has always our highest good in view; so that whatever doctrine does not seem directed for promoting this, can never be thought directed by God, or designed for the true happiness of mankind; but, on the other hand, where any teacher, or any doctrine, appears to consider present and future things in a just light, to value them as they really deserve, and, of consequence, to turn our thoughts and affections from the things of this transient state, as of very small value and importance to us, towards the concerns of a future endless state; wherever, I say, any teacher gives such evidence of his acquaintance with another world, by exemplifying in himself, and recommending to others a just regard to its superior interests, as well as a just contempt of every thing

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thing here below, such a teacher may be presumed to have his commission from on high, and deserves to be hearkened to accordingly; but where were these ever so remarkably displayed as in the life and doctrine of the *Christian* REDEEMER? Where was he ever seen anxiously providing against the hardships and distresses of human life, or indulging himself in its unnecessary pleasures? What he taught that he practised; he did not lay up for himself treasure on earth; neither took he any thought about its short-lived enjoyments and pursuits; these to him were nothing when compared to the heavenly joys in his view; and whether his followers, in all ages, do actually practise the same *disengagement from the world*, or not, it is certain the arguments and injunctions to it never were more repeated, enforced, and exemplified, than by him.

From what has been said, joined to any serious reflection on the different occurrences of life, we may easily see that a *disengagement from the World*, such as has been described, is a disposition both reasonable and suitable to our present state; but, that we may the better understand it, and know when we are possessed of it, there are some of its characters or properties, which we promised here to take notice of, as

I. That it must be *deliberate and composed*, proceeding from a fair and diligent examination of the real value of these different objects that present themselves to us, and solicit our regard. Upon meeting with some worldly crosses and disappointments, many have formed good enough resolutions of renouncing their former fond attachment to sensible pleasures and pursuits, and been perhaps, for some time, heartily out of humour with the world, till better success has reconciled them to it; but this is far from that calm and rational disengagement from it which religion requires, and which proceeds from no insolent contempt of others, nor from any unnatural disregard to the interests of mankind, such as appears in these peevish and capricious devotees now mentioned; but from a just sense of the excellency of our nature as men, and the sanctity of our calling as Christians, directing us to fix our aims on something nobler and more exalted than the pleasures of sense and appetite; to delight ourselves, not with the mere possession of the good things of this life, but with the judicious use of them, for administering to the necessities, and contributing to the good of others; all this being necessary to qualify us for any higher spheres of enjoyment and perfection we may hereafter be designed for.

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This reasonable and deliberate *disengagement* of our affections from all worldly pursuits and concerns, is what may be practised in any station of life, however much involved in its necessary employments and affairs, as all that is required is, not the giving up entirely with these, but the prosecuting them in such a way as may make them subservient to the higher purposes for which we were created; not but that some have, by their station and circumstances, more advantage in this way than others; or that the man, who is necessarily engaged in all the hurry and noise of tumultuous life, can be as much disengaged from it as the hermit in his distant cell. This can never be expected or required; we have, in this, as well as in other instances, our different talents and opportunities to answer for, some more, some less; yet still it must be acknowledged, that in no condition or circumstances, we need be so entirely immersed in worldly affairs, as to hurt our integrity and innocence, or have our attention quite removed from our eternal and more momentous concerns.

From this *deliberation* and composure of thought, in drawing off our minds from too strong an attachment to sensible things, there follows

Another certain character of such a *disengagement*, namely, that it will be *constant* and

uniform on all occasions, and not varying with the different changes of our outward circumstances and fortune, as is too often the case with us, when we lay down to ourselves resolutions and rules of conduct, whose consequences we have not maturely weighed. In vain, therefore, will any man pretend to be *disengaged* from the world, and devoted to God, unless he can bring himself, not by starts only, but at all times, to look with indifference on the ensnaring delights of sense, as soon as they appear to attract too much of his regard, and unless he can strengthen his resolutions against all the vicissitudes of human life.

The only other property I shall mention is, that our *disengagement* from the world, in order to our being devoted to the love and service of God, must be *entire* and *unreserved*: a heart divided betwixt God and the world, will be but a poor offering to our Maker, who alone has the just title to it. There is indeed nothing in which we are apter to impose upon ourselves than this, of thinking that we may retain *some* vanities, some worldly desires and pursuits, that are most agreeable to our temper and inclination, imagining them innocent, or at least excusable, if we give up with other things that ly not so much in our way. Thus the man who despises riches and pleasures, thinks himself perhaps sufficiently disengaged from

from the world, and that he may pursue his ambitious projects with a safe conscience, as, on the other hand, the sensual and covetous man flatters himself, that, if he banishes pride and ambition, he puts sufficient bounds to his desires; but let no man deceive himself here, God is not to be mocked by such a partial surrender of ourselves to him; nor indeed shall we ever have that entire satisfaction we wish for in our own minds, that "peace of God which passeth understanding," unless every idol of our hearts be sacrificed to him, every thought and affection brought into obedience to his will.

I shall only further take notice of two means or directions for attaining that deliberate, constant, and unreserved *disengagement from the world*, which we have been describing; and

The *first* is, only to take a *serious view* of it, coolly to consider what satisfaction we have ever got, or expect to get from it. If we saw a man deeply engaged in any unprofitable branch of trade, without ever casting up his gains by it, or changing it for a better and more profitable, when in his offer, we would very justly condemn him; or if we saw our friend much bent upon obtaining any inheritance or office, without ever considering the dangers he run by it, or the returns it was to make him,
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we would certainly think him very rash and imprudent; if we would be our own friends, therefore, should we not seriously consider, when engaged in the eager pursuit of the things of this life, what danger we run, and what advantage we have reaped, or expect to reap from them? and indeed a cool reflection on these would be enough to make us relinquish most of our wordly pursuits.

The other mean of *disengaging* our minds from this world, is frequently to *meditate* on the next; to dwell often in our thoughts on the sublimity and purity of these future endless delights, which reason and scripture propose as the great mark we ought always to aim at; the *habitual* contemplation of these, will certainly put us out of conceit with the fading vanities of this life, especially when they appear to prejudice our eternal interests; and there cannot be a stronger mark of the depravity and degeneracy of our natures, than to see the coldness and indifference with which we receive the certain, and almost demonstrable assurances of our being designed for the most exalted happiness and perfection our nature is capable of, if we are not wanting to ourselves in the means of arriving at it. The liveliest views we can have of our future condition, come indeed far short of the reality of things, as they shall afterwards appear; yet

yet still, methinks, they might lessen our value for all mean and sensual enjoyments, and moderate our pursuit of them, in like manner as a hearty engagement in the more important business of life, leaves no room to be taken up with trifling amusements. Let our chief interests, therefore, engross the whole capacity of our souls: Let the habitual contemplation of future glories, disengage our minds from all the sordid views and pursuits of this vain world; that, when it with its enchantments are dissolved, our portion may still remain to us, our views of God, and evidences of his favour, may be unclouded, and our souls admitted into an indissoluble union with that infinitely perfect Being, from whom all bliss, being, and perfection, are derived.

DISSER-

DISSERTATION VII.

O N

EDUCATION.

THE title hereto prefixed informs of the subject I have now in view; and tho' I allow the result of my enquiries and reflections, with respect to it, to pass under the name of a *Dissertation*, in common with the preceeding tracts, yet it is not so much my intention, to treat of it in the philosophical or didactic way, as in the practical; there being no subject that has more immediate respect to practice, than EDUCATION: Those who are no philosophers must have it long committed to them; but, like other sciences of most general utility, it must have its foundation in theory; there must be some insight into human nature; some knowledge of the powers and principles implanted in it; the improvement they are capable of; the great end in view by such improvement; and the most effectual way of conducting the mind towards it. In the knowledge of all these lies the

the *Theory of Education*; and, for this, I beg leave to refer to the preceeding Dissertations.

To say much on the importance of Education, that is, of having it carefully attended to and conducted, is also unnecessary, as is every sort of labour, to prove what men generally admit; and, with respect to Education, it will easily be admitted, that the difference betwixt one man and another, as to every branch of improvement, mental or corporeal, generally speaking, arises as much from this, as from any original essential difference, in respect of constitution or capacity.

What we now chiefly propose is, to consider *Education*, in its progress through the different periods of life; or, rather, through that part of life, to which it principally has respect, and which is commonly considered as terminating on our arrival at manhood. The age at which this is commonly fixed is well known, but no general rule will suit all cases here: The growth of the understanding (which may be supposed the most necessary requisite to manhood) admits of as great diversity as that of the body; some are farther advanced at sixteen than others at the age of twenty; but, as the conduct of affairs in life makes it necessary, that a certain rule should be established as to this, extending to all cases, without distinction

distinction of characters or capacities. We find that one third part, or nearly so, of the common extent of active life, is supposed to pass, before manhood or maturity of years, and of intellect, is attained. Previous to this, three lesser periods may be reckoned, to which Education must have respect; these are, Infancy, Childhood, and Youth, allowing six or seven years to each of them, as much precision here is neither necessary nor practicable. During the

First of these PERIODS (whether called by the name of INFANCY, or any other) the business of Education may be said to have respect rather to the corporeal system than to the mental, tho' the latter also is not to be entirely over-looked, during the whole of this period, they are, indeed, so nearly connected with one another, that a total inattention to either of them, might be prejudicial to both. It must, however, be always remembered, that what has respect to the bodily part, must be considered and attended to, in a subserviency to the other; and, with this view, it must not be thought a matter of little or no consequence, even in infancy, before the powers of the mind are unfolded, to give a particular attention to the state of the body; an attention descending to some things, which, however minute,

minute, cannot be thought trivial, but by the undiscerning and unexperienced.

The *first* of this kind that occurs is the business of *Nursing*: As to this, it will be enough to make one observation, which extends to many other cases, that we may afterwards have occasion to mention; and that is, that wherever the method, which nature most obviously points out, must be departed from, the less this is done the better. When (as is often the case) mothers cannot suckle their own children, their place would be best supplied, by those who are most nearly of the same age and complexion, but with as much advantage as possible, in respect of health and constitution. Nothing, but an unavoidable necessity, will justify the nursing of infants by the spoon, instead of suckling them; or the making choice of a nurse, with that hurry and precipitation with which it is often done, though nature gives such early warning with respect to it. Whoever felt the inconvenience of changing them, upon the discovery of constitutional diseases, want of milk, sluggishness, and the like, (all which they endeavour artfully to conceal as much as possible) will not think it unnecessary to take this warning as to nurses. What proof they may formerly have given of their success, and what regimen

they then observed, ought chiefly to be attended to.

Besides her being healthful and careful, I cannot help mentioning *Cheerfulness* as a qualification of particular importance to a nurse, by giving hopes of her promoting the health and liveliness of the child, while she only gratifies her own humour and affection, by the frequent but careful dandling of it.

Nor can we condemn the attention, which some have recommended, in respect of pregnant mothers, as well as nurses, in the way of preventing whatever may disturb, deject, or discompose them, and studying to promote their ease of mind, serenity and cheerfulness, as having a beneficial influence on the fruit of their care, on the embryo or infant, as well as on themselves.

The good effect of the *cold bath* as to health, at every time of life, and particularly in infancy, is so universally admitted, that there would be no occasion for mentioning it, were it not to introduce a remark or two, with respect to the manner of managing it; which is, that, as the seat of diseases, with infants, is chiefly in the head and upper parts of the body, care should be taken to bathe these first: And again, that, tho' some occasional disorders may make it necessary to discontinue the use of the cold bath for a little, or, at least,

least, to make it less cold, yet care should be taken to return, as soon as possible, to the former regimen; a mistaken tenderness as to this, has often given occasion to ricketish disorders, and weakness of constitution, which might, by a judicious use of the cold bath in infancy, have been prevented.

For the same reason that cold bathing is mentioned, as having so much influence on health, some notice must also be taken of *Gloathing*, particularly in infancy, when all straitness, and unnecessary warmth, are to be carefully avoided. This rule, and the reason of it, are so universally admitted, that no enlargement on them is necessary, however fit it may be to recommend a greater attention to them in practice; as also to the manner of bringing infants, gradually, to use their tender limbs, without occasioning any distortion or deformity, which they may afterwards be unable to get rid of.

When the means of health are mentioned, it might be expected, that some notice should also be taken of the *diseases* peculiar to this period; but, unless they are prevented, or mitigated in their effects, by the use of simple means, there is little room to hope, for their being remedied, at this age, by any of those compound medicinal preparations, which might, in a more advanced period of life, be

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proper

proper and useful: While they are unable to express what they feel, it will sometimes not be easy to find out the grounds of their complaint, or to remove them; and, when once they begin a little to have a will of their own, before their understanding is so far advanced as to be reasoned with, it is still more difficult to manage them, nor will medicine much avail them. No medicine will prevent the diseases of teething, whooping cough, or small pox and measles; but, where the previous habit of body is healthful, there is the more reason to expect that all their symptoms and effects will be mitigated; and, tho' the original weakness of some constitutions, makes this healthfulness almost unattainable by them, yet the best of constitutions may suffer, by inattention to the few simple directions that have been suggested.

Fresh air, frequent exercise, plainness and fulness of diet, in a word, whatever may have the effect of gradually stretching and strengthening the fibres, deserves particular attention, in this early period of life, we are now treating of. There have been instances enough of the success of such simple means, for strengthening constitutions originally weak, to encourage the using and persevering in them: and let the debility of the constitution, and success of these means, be as they will, we cannot

cannot easily fall in with Monsf. Rousseau, in neglecting or taking no charge of such children as are constitutionally weak and sickly: By this rule, the celebrated Monsf. Paschal, Mr Boyle, and many others of distinguished character and genius, would have shared the fate of the Hebrew children in Egypt, and the world have been deprived of their incomparable labours.

But, is there as yet (you will say) no room for any higher object of attention? very little indeed, till the dawnings of reason begin to appear; and, when they do, your first care must be, to prevent any *wrong habits* being contracted.

In infancy and childhood, it is remarkable, how easily any infection is caught, any *habits** of body or mind contracted, from the example and imitation of those who are often with us, especially if they are such as we are led to regard, with particular affection or esteem: Even bodily attitudes, the most awkward, I have known to be thus acquired, and long retained.

Q 3

Habits

• To establish *habits*--it is not enough to give rules or instructions—Example, with consequent imitation, will have more effect, and custom is a frequent and uniform reiteration of acts, long continued.—The acquisition of language is enough to shew the power of custom and habit; for from this only arises any facility in the use of one language rather than another.

Habits of impudence or bashfulness, obstinacy or pliability, sincerity or insincerity, we may likewise often see imbibed by infants, when advancing in years; from, perhaps, the example of the most contemptible, of those whose company they have most access to, and delight in.

How is all this, you will say, to be prevented or remedied? It is to be done, by a proper choice of those who are about them; by not allowing them to pass too much of their time among servants and dependents, or those who would either humour or cross them injudiciously; by keeping them, as much as possible, in the company of such as may, by imitation, lead them to *good habits*, (for of this also they are soon capable) by observing carefully when they begin to contract bad ones, so as to check them soon; and, as there is danger that parents may not be so quick-sighted with respect to this, it might be of use to make them, sometimes, undergo the inspection of such as would be less partial to their faults.

Another direction, suited even to the age of infants, tho' not confined to this period, is to encourage an *inquisitive disposition** in them,

to

* *Curiosity* is weak in old age, but strong in infancy and youth; and as it is peculiar to the human species, it gives them an unspeakable advantage over other animals, in the acquisition of knowledge and improvement of their superior capacities.

to give answers to their questions, in such a way as may make some impression on their fancy, in order to their being remembered: Hence it is that the use of fables is so proper at this age, when any traces in the memory wear out very soon, if it has no assistance, in this way, from the fancy or imagination, they cannot be too soon accustomed likewise to reason a little, and to draw just inferences or conclusions from what they see and hear.

To accustom them early to *restrain appetite*, or have it under some command, is also of great consequence; were they even engaged, rather *voluntarily* than by any exertion of authority, to deny themselves some gratifications; rather voluntarily, I say, than by an exertion of *authority*, which is a way of managing them that should be extended to all other cases likewise; for the engaging them, as it were of themselves, to do what is right, would give the greatest hopes of their persevering in it.

But authority there must be, in some hand or other, however seldom, and however gently it may be used; it is neither necessary, nor proper, that this authority should be in many hands, else there may be sometimes a clashing of it, or it may work a kind of servility; but, in some one hand at least there must be such authority, to be exerted when necessary;
and

and, in order to its having the proper effect, in this as well as in all other cases, there must be a persuasion, as to him who exercises it, that he has an affection for them, with a sincere desire and intention of doing them good; and that, for doing this, besides affection and integrity, he is possessed of wisdom and capacity, far superior to their own, so as to know much better than they do, what is good for them, and how the same may be attained; the great difficulty here will be, to preserve that affection spoken of, without such a mistaken tenderness, as may either hinder the exercising authority when proper, or the allowing our infant charge to be exposed to some little pains, hazards and hardships, that may be necessary to prevent debility of body or mind.

One other particular remains to be spoke to, as to this period, and that is, How far it will admit of some attention to *books or study*, of any kind? There is no doubt but there have been instances of great proficiency made by some extraordinary geniuses, even in the period we are now speaking of; such as Monsieur Paschal, Grotius, Tasso and others; but these are, by no means, to be drawn into precedents; it may rather, with more safety, be admitted, as a general rule, that, to have the faculties of mind and body invigorated,
and

and prepared for future employment, should rather be the object of attention during this period, than any premature exercise of them, in the way of learning, unless so far as it can be insensibly instilled, without making it, by any means, a task or burden.

In a consistency with this view, the rudiments of some branch of erudition, might possibly be instilled; such as, very short general tables of geography and chronology; but that which is particularly suited to this period, is the acquiring any of the living *languages*, that are most necessary for use, particularly their *native* language, which, even in this period, they might, by any of the ingenious methods mentioned by *Mr Locke*, or otherwise, be brought to read distinctly, without its being made any burden to them, and, so far as respects *pronunciation*, their organs can, at this age, be formed to it, much more easily than afterwards, and any habit of *pronunciation* now got, is very likely to be retained, in some measure, all their life.

To learn by the ear, but not as yet by grammar, a little of the *French* language, or of any other language that may be useful, not excepting even the *Latin*, in the way of speaking it familiarly, might, possibly, in many cases, be more practicable than is commonly thought, even before the expiration of that period.

period which we have hitherto been treating of, and have, for the sake of order or method, made to comprehend the first seven years of life, or third part of our time before arriving at manhood.

Having therefore finished what appears most necessary to be said, with respect to this, we proceed to the

Second PERIOD, distinguished by the name of *CHILDHOOD* or *Puerility*, and taking in the six or seven years, immediately following that which we have been now considering, but, in such a manner, as will not admit of an invariable rule, by which we are to determine, when it is that the distinction, betwixt it and infancy on the one hand, or youth on the other, may be said to take place; this depending, as was formerly observed, not on the increase of years only, but also on the diversity of genius, capacity, and advantages for improvement.

In the transition from infancy to childhood, when they are, as it were, blended together, the attention formerly mentioned to any *habits* that are formed, is particularly necessary; habits of indolence or application, of vanity or modesty, of generosity or meanness, of benevolence or selfishness, are then, as it were, in embryo, and so ready to escape the attention of those whose charge they were formerly,

formerly, that, generally speaking, it would be advisable (so far as other circumstances will admit of it) to have, as it were, a second weaning of them, at this period, by committing them to private *boarding-schools**, where no care or tenderness necessary should be wanting, but where any preference given them should depend intirely on their behaviour. In this view, it will easily be seen, that the choice

* We have here ventured to differ (though not so much as may at first appear) with Mr Locke and others, who have said a great deal as to the preference of private tutors to publick schools. To enter on any argument or dispute as to this here is unnecessary, but we beg leave to obviate what may be said against the method here proposed by the two following observations.

1. The genius and disposition of children, in respect of idleness or diligence, bashfulness or forwardness, and the like, as also the disposition of those with whom they have a domestic connection, must be taken into the account, before we can judge of the expediency of a private or publick education in different cases, nor is there any disadvantage in trying the most private method first, and continuing it while it is successful, and when it must be departed from, the most private boarding-schools (both in respect of the number of scholars, and some distance from towns) should be preferred.

2. The qualifications required by Mr Locke and others in a private tutor, are such as make it extremely difficult to find any so qualified, and of such experience, who would undertake so young a charge as we are now speaking of, with an engagement to continue in it. In most cases it will probably be found, that private boarding-schools are best suited to what we here mention as the second period of education, viz. from the age of seven to that of fourteen, and private tutors at the university and elsewhere for four years more, being the time in which there is most danger of being corrupted as to principle and practice,

choice of a boarding school, should depend upon the condition of life in view for children, so as to put them in the way of associating, neither with those, over whom they might assume too much superiority, nor even with such as might do the same over them, and give them an admiration of splendour, or taste for expence beyond their circumstances; but rather, to mix with those of different stations, and, in a particular manner, such as are nearly of the same station with themselves; to which we may add a circumstance of some importance, *viz.* that the distance (which there must be) from their parents or nearest friends, should (if possible) not be so great, but that they may lay their account with having their behaviour reported to them, and the usage they meet with; and may, by seeing them on some occasions, (but not too often) satisfy them as to their proficiency, in those qualifications that are necessary to form them for being men, as well as scholars.

What was said as to preventing wrong habits in infancy, may be extended to childhood, with this addition, that there must be superadded, some more attention in bringing them to *right habits*; those particularly, in which they appear to be most defective. The farther they advance in this period, endeavour to manage or deal with them, more in the way of *reasoning* than of authority, and to en-
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engage their affection to those, whose precepts you would have them obey; accompanied with that persuasion, formerly mentioned, of their authority's being supported by superior knowledge and attention to their real good and welfare.

In this period, I have often observed the constitution of children suffer more by a mistaken tenderness, than either before or after it. The care necessary, on their being seized with any of the common indispositions, to which they are then liable, is often continued too long, so as to enfeeble them, by confinement, by too much restraint as to their diet, by excess in cloathing, by discontinuing that great strengthener, formerly mentioned, the cold bath, and even, perhaps, by stuffing them with medicines. 'Tis true, indeed, that this is the period, in which any constitutional weaknesses or diseases will most readily appear, and, when discovered, they are to be cautiously and seasonably attended to; but you must beware of exceeding here, and continuing the use of the means for recovering health, so long as to be hurtful to it, and perhaps bring on worse diseases. Beware also of making this a reason for immoderate indulgence; for, giving the child all his will, rather than fret him by denying it, the consequence of this will be, that, as he will very soon

soon discover your injudicious fondness and partiality; he'll take care not to recover very fast, either his health or good humour; he'll probably grow more unreasonable and impetuous in his demands, till, at last, you'll be obliged to use more violent methods in crossing him, than would, at first, have been necessary.

Our observation as to constitutional diseases being best discovered at this period, may be extended to the mind likewise, its *ruling passions*, or idiosyncracies, whether rashness or timidity, softness or severity, cunning or simplicity, peevishness or bluntness, narrowness or profusion, and the like; now is the time to discover these, and to bring them, as much as possible, under the restraint of reason, assisted by a proper *balancing* of the one against the other; that is, by sometimes permitting your young pupil, to go so far to that side to which he seems too inclineable, as that he himself may be made sensible of his error; or to strengthen the motives; that may engage him to the opposite side, beyond what you would otherwise approve, making allowance for the opposition that will arise, from his inclination to the contrary.

If even in infancy, much more now is it necessary, to accustom children, to have their desires, passions and pursuits, under proper restraint,

straint, by submitting them all (as was said of the ruling passion) to the authority of reason; nor is it one passion only, that will be found always to rule; that which for the time is strongest will carry all before it, if not timeously checked, and accustomed to the *government of reason*, as just now mentioned; and, however oft they fail of being thus governed, they are to be encouraged still to continue their endeavours after it.

Even before it is safe to encourage them to reason or argue, as to what respects *religion*, it will be proper, to make them keep up a reverence for every thing sacred, and, in forming the ideas that are annexed to the words they use, to take care that they be as correct as possible, but not too complex. A reverence and affection for their parents is one of the most natural principles in children, which cannot be too much inculcated; and the most natural way, in which they can rise to any conception of the *Supreme Being*, is, by considering him, in the relation of our common Parent and Guardian, seeing and over-ruling all, and fit to be addressed and adored, obeyed and relied on accordingly, in such a way as is most agreeable to the manifestations he has made of his nature and will to us, both by the light of nature and revelation.

To reason, in some degree, is as natural for children as to breathe; that, in which there is difficulty here, therefore is, the teaching them to *reflect* a little while they *reason*; that is, before they draw conclusions, and form their judgments and opinions; they are not to be encouraged either to form or to declare their opinion too hastily, especially when it is not asked, but should be accustomed to deliberate, yet not too long; to hear with attention; to speak with modesty; to ask information; to reflect a little on it when got, and to be open always to conviction from reason.

When there appears to be any natural defect in their faculties, or a very great degree of natural *dullness* and stupidity, so far as these can be remedied by proper culture, upon the principles already laid down, it should be done; but, where they cannot, great tenderness and compassion should be shewn, rather than any unavailable severity and correction that might crush their spirit; but where these natural defects do not take place, some care is necessary to guard against an excess of *forwardness* or pertness on the one hand, as well as a sheepish *backwardness* on the other; the latter is to be cured, not so much by reproofs, as by moderate indulgence, by sometimes overlooking it, by expressing a good opinion of them, and bringing them to a better opinion.

tion of themselves, by the company, sometimes, of those who are more backward, and by commending any proficiency they make. But the former, the forwardness and pertness mentioned, though it be a greater enemy to improvement, because it is generally accompanied with too much vanity and self-conceit, to receive instruction and be profited by it, yet it is rather more difficult to cure than the other, as it commonly meets with more indulgence, and even approbation, through its being mistaken for manliness and spirit; it is not however incurable at this age; nothing being easier than to find out the agreeable young prattler in many blunders, and, perhaps to convince him, that he is far short of others, who have less shew but more merit, and with whom he should be made to associate, and to appear frequently amongst them, however disagreeable it may be to him, and whatever disadvantage he may have, at first, by a comparison with them, till he is excited to rival or excel them, in respect of that which gives them such advantage over him. Care should be taken, however, that such comparison or rivalry be practised rather with strangers than with near connections, or children of the same family, among whom it might breed unnatural differences and dislike. For the same reason, parents should beware of

shewing such a partiality in favour of some of their children as may draw on them the envy and ill-will of the rest.

As it is in the period we are now treating of, that the diversity of tempers and dispositions in children appears, so, it is now likewise, that the diversity of their *genius* begins to shew itself, and should be carefully observed, as the best rule for directing their future destination or way of life. By *genius* we here mean a natural disposition and capacity for some particular study or pursuit beyond others, and, to discover the bent of this in children, is a matter of some nicety. You must let them use great freedom with you, before they will disclose it, and, if you cannot do this yourself, you must consult and employ others with whom they have such intire freedom; you must observe how they choose to employ their time, when alone, and, when no particular task is appointed them; or, if they are come the length of being intrusted with any money, you must observe how they manage it, and on what they choose to lay it out; what it is that they soonest weary of, and what they are willing to labour longest about, even privately and of themselves; also what elevates or depresses them most. By an observation of all these it is, that the bent of their genius may be

be discovered, and proper measures taken thereupon.

The studies and exercises proper for them, shall be touched at a little, afterwards; all that we shall here observe is, that, as the *memory* is the store-house of ideas, care should be taken, through this period particularly, to have it well replenished, and its furniture in such order as may be fittest for use afterwards; this will give the *understanding*, as it advances, something to work upon, and make its work easier. But, with respect to the *imagination*, or *fancy*, there is no difficulty in discovering where it is remarkably lively, and assisting its exercise; it may, however, be observed, that, where there is great sterility or barrenness of imagination, it can scarcely be cured; nor is it of great consequence to labour much with children for this purpose; they may have a sound understanding, with great poverty of imagination, and become useful members of society, though they are neither poets, painters or even orators; nay, there have been instances of some children, who were thought dull and stupid, and yet afterwards proved to have strong intellects. Cato was reckoned almost a fool in his infancy, and was remarkably reserved and obstinate; I have heard that even the great Sir Isaac Newton, was likewise reckoned a dull boy at school, till his private

private mathematical exercises discovered the superiority of his genius in that way. When speaking of the imagination, we may observe, that it is of consequence, in respect of its operations in childhood, to guard against wrong associations of ideas; such as, their associating the idea of superior merit with that of fine cloaths, equipage, &c. the idea of darkness with that of spirits, and the idea of spirits, or invisible beings with that of fear, danger or hostility, and the like.

With respect to the different exercises and branches of learning, that are fit to be attended to in the education of youth, all that falls under our notice further here, in our way through the different periods we are treating of, is that, before the end of this, which we are at present considering, that is before the age of fourteen (without being very precise as to the number of years, or measure of time to be allotted each period) all should (if possible) be over that is necessary, in the way of those exercises, which have any respect to the body, and to which it is most easily formed, while its organs and limbs are tender and pliable; such are *dancing*, some knowledge of *musick*, vocal and instrumental, and *writing*. The other exercises that shall be taken notice of afterwards, as more particularly suited to the next period, viz. that of youth, such as fencing, riding,

riding, swimming, &c. as they require a greater exertion of strength, than is commonly attained before the age now mentioned, they can scarcely be recommended sooner; unless in the case of such as are remarkably forward in respect of their growth and bodily strength.

Diet and diversions are all that we have to make any further remarks on, during this period. As to *diet*, therefore, the proper regimen for children needs not be here mentioned, being so often treated of, and generally so well known, were it but equally well attended to in practice. The few following observations may however not be improper here.

I. A plain diet, i. e. that which requires least of cookery, sauces, mixture of different foods and the like, is fittest for children, as tending most to nourish and strengthen them, without inflaming or vitiating their juices: A milk diet is particularly suited to them in most cases.

The fewer dishes they are accustomed to at their meals, so much the better; for the gratification of an appetite, that is provoked only by variety, will probably be more hurtful than useful to them.

II. While their health and digestion are good, there needs not be great anxiety about restraining them, as to the *quantity* of their food, if it is only regulated aright as to quality; it would

would not indeed be improper, to have so much regard to *frequency*, in the diet of children, as to prevent their overloading their stomachs at once, even with plain food, but there is little danger from this, when the appetite is not provoked by variety, or unnecessary delicacy.

Some are rather more rigorous than is necessary in keeping *animal food* from children; *viz.* flesh or fish, even in the plainest way; but, as it will make, probably, the principal part of their solid food through the rest of life, it does not seem improper to accustom them, in some measure, to it, as soon as the juvenile diseases of small-pox, &c. are well got over; taking care, however, that it be always accompanied with so much of the vegetable kind, *viz.* bread, roots, and the like, as may prevent their becoming too carnivorous and inflammable.

As to *drink*, indeed, such as may be called strong, whatever prospect there may be of any future use of it, the reason drawn from this for the moderate use of animal food must be very cautiously extended to it; I am not clear for the use of any drink, much stronger than water, or very weak beer, till this period is over. The first effect of all strong liquors, in some degree, more or less, is to contract the fibres, and coats of the vessels

self they approach; which makes all such liquors the more improper till full growth is attained, and, even when it is, we shall see great reason for moderating the use of them.

With respect to the *diversions* and amusements of children, all we shall observe here is, that, as the disposition towards them, is now under less restraint, from any other views, principles or engagements, than afterwards, when they are more advanced, there will be the more need for the use of some authority (but such as must always be supported by reason and exercised with affection) for restraining, or keeping it within proper bounds, so as to avoid contracting an habitual aversion to every thing, in the way of study or business, that may interfere with it. This is often the consequence of an unbounded disposition for play, even as they advance in childhood; and, was there nothing more lost by it, but the time now squandered in this way, there might be hopes of easily retrieving it; but the view of what may be afterwards lost or misapplied, by their contracting a habit of idleness and dislike of application, makes it a matter of some more importance.

While, therefore, diversions are allowed children, with much more latitude, freedom, and even usefulness to health, at this age, than

than at any other, the following regulations may be proper with respect to them.

1. Their diversions should be always such as are most conducive to health and vigour, not such as may confine, relax or enervate. All exercises that require running are fittest at this age, and, together with these, such as exercise the arms much, without distorting any other part of the body.

2. As they must have companions in their diversions, a regard to justice, honour and good humour towards them, should be cherished, and, on the contrary, every appearance of injustice, dishonesty or ill-nature, carefully and immediately restrained.

3. Diversions should, as much as possible, be made the reward of application, or a preparative and incitement to it, and, therefore,

4. They must be always so far under your own command, and that of others, as to discontinue their diversions, without grumbling, how soon ever this appears proper or necessary.

We conclude our remarks, on this period, with observing, that the study of *languages* should, if possible, be over with it, or, at least, that part of it which would be most laborious and difficult of attainment afterwards. And if, as we shall afterwards observe, such progress is made in the living languages, even before this

this period begins, as to have the expression and pronounciation, in some measure, formed, while the organs of speech are most pliable; it will not be thought a matter of great difficulty, before this period ends, while the memory is in its greatest vigour, to acquire as much knowledge of the dead languages, that is, of what are commonly called the learned, *viz.* the Greek, Latin, and also the Hebrew languages, as is necessary for the easy perusal of any books wrote in them; without this, they cannot easily pursue the different studies that are reserved for the following period: But, tho' the degree of acquaintance with these languages, necessary for the purposes mentioned, be now supposed attainable; yet we cannot expect such acquaintance with them, at this age, as is necessary for the critical perusal of books, and elegance in composition, to which a maturity of judgment is required, that suits better the

Third PERIOD we are to treat of, *viz.* that of *YOUTH* or *Puberty*, reckoning it from the age of fourteen or fifteen, to that of twenty or twenty-one.

The preceeding period is supposed to have been spent mostly at the *boarding-school*, where the teachers, companions, and attendants, are all supposed to be such as (while no necessary care or tenderness are omitted) will have no blind

partiality, in favour of their charge, that may endanger their indulging them, in wrong habits or practices, either through unwillingness to correct them, or by their escaping their notice; of both which there is some danger, while they are chiefly conversant with their parents, nearest relations and dependents: We would not, however, have them considered, while at boarding-schools, as entirely excluded from the notice of those now mentioned, who are particularly interested in them; on the contrary, it is of consequence, as a spur to their assiduity, and for keeping them on their good behaviour, as well as for exonerating, in some measure, those with whom they are entrusted, that, at certain intervals, an account may be supposed to be given of their improvement; that there be access to further information, if wanted; and such a connection still kept up, both by correspondence, and, by, at least, annual occasions of passing some time together, as that the ties and feelings of affection, on both sides, may still continue; and that, while children are animated, by the prospect of approbation from their parents, and friends, these may also have their care and anxiety in some measure allayed and compensated, by their returns of affection and success, and may have it in their power to observe, more narrowly, their progress, or what

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new directions may, at different times, appear necessary with respect to them; as to which, we would further observe, that,

When any great *change* is found necessary, in their management or behaviour, through any wrong habits and practices being too long indulged, and the contrary neglected, it may, sometimes, be proper to transfer the management of them to others, who, if they are entire strangers to them, will have much advantage, over those who had the charge of them formerly, however capable they may have been of it; for, even an untowardly child, is, generally, upon his good behaviour among strangers, and endeavours, perhaps, to gain on them, but as soon as he finds their opinion of him to be fixed, by being either against him, or biassed in his favour, he is no longer restrained by any regard to it; and, even when his own mind tells him, that his behaviour has been wrong, it often happens, thro' a kind of false shame or obstinacy, that he will not condemn himself, so far as to change it, among his former acquaintances; but let him be sent among entire strangers, who will regard him only according to his merit and behaviour, and who are not supposed to be prejudiced against him, by any knowledge of his former misconduct, it is possible, nay very likely, that he will exert himself more, to

correct what is wrong, and, perhaps, change the whole system of his conduct, than if he had continued under the same management as formerly, however unexceptionable it might have been.

Whether a change of managers, in this way, be found necessary or not, during the period last spoken of, we may take it for granted, that, upon the commencement of this, which we are now considering, call it Puberty, Youth, or what you will, such a change will be necessary, both on account of the different studies now to be attended to, and the different manner in which advice is to be given, and authority maintained. As to this last, indeed, it must be owned, that to have advice and authority regarded, we must proceed with Youth, as they advance, more invariably than ever, upon the principles formerly laid down, *viz.* the getting their reason always on our side, convincing them of our affection, superior discretion and regard to their interest; for, when they are thus far advanced in years, let them make what use they will of their liberty, it is certain, they must be left more to their own management than formerly; they must be allowed to stand more upon their own legs, tho' with the risk of sometimes falling, rather than be always indebted to others for supporting them.

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With this view then, it is plain, that the more strict discipline and confinement of a boarding-school, must now give place to a plan of greater enlargement, the conducting of which must be determined, by what now appears, more plainly, to be, either the *bent* of their *genius*, or, at least, not very disagreeable to it; for tho' in some cases, it is observable, that a certain bent of genius appears, towards some particular studies, professions or occupations, and is so strong, that it should not be crossed, or, if it is, it will, afterwards, force a regard to itself, with more disadvantage; tho' (I say) thus much must be observed as to any remarkable bent of genius, in one particular way, yet, in most cases, the genius of youth is such, as that it may be successfully turned, more ways than one; but, there must be a choice now made, that its force may be more collected towards one point; and, as their inexperience of the world, makes them unfit to choose for themselves, others, who have more experience, must choose for them, according to their circumstances and capacities; and, if a judicious regard is had to these, time and habit will reconcile them to the choice, tho' there should not appear to be an uncommon bent of genius towards it, if care be taken, that it is not such as they have a particular aversion to, and that a prevailing

bent of genius to something else, be not thereby directly opposed or counteracted.

According to the choice, therefore, or determination that is now made as to this, must the business of Education, in this last and most important period, be conducted; now it is, that any errors, in their former management, will appear; and the first care must be, to correct or remedy these, as soon as possible, before they take deeper root, and to make up or compensate any disadvantages, that some may have beyond others, even from nature itself, *i. e.* from their natural constitution, parts, or capacities.

The transition from Childhood to Youth, is gradual and insensible, yet not so much so, but that a short interval of time may be now spent, under the eye of a parent, or some wise and watchful guardian, for making such discoveries, with respect to the various particulars now mentioned, as may regulate their future plan, which, tho' it admits of great variety, we may here consider, more generally, as having respect to one of these two, either to *books* or to *business*: *i. e.* either to such studies or sciences, as make an application to books, or reading, in different languages and faculties, necessary; or, such pursuits and employments in life, as, tho' they may have some assistance in this way, yet are to be acquired, chiefly,

chiefly, by imitation, or practice; such are all the useful arts and occupations of life.

When this last is the choice, the business of Education is, generally, made less account of, and yet, even here, there is much room for improvement, and there might, at this period, be some time usefully spent, even by those who are designed for men of business, in the way of getting such a knowledge, or rather taste of books, as may facilitate their future plan of action, without retarding or interrupting it, and, more especially, in the way of getting their minds formed to piety, virtue, and reflection, in any calling or occupation of life.

EDUCATION, in its more general and extensive sense, is an apprenticeship for life; its business is to teach us, not any one particular art or science only, but the *science of human life*; not only to form the philosopher, orator, or divine, but to form the man; and, even when this last period of education, which we are now considering, is finished, and, what is commonly reckoned manhood, or maturity of years, obtained, after all the pains that could be taken formerly, application given, or progress made, the most that can be expected as to youth is, to have a good foundation laid for their future improvement, when launching out into the world; and for a successful application,

oation, to their different studies or pursuits, when left to their own conduct and management.

It is, however, when regard is had to such a plan of life, as makes an application to books necessary, with a view to the studies of *law*, *physic*, or *divinity*, and to the acquisition of such knowledge, as may be either useful or ornamental in life; it is, I say, when regard is had to a plan of this kind, rather than to the common occupations of life, that a more liberal education is necessary, and the whole of that period, we are now considering, employed in prosecuting it. With a view to this, therefore, various particulars occur to be treated of, by considering the subject of Education in the following lights.

1. According to the different *branches* it has respect to, *i. e.* the different *objects* of attention proposed by it, *viz.* health, morals, manners, religion, learning, business and amusements, company.

2. According to the difference of station, disposition, character, and capacity, to which it has respect.—And,

Lastly, According to the different methods of conducting it, private or public schools, universities, tutors, travelling, and conversation.

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This opens a very extensive and useful field of enquiry, to any who have either leisure or abilities to go through it; and, after all that has been wrote upon the subject, it will probably be found, that much might be added, or, at least, set forth in a way, more accommodated to practice, than most of the treatises on this subject. My inclination leads me much to bestow some time and pains in this way, according to the small share of abilities and experience I have; being a way in which, I think, my labours might be as useful to mankind as any; nor are the subjects of the preceding Essays and Dissertations unconnected with it; but other objects, of more immediate attention, prevent my undertaking for any thing of this kind; I shall here, however, subjoin some cursory observations, respecting the different particulars now mentioned; wishing to see them more fully treated of by others.

The acquisition of *learning*, is so far from being the only object, that it can scarcely be called even the principal object of attention, in the education of youth; but, as there is a certain measure or degree of it suited to men of business, whose way of life raises them above the vulgar, and a higher degree fit for those, whose independent fortunes make an application to business unnecessary for them, but, at the same time, enable them, like the

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great Mr Boyle, to pursue some useful studies, that would be too expensive for others; it would be no small advantage to society in general, if proper plans were laid down of the different branches of knowledge, that are best suited to each of these.

Young gentlemen of the *Army and Navy*, have often much spare time, which they might bestow on such studies as would be improving and entertaining to them, tho' not relating immediately to their own profession, if they had but any fixed plan, for this purpose, particularly suited to themselves. Something, of the same kind, might be adapted to those in a *mercantile* way, who have often much leisure, especially during their apprenticeship.

Nor is the education of youth, in the *inferior* stations of life, an object of so little importance to the public; but that some plain easy system might likewise be calculated for them; remembering always, in whatever plans or schemes of this kind are laid down, to take care, that they do not interfere with the principal views of those for whom they are designed, by bringing men of business and action to be too studious, or over-fond of books and contemplation; remembering also, in every

• Upwards of twenty years ago, I remember to have read with great pleasure, a very small treatise, much to the purpose of what is here mentioned, entitled, "A Preface for an Apprentice."

very scheme or system that is pursued, to have a particular regard to whatever respects the improvement of the mind, and the conduct of life, according to the different classes, or conditions of men, now mentioned, and the different duties, connections, difficulties, and temptations, that are peculiar to each of them.

But, without enlarging further on these general points, we shall now proceed to the *miscellaneous observations* proposed, in which no particular order or connection will be necessary, except their having relation, principally, to this last period of Education, *viz.* that of YOUTH.

All the knowledge you can instil into a young man yourself, nay, tho' he had twenty tutors lecturing to him, and tho' he could repeat all that you want him to retain in the scientific way, yet this will not avail him so much, as the giving him such a *taste* for knowledge, *i. e.* for the different branches of science that are most necessary for him, as will engage and enable him to search it out for himself, by going to the source of things. He must indeed be obliged to others, who have more experience, for information, as to the books, or other sources, from which he may draw most improvement; but, if he has no relish for the matter himself, leading him to apply

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his mind to it, more or less as is necessary and practicable for him, all the knowledge that he can get by the ear, or in the way of a task prescribed to him by others, will avail as little for his improvement, as your getting him stores of the most delicate and wholesome kinds of food, would do for his health or nourishment, if he disrelished them.

But how, you will say, is this relish for knowledge to be wrought or instilled? I know of no other way so effectual as that of *emulation*: by having a young man often in the company, not of those much farther advanced than himself, but of those whom you think he wants to equal, if not excel. At the same time, the greatest care must be taken always, in cherishing emulation, to prevent its begetting in him any wrong passion, that may have some similarity or relation to it; such as envying, instead of endeavouring to equal others; or bringing them down to his level, rather than nobly striving to rise to theirs, and acknowledging what is due to them when they excel him, by undisputed merit, and have therefore a just claim to preference; on the other hand, he is to be cautioned against triumphing over others, when he seems to excel them, in such a way as indicates contempt and self-conceit; let these be prevented, together with too much impatience for being distinguished, and liableness

liableness to discouragement on every failure or disappointment; let these, I say, be prevented, and no principle will be of greater efficacy for improvement, than emulation; but, without attention to what was now mentioned, it may be hurtful.

The accustoming a young man to *think closely* and accurately, is also of great consequence; I do not mean the making him entirely morose and cogitative, for I would have his mind kept free and disengaged, for lighter or more serious exercises, for turning easily and quickly to whatever subject demands most immediate attention, according as it comes in his way, cultivating a quick command of his thoughts for this purpose, and taking only one subject, or a part of it, at once; but if he is not accustomed to think closely and accurately, when a subject occurs that requires it, he will lose much time and pains in settling about it, and labour under an unspeakable disadvantage, in whatever respects the acquisition of knowledge, or reasoning, in consequence of it.

One who thinks closely on what he reads or considers, so as to enquire directly into the nature of the thing itself, and take it in the different views it is capable of, will do more in one hour, than another, who goes superficially

cially to work, (labouring only to collect the sentiments of others, without thinking closely for himself) will do in six.

Mathematical studies have often been recommended, as of use to give young men a habit of close thinking. The engaging them sometimes in an argument, with respect to any subject they suppose themselves masters of, shewing on what side the argument is weak, (when, perhaps, least suspected to be so by them) and the precise point on which it turns, will also be of great use. Playing at *Chefs* might seem a trivial expedient to be recommended, with the view now mentioned, of fixing the attention; but it would, I am persuaded, in many cases, be of some use, as it gives such frequent instances of the bad effect of inattention, and the difficulty of retrieving any error to which it has given occasion.

It should be a general rule, with those who read books, not merely for amusement but for instruction; and it is a rule particularly necessary for young students, to read a book *from beginning to end*, without too much interruption in doing it, and without having many books on hand at once. If they have no such rule as this, nor consider it as necessary, they will be in danger of becoming desultory in their reading, and satisfy themselves with the erudition

erudition of the *Ladies**, taken from title pages, dictionaries, periodical collections, and detached passages of books; and, besides reading through one treatise on any subject of particular importance, young students should be accustomed to hunt after different books that have respect to it, and make it their aim rather to master the subject, than to have it to say, that they have read such and such books on it.

It would, indeed, make the matter much easier to young students, if those, who have more knowledge and experience, would direct them to the books that best deserve their perusal, on the different subjects fit to be studied by them, or even to those parts, of very large works, which have respect to them: This would save them the trouble of going through many pieces of little value, as they often must, in hopes, from their title, that some light may be got from them, but often meeting with much disappointment. It may also be further suggested, as a method very proper to be taken

* If any of them shall do me the honour to read this, I beg their forgiveness for what is here said of their erudition, as not at all meant in the way of disparagement, or disrespect; but, tho' they well deserve all the advantage that can be had from books, in the way of entertainment or improvement suited to them, yet they have more powerful charms to recommend them than those of letters; nor is much *literary knowledge* and study, any more necessary for them than swords and targets.

ken with young readers, that their opinion should be asked of any books they read, and their reasons for approving or disapproving them.

The being directed to proper books, for understanding different subjects, and somewhat assisted in the perusal of them, may be considered as no small advantage, in the way of *University Education*, under the direction of men capable of assisting young students, and making their work easier in the manner now mentioned. Nor would it be improper to add two observations more, that will be found of no small consequence, in order to profitable reading, viz.

I. When you read over a book, with one particular view, you will probably give the less attention to many other things in it, which have not relation to this; so that, you are not to suppose it unnecessary, to have recourse to it again, (possibly with another view) as reckoning you are already master of it. A book may be valuable, partly for the language or style, partly for the subject or sentiments, some of it for one controversy, some for another: Views to every one of these, may, possibly, make it necessary to look, oftener than once, through a book; but, it would make a superfluous easy, if the reader could, at his first perusal, mark the passages fit to be reviewed, or even

even abridge and write them out into a book of excerpts, if they are of consequence in any view; but, if they are not, it would be losing too much time thus to extract them.

2. Another direction, that will be necessary for young students, is, to beware of thinking that they are masters of any subject, merely because they have read many books on it; they must also digest it in their thoughts, and see clearly, on what precise points it rests most; and, how far these are known or understood by them, whether they be matters of fact or of opinion.

After all that a writer says, sometimes, for his opinion, we cannot possibly see it in the same light with him, and, till we do, we cannot be blamed for withholding our assent to it; we must beware therefore of being carried away by strong assertion, in the place of argument, and not reckon ourselves masters of a subject, till we converse on it, consider it in different lights, and state or answer objections against it, observing carefully, on what sides the proof is strongest or weakest, which will not be so well known or attended to, till we come, either to converse on it, or to commit our sentiments to writing, and make it the subject of correspondence with others: Nor can too much be said to dissuade from taking things implicitly, on the opinion or

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testimony

testimony of others, without thinking for ourselves; not in the way of being sceptical or incredulous of what others say or write; but that, according to the evidences or means of proof and information we have access to, we endeavour honestly, as far as we are capable, to form our judgment of persons and things; and to have some other foundation for it than merely the opinion or testimony of others, without considering on what they are built.

It is of no small consequence to young men to accustom them to *application*; to bring them to a habit of it; or, at least, to make them capable of it; but beware of overstretching their attention, if you do this but in a few instances, there is danger of their being discouraged from any attempts of the kind ever after; and, in most branches of human knowledge, great progress may be made, by slow degrees, without that rapidity, and long or violent exertion of its powers, which leaves the mind feeble and exhausted. Regular perseverance, therefore, is what will have most effect; so that, you cannot too much recommend this perseverance, industry and regular application, in such a way as to make the acquisition of knowledge, as well as prosecution of business, easy, yet successful.

The foundations of *religion* and *morality* are to be laid in youth, by giving proper ideas of
 God,

God, and of our relation to him, and to one another, with the duties thence arising, as set forth in our first and fourth dissertations, which are so full on this subject that any further enlargement on it here is unnecessary; nor can too much care be taken, in recommending and establishing such a reliance on providence, as encourages industry and the use of means, in all cases, but submits events entirely to the supreme will, suppressing all childish fears, and superstitious apprehensions with respect to them. Pains should likewise be taken to cherish in youth a habit of *philanthropy* or general good-will to mankind, (without exception of sects or parties) and a disposition

* It is made a question by some, whether it be most advisable to give the young generation any assistance in forming opinions and habits, or leave them entirely to themselves; but, it may be observed, that this last is impracticable: If they are not entirely excluded from the world, they must be open to the mixing of opinions, and learn from others, and there is danger of their taking up with the worst as being the most numerous, or their taking up with *one* rather than *another*, the former being much diversified, while the latter is settled in one way only; and the same might be observed as to their taking the side of *virtue* or of *vice*, if left entirely to themselves. Are we then (you'll say) to prescribe or lay down *systems* to them to enslave and fetter their reason? No! but to lay open to them, as much as possible, the reasons of things, and accustom them to exercise their reason and understanding fairly with respect to them; but what is of still greater importance, and inseparably connected with that discovery of truth to the *understanding*, now spoken of, is forming the *heart* to *virtue* and *piety*. These are the two great branches of education necessary to be attended to.

to think favourably of them rather than otherwise. This is the more necessary that the writings of some, and the practices of others, often tend to give them a contrary bent, or a disposition to suspect and judge always unfavourably of others; which disposition, though consecrated by the name of prudence, sagacity, knowledge of the world, and the like, has certainly an ill effect, in corrupting the heart, checking benevolent dispositions, as being all imaginary, and benevolent actions, as unmerited. Much judgment, therefore, is here necessary for putting youth upon their guard against the corrupt practices of Mankind, and yet preventing the general prejudices and suspicions now mentioned; nor do I see how the principle of virtue, with respect to others, can here be supported without the help of religion directing our regard to God, the intimations of his will, and the relations in which he has placed us, and drawing the motives to duty from this source.

A *firmness* in their opinion is not unbecoming young men, when it is proportioned to the reasons they have to support it; but they must be directed, to lie open in all cases to information and conviction from the arguments on both sides, that may be further suggested, while they are carrying on their inquiry; but, when it is once finished or completed,

pleated, to the best of their ability, their judgment is to be no longer wavering, but fixed and established; and, it would be no small advantage, if the grounds of it could be retained and recollected, when necessary, for the satisfaction of others.

I have sometimes had a difficulty in determining, how far it is proper to indulge young gentlemen, in their passion for Music; which is a study or exercise, not only delightful but useful, when not carried too far: Some indeed have no such passion for music, not even a relish for it; but, when they have, it is undoubtedly in youth, that they can improve most, and yet, there is danger of its carrying their thoughts from every thing else; their heads will be full of crochets, when they should be otherwise employed; and their time and company much regulated by their engagements in this way.

Vocal music, indeed, deserves, I think, more attention, than is generally given to it, and would be proper, particularly in youth, when the voice can best be formed, and even the ear more improved, than is commonly imagined, for such a combination of sounds, as is most conducive to harmony*; but, as for

instrumental

* This is likewise of some consequence even for elegant composition, and much more so in order to graceful pronunciation. which deserves to be studied, but not so far

instrumental music, what would seem most advisable with respect to it, is, to encourage the inclination to it as far as is necessary to their relishing and judging of musical compositions, but not so far as to compose or to practise on many instruments themselves; their performing on one instrument is sufficient for the purpose now mentioned, and will be necessary; for, their ideas of music, even with a pretty good natural genius towards it, will not be determinate, without an acquaintance with one instrument, but I would not have it of the most complicated kind, as the stringed ones generally are, so that the *violin* I would absolutely forbid my young charge, it admits of too much variety and musical perfection; what we commonly call the *German flute* is sufficient to amuse, compose and join in concert with others, when necessary; and even in this, I would never have him consider himself, in the light of a performer; but as a judge or connoisseur; and much the same may be said as to his taste for *painting* and *drawing*, which is to be cultivated in some degree, so as to judge of what is well designed and executed in that way, by others, but not

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as to make it too *theatrical*. A musical ear will avail the young orator only, when it has joined with it a *delicacy of taste*, and *propriety of sentiment*.

so as to have his own time or attention ingrossed by it, unless a view to some particular profession or purpose makes it necessary.

In what respects those *exercises* and amusements, that are conducive to health, much more latitude may be given, than in these sedentary ones, that were just now mentioned, without your pupil's being so much hurt by the consequences of them, and there are some of them that deserve to be particularly mentioned,

Dancing, he is supposed to have been taught, in the former period of puerility, *viz.* between the age of seven and fourteen, so that there now remains for him, only the practising it, in the plainest and easiest way in which he can gracefully harmonize, with that lively mixture and diversity of sounds, which is commonly used, for animating the mind, and regulating the motions of the body in these exercises. This is all, I hope, that will be thought necessary, in this way, not only for students, but even for men of fashion and breeding, to whom high dances appear to me to be no great accomplishment; some one kind of them, that may give most occasion to exercise the limbs gracefully, and get the intire and easy command of them, may indeed be allowable; but, what exceeds that, seems to be the property of the stage, and is not

not to be coveted by the sober and regular part of mankind.

In order to give youth that vigour in their limbs, and that intire command of them we were speaking of, there is another exercise, which I have often thought fully as effectual and useful as dancing, and that is *fencing**; some little practice in this way is very common, and the carrying the practice so far as to pretend to be a swordsman, is not very consistent with the character either of a man of business, of letters, or of fashion; but, I have often thought, the use of foils might have more advantage, than is generally taken notice of, were it only in the way of playing over the same common lessons of cart and fierce, without any anxiety about learning all the different feints and thrusts, vaults, batters, &c. contrived by the common masters of this art; without all this, I say, the plain and common use of foils, is not only serviceable for health, but has likewise an excellent effect, for giving an intire command of the arms, limbs and every joint of the body; it

* On this point likewise, I have ventured to differ with Mr Locke and others, who condemn any attempt at skill in this way, as disposing to be quarrelsome in reliance on it; but the method of duelling (which scarcely any laws can restrain) is now such as that any dexterity, in the way here spoken of, can give but very little encouragement to venture on it, and yet may sometimes be useful for self-defence.

has indeed this effect more than any other exercise I know; and such an easy command of every motion, is one of the principal ingredients of what we call gracefulness of person and action, which is then most remarkable, when every motion appears to be performed not with agility only, but with ease, judgment, and propriety both as to time and manner, nothing wanting, and nothing superfluous.

The subject we have been here led to touch at, under the head of exercises, may suggest something in relation to it, necessary to be instilled into youth, before their arriving at manhood; and that is, the guarding against quarrels, or whatever may involve in them, such as abusive language, rash anger, self-conceit, bad company, excess in drinking, contempt of others and the like. To guard against these and cultivate sweetness of temper and manners, will be a better preservative from *duals* (or *rencontres* as they are now called) than any establishment that law has as yet made against them in any country, and better than even the *wise Mr. Rousseau's* † expedient for this purpose.

Another exercise fit for young gentlemen to practise, and be masters of, is *Latin* & Any rules, necessary for this, are so few, that they

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will

† See an account of it in the end of this Dissertation.

will soon be acquired †, but the facility, firmness and gracefulness, which some attain to in it, require more time and practice; nor is there any doubt, but that, in time, it may draw after it some attention to the nature, diseases and different breeds of horses, in order to be able to give such directions with respect to them, as may, on many occasions, be necessary, to balance the negligence or ignorance of servants, which, in this case, may sometimes be very hurtful. The extravagant passion for horse-racing, laying bets, and every scheme of artifice and expence attending it, should be considered, as so far out of their road, who have any useful branch of education to pursue, that nothing needs be said with respect to them, further than to banish them intirely from their thoughts, if ever they appear to have any inclination towards them; and, even as to that attention to horses spoken of, in a moderate degree, some care will be necessary to prevent its beginning too soon, or being carried to too much expence; which may still more be said as to *dogs*, and yet *hunting*, with some management of fire-arms, or shooting, are diversions extremely suitable to young gentlemen, and generally so engaging to them, that they can scarcely be indulged

† The art of leaping over gates, hedges, &c. though commonly taught, is, in reality, so useless, and has so many hurtful consequences to the sportsman as well as to the farmer, that it would be much better to lay it intirely aside.

so much in this way, as they would incline, till most of the period we are now treating of be over.

The only other exercise I shall mention is *swimming*: One of the manliest and most noted among the antients, and very conducive to health, but now much overlooked: The rules for it are few, simple and well known; any dexterity in it depends intirely on practice, and, if this practice is not begun in youth, it will not be easy to acquire it afterwards; it is therefore worth the having some directions* given about it, by those who have youth in charge, as it may be a mean, not only of health, but also, of saving their own lives, and those of others.

Many other amusements and diversions might be mentioned, about which no observation is necessary, but the general one, of keeping them in their own place, let them never be considered as primary objects of attention, but only as secondary; as good only, in so far as they can be any way conducive either to the health and vigour of the body, or to the ornament and improvement of the mind.

Games of hazard cannot be said to deserve thus much tolerance in youth; there will be danger

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* *Directions* as to the exercise itself may be very few, as nothing more is necessary but stretching and poising the body, proper respiration and banishing all fear; but more *directions* will be necessary for guarding against immoderate cold, fatigue, rashness, &c.

danger of their intoxicating too much, corrupting the mind, inflaming the passions, and (not to mention fortune) wasting time unspeakably; nor is it a good mark, of the temper and spirit of the present age, that they should now be reckoned so necessary, for passing time agreeably in the polite world; but, neither these, nor even the public diversions of the *stage*, will be found very consistent with a proper attention either to books, business, or any kind of useful improvement.

Could young gentlemen, even those of the greatest rank and fortune, be kept intire strangers to all games of hazard, and theatrical entertainments *, till they arrive at manhood, and their judgment be so far ripened, as to prevent their carrying a fondness for such amusements to excess, it would be the safest way of managing them; and therefore, these places of education should always be preferred, in which they are not admitted, nor any tolerance of them, either in public or private: But, when their situation is such, as that they cannot be kept off from them intirely, all that can

* What is here said will not be so easily admitted as to theatrical entertainments, and yet it is certain that some maturity of judgment is necessary in order to draw any improvement from them. This observation might be extended to the immoderate reading of plays, novels, romances, which, if begun too early or practised injudiciously, may corrupt the fancy, and indispose for more serious and important exercises.

can be done is, to take the more pains, in impressing properly and fortifying against them; so as to put off their acquaintance with them, as long as possible; to prevent their being enamoured of them, as is often the case very early, and, when some knowledge of them becomes necessary, in view of their launching out into the world, to bestow some pains, in making them well acquainted, with the principles upon which they are conducted, for the same reason that they are taught fencing (or the noble science of self-defence as it is often called) that they may not be dupes to all they meet with, when they must sometimes join the polite circle; nor so much slaves to any unbounded inclination this way, as would be hurtful to their interest and improvement, in every other respect.

The disposition and taste of youth, as to the different particulars we were now speaking of, and indeed, their success in every branch of improvement, depends much on the *company* which they frequent or have most access to. Variety is a matter of no small consequence here for giving them a modest assurance; but, first of all, in order to judge of their genius and inclination, it is fit to observe what company they themselves choose; if it is with inferiors and dependents, of whatever character, with those who will humour or

flatter them most, whatever they do, that they are observed to associate, it is fit that they should be kept, as long as possible, from having their own choice; they are in danger of contracting mean, and, perhaps vicious habits in this way, insensibly; but, it is a most promising mark of them, if their own inclinations appear to lead them, to the choice of such as are rather above them, not merely on account of superior rank, splendour or fortune, but with a view to improvement, to have their minds the more enlarged, and their behaviour regulated among such as will regard them according to it.

It will scarcely be necessary to observe, not only, that the smallest inclination for such company, as would lead to places of bad fame, is to be *checked* *, but likewise all immodesty, all obscenity of discourse or sentiment, double entendre, common swearing, and the like: To which we may add, that all *tavern-meetings*, or pretences of assembling together in the convivial way, where, not only drinking, but intoxication is the chief object, in short, all good bottle-companions are to be avoided,

* It is not always by warning against what is here mentioned, or any thing grossly immoral and criminal, that youth are to be *checked*, but, sometimes, by considering them as above being suspected of any such enormities, and seeming to be surprised if at any time the contrary appears.

as by no means suitable to young men, nor corresponding with any views of what respects health, improvement, or any of the purposes of education.

It may perhaps be a question, however, on this head of company, How far the company of the LADIES* may now be proper? or, if it might not be a means of improvement to young gentlemen, as they advance in this last period of education, which we are now considering?

This is a matter of some delicacy, and which will not admit of a general rule suited to all cases. The natural disposition, temper, and character of your pupil must be attended to, in part, for determining this: If he is naturally either bashful and awkward, or, appears to have something of roughness and ferocity, in either of these cases, the company of the Ladies, is an excellent mean, of enlivening and polishing, as well as softening and

* Though nothing is here said of the education of the LADIES in particular, yet it is a very fit object of general attention, in itself, and in respect of its influence (as here set forth) by their having almost the sole charge of children in the beginning of life, and no small share of their education afterwards. Whoever, therefore, would wish to be more particularly instructed as to what respects the education of the Ladies may have sufficient satisfaction from perusing what the Earls of Halifax and Chesterfield, Dean Swift, Mr Addison, and Dr Fordyce have wrote on this subject, setting forth that modest dignity and discretion, that delicacy of taste and sweetness of temper, that oeconomy, prudence and piety, which are the ornaments of the female character.

and humanizing his disposition, and he may be the more indulged in this way, that possibly, his own inclination will not lead strongly to it, so as to carry it too far. There is rather danger, that one of this last character, may be taken up with low women, which there is no better mean of preventing, than by introducing him to the acquaintance and company of Ladies of virtue and character. But, on the other hand, if your pupil be rather soft and effeminate in his disposition, if he is like to be a dandier after the ladies, and to devote too much of his time and thoughts to them, at a period, when the purposes of his education and improvement require his having some other objects of attention; his fondness for their company must be restrained: The occasions of access to it, in weekly or monthly assemblies, of the youth of both sexes, will be sufficient, nor will he lose much, though he should sometimes happen, to be out of the way of these likewise; it will soon be made up; and notice should be taken, whether he shews any particular attachments, in this way; if he does, and that they are any way prudent and virtuous, instead of checking them by violent means, it may rather be found advisable to cherish and continue them, under proper regulations; for instead of doing any thing that may delay a young man's settlement

ment in a married state, when his family and fortune require or admit of it, it should rather be encouraged; but till this is the case, care should be taken, as much as possible, to prevent his forming any particular attachments or engagements, with a view to it; when once formed, they should indeed be held sacred and fulfilled; but, they should rather be entirely prevented, if the prospect of fulfilling them be remote, as it is not possible for man to foresee the changes of circumstances, that may, in a few years, work such a change, either as to sentiments or interests, as might make lasting connections of this kind, formerly desirable, to be very improper and undesirable; and yet, when a foundation is laid for them, by such previous puerile attachments as were mentioned, they cannot, in some cases, be honourably got rid of.

It may therefore be considered, as a general rule, proper here, that all such intimacies or engagements, respecting love and marriage, be the intentions never so fair and honourable on both sides, should rather (as much as possible) be carefully prevented, till there be a near prospect of judiciously fulfilling them.

This, however, is not to prevent that general acquaintance with the Ladies, which we mentioned as of singular usefulness; nor even a preference of esteem and affection, to some

of them beyond others; but, there must be no private declarations of this, that may draw on the mutual engagements, and perhaps embarrassments, now spoken of.

The mention made of fidelity to engagements that might be embarrassing, gives occasion for observing, among the instructions particularly necessary for youth, that they cannot be taught to consider *truth* as too sacred a thing, nor shew too much regard to it, in the way of *veracity*, or declaring what they believe to be truth, when necessary to be declared, with candour and openness; *sincerity*, in not labouring to impose on others, by any false appearances of qualities, dispositions, or sentiments, which they are not possessed of; *fortitude* in bearing pain, disappointment, and distress; inviolable *secrecy*, (when promised or required) and strict *honour* or *fidelity* to all their promises, in making which they cannot be advised to be too cautious; but which, when made, should, amidst all difficulties and disadvantages, be religiously adhered to.

The desire of *pleasing* others, is stronger in youth than afterwards, and may be made a mean of engaging them to many things that are commendable; but, at the same time, care must be taken, of its not degenerating into a simple and servile compliance with the humour of others, be what it will, or into *flippery*, i. e. a frivolous attention to every little.

the motion, gesture, and punctilio in behaviour or conversation, by which *petits maitres* are distinguished.

When any mode of behaviour or discourse, appears becoming in another, and gains admiration, young men are easily led to fall in with it, and wish to distinguish themselves in the same way. Imitation is natural, and, what is becoming and engaging in another, will, they think, be so in them likewise; but some cautions will be necessary for them as to this. First of all, it would be fit to distinguish between the *thing itself*, that is said or done, and the *manner* of saying or doing it; the thing itself, if praise-worthy in one, will probably be so in another, unless the circumstances of the person and case be very different: But the same cannot be said as to the manner; for every man alive, has a manner of saying and doing things, as natural and peculiar to himself, and as distinguishing of him from others, as the features of his face. Good language, right pronunciation, gracefulness of motion, action or gesture, are all universally agreeable; but the particular phrases, tone of voice, gesture and motion, which are natural to one, will often appear constrained, affected, and unnatural in another, saying or doing the very same things.

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Too much pains, therefore, cannot be taken, in recommending to youth, to give more attention to the things themselves that are said or done, and to the state or temper of their minds at the time, than to their outward manner, or appearance to others; if their inward *sentiments* are just, and harmonise with their actions, in saying or doing, what is supposed in itself right, the less anxiety they have about outward circumstances and appearances, the better; these will follow of course, according to the sentiments that prevail; it is the *sentiment*, indicated or expressed, that draws approbation; and, it is, when any one expresses it, in the way most natural to himself, that he does it with that ease and *propriety*, which are the greatest charms of action and conversation, and which, to a discerning taste, are manifest, but are suited, to that diversity of characters, tempers, and circumstances, to which no general rules can be adapted.

The opinion of an intelligent observer, with respect to the manner of doing things, regulated by the impression they make upon himself at the time, and candidly declared, will avail more, in determining as to propriety, than all the maxims of the schools, all the precepts of tutors, or a slavish imitation of those, who, by happily hitting on this propriety

ety themselves, have come off with honour and applause.

In the near approach of manhood, it will easily be admitted, that it is not, by methods of violence and compulsion, that any thing can be done with young men; unless they can be got to do things of themselves, there is little to be expected from them; but, as much may be done insensibly to engage them to what is right, by a judicious intermixture of commendation and reproof, it will be fit to observe carefully, the various effects which these have on them. The way of commendation (which admits of much art and diversity) even for appearances of what is right, or upon a supposition of its taking place, when, perhaps, as yet it does not this way; is what should first be tried, and has generally the most lasting effect; but, if it is found that praise or commendation, instead of exciting to diligence or good behaviour, rather makes a young man more indolent, vain, and self-conceited, the way of reproof will be necessary, but, still to be so conducted, as that he may never think you have entirely lost your good opinion of him, else he will be at no pains to preserve or recover it.

You may possibly find it necessary, to justify your pupil to others, yet reprove him by himself; and your doing so thus, secretly, will

engage him much to you; nor will it be improper, sometimes, to employ others to commend or challenge him, in a way that will seem more accidental, than if done by you. By methods of this kind, a judicious tutor may do a great deal, especially, if he can preserve the esteem and affection of his pupil, so as he may be always ready to place confidence in him, or unbosom himself to him, rather than to any other.

The ruinous effects of *luxury* and *expence*, not limited or regulated by fortune, are so remarkable with us at present, and for many years past, that it is of no small consequence, to the future ease and success of youth, to have their taste rightly formed, as to the different articles that draw expence, or give occasion to luxury; such as dress, table, equipage, and the like; if the passion for games, and public diversions, be kept within due bounds, it will go a great way to prevent the bad effects of profusion and extravagance, commonly complained of; for these are articles, still more destructive of the largest fortunes, than even what we are now considering, or what respects the ordinary expences of life, which do not admit of the same rule in all cases, as they must be suited to a variety of circumstances, and, to restrain them too much, may

may, sometimes, be more improper, than to increase them.

All that shall be suggested upon this head here, is, that, after observing carefully the disposition of your pupil, in respect of his value for money, and, in what cases he seems most willing to part with it, you endeavour to lessen his value for it, if too great, or, if otherwise, to lessen his value for any unnecessary articles, upon which he inclines to lavish it; make him sensible of its intrinsic value, which is none at all, and, of the comparative value of the different articles, for which it is exchanged, so as to check any appearance of parsimony, avarice, and mean attention to little things, on the one hand, as well as profusion on the other, and (which is rather still more difficult) to prevent such a taste for some expensive gratification of humour, fancy, or appetite, as may give occasion to the most sordid penury in other instances for supporting it; and, perhaps, issue after all, in poverty and contempt.

One advice, that cannot be too often repeated, with a view of preventing all this, is, the recommending often and earnestly to young men, to cultivate a *self-command*, as to their passions, appetites, and desires, by keeping them so far under the government of reason, as that they may solicit or obtain no indulgence inconsistent with it; but that, by an habitual mastery over them, their happiness

may be more in their own power, their taste for immoderate expence restrained, and the ruinous consequences of a boundless riot after pleasure avoided.

As I do not here profess to treat of Education in the systematick way, I shall not enlarge on the different *academical studies* proper for young gentlemen, and successfully pursued in our different *Universities*, further than to make one general remark on the order that appears most natural for prosecuting them, and that is, that they should be taken, so as to correspond with the growth of our faculties: It will easily be seen, that those faculties, which have most connection with the bodily frame or constitution, grow up before those that are more purely mental; so that, after that early period of life, in which it may be said, that sense and appetite rule, or that all is sensitive, the *Memory* is the first faculty that distinguishes itself, or springs up soonest, and is then rather quick than retentive: The *Imagination* next gathers strength, then the *Will* and *Affections*, and, last of all, the *Understanding* and *Judgment* come to some maturity. Should not we, therefore, take the food of the mind, or the different branches of knowledge to be communicated to it, in the order that best suits the progress of its faculties now mentioned; beginning with languages, fables, examples,

amples, short histories, short geographical and chronological tables, writing, and some arithmetick, in all which the *Memory* is particularly concerned. The *Imagination* is next to be exercised and improved by poetry, painting, music, *i. e.* a taste of these, so as to judge of them with some propriety, and be entertained by them; also natural and civil history, and even natural or experimental philosophy. In this order we proceed to what respects the *Will* and *Affections*, which are to be formed by the study of moral philosophy or ethics, together with theology, so far as it is connected with this. But those branches of knowledge, which require higher efforts or operations of the *Understanding* and *Judgment*, than those we have mentioned, should come last, such as logic, or the art of reasoning; a short sketch of metaphysicks and pneumaticks; the more abstract parts of mathematicks; algebra; astronomy, &c. a critical knowledge of history, poetry, chronology, geography, &c. a competent knowledge of theology, both polemick and practical; and even of physick, particularly anatomy; also jurisprudence, composition, rhetorick, and elocution, *i. e.* the application of them to any purposes of importance in life.

There is one branch of education, not as yet touched at, which is generally considered as giving it the finishing stroke, and that is,

Travelling, which I do not consider, as a mean of increasing knowledge, in the manner it was among the ancients, when the communication of knowledge by books was not so easy as it is now; but it is certainly a mean, if properly conducted, of enlarging and humanizing the mind, which is of much more consequence to its improvement, than any acquisitions of knowledge or fortune: In order to its having this effect, however, the mind must be somewhat formed, its principles fixed, and its faculties arrived at such vigour, as that it may, with safety, be exposed to the great variety of impressions that will be made upon it, in its transition from one object and scene to another, approving or disapproving, retaining or rejecting them, with judgment, according as they are conducive to any branch of civil or moral improvement.

In this view of forming and improving the mind, as well as collecting useful discoveries, institutions, or inventions, that may have escaped the general notice, travelling may be of great benefit to young gentlemen, when the circumstances of their family and fortune easily admit of it; but, when they do not, it is far from being of such consequence, as that their education cannot be carried on and completed without it, so far as respects all that is essentially necessary for their improvement in knowledge

knowledge and virtue, is well as for the proper conduct of life.

In this view, likewise, it will easily be seen that, tho' travelling should be delayed, as was said, till the mind be somewhat formed and settled, yet it should not be delayed so long, as to contract any such immoderate attachments and conceit, in favour of what it has been accustomed to at home, as may occasion the considering, what is usefully received and practised else where, with indifference or contempt.

Between the age of twenty and thirty, is the proper season for travelling, where education or improvement is the object; I need not therefore add, that the idea of a tutor or governor, is entirely unsuitable to it. I would not have a young gentleman himself, and much less others to suppose, that he was travelling in leading strings, to have his thoughts and reflections suggested, or the punctilios of his behaviour regulated by another, he must think and act for himself; but, as it adds unspeakably to the advantage and comfort of travelling, to have one companion, to whom he may safely communicate his thoughts and reflections, and, in whom, he may place an entire confidence; to have such a travelling companion, would be highly proper; and likewise, that he should be one, who has prudence and

and experience, but by no means to be considered as a travelling governor or tutor.

Whoever would travel with advantage, should know so much of the laws*, customs, constitutions, manners, history, and geography, of his own country, as that he may be able to satisfy any sensible foreigner, who may make enquiry with respect to them, and, who will be ready to give in return, all the information wanted, as to the same particulars, in those places with which he has had access to be more acquainted. In order to this, however, it would be of consequence, to have some previous knowledge of them, so as to know what enquiries may be proper with respect to them, to embrace proper opportunities of being informed, to give such a turn to conversation as is necessary for this purpose, and, to mark down, very briefly, any new and useful

* Whether there be a view of travelling or not, these are all proper objects of attention for young gentlemen, and particularly so much knowledge of the civil, municipal, and even ecclesiastical law, as may enable them to understand and manage their own affairs, to judge of the management of others with whom they are entrusted, and to support their own just rights. The reason of self-defence formerly given for learning some other sciences, may likewise be given for this; nor is the danger of being made quarrelsome and wrangling, by having some knowledge of law, an objection of any greater weight here than in the case of fencing, formerly mentioned. The regulation of the temper, and not the restriction of skill or ability for self-defence, is the way of checking the quarrelsome and the litigious.

ful information received, with the authorities for it, in a day-book or journal, to be afterwards mentioned.

The *Tour* of FRANCE, is by far too confined an object for travelling, and often begets a habit of levity and dissipation, which cannot be more effectually cured, than by visiting other parts of Europe, where different modes of behaviour take place.

For travelling with advantage through any country, I need scarcely observe, that it is absolutely necessary to be master of some one language that is well understood in it; so as to be able to enter into conversation with the most sensible and intelligent of the inhabitants, without the assistance of another to explain or interpret. Some difficulty as to the language of other countries, is what occasions the common error of travellers, associating themselves chiefly with their own countrymen, when they ought to be enlarging the circle of their acquaintance, among the native inhabitants of the different places they go thro'. It must be observed, however, that the enlarging it much, is neither necessary nor proper; and it would be of great consequence to them to be well recommended to a few, in every place they resort to, on whom they might rely for any information or assistance they may stand in need of; not forgetting, as they go along

along, to inform themselves carefully, with respect to those who are most eminent or distinguished, for any particular excellency, and to cultivate their acquaintance; they should not hurry too fast from one place to another, except when, as is sometimes the case, a general idea of the country is all that is wanted; and whatever singularities, or even seeming absurdities, may be observed in the manners and customs of different places, and more especially in what respects religion, they are by no means to be treated with ridicule or contempt; there is a reverence due to every thing that regards religion, and great caution necessary when engaged in any conversation with respect to it; nor should even the politics, or party heats and disputes of any country, be wantonly meddled, or made free with by strangers.

Travellers should keep a short *journal*, of the most material transactions and observations of every day, with the very impressions, as it were, that are made upon them, by the different objects that occur; a review of these afterwards will be a fund of great entertainment to them; but they are to beware of shewing too great attention to trifles, which is a fault they are often chargeable with, and, still more, of indulging a passion for the marvellous, as if it were miraculous, but rather endeavour

deavour carefully to search out the reasons of things, and then the wonder will often cease.

I may possibly be thought singular, in what I am now to say, but will be found, upon enquiry, to have some reason on my side, when I affirm, that, if a young gentleman's family and circumstances are such as require an early settlement in married life, I would expect more benefit from his travelling, either single or in the family way, deliberately afterwards, than from his rambling, in a hurry, through foreign countries, before his mind be properly formed and disposed for being improved, rather than corrupted by it: On the supposition, however, of any engagement of this kind, there is no question, but the time and extent of his circuit must be more circumscribed, than would otherwise be proper and practicable; but, with respect to this, it will be necessary to add one observation more, which is, that

Three years is the longest time that should be bestowed on travelling, with a view to education, and perhaps, rather too long; but, if they can easily be spared, they may be profitably spent in this way, and will be sufficient for visiting, at least, the most remarkable parts of Europe. There are few of them in which travelling will be proper in winter; so that, as I to make so long a tour, my first winter quarters

quarters would be in Paris, the next in Naples, and the third in Lisbon, making short excursions from each of these, in the way I found most convenient, and taking the most favourable seasons of the year for larger circuits, not only on the continent of Europe, but even to some islands of the Archipelago, proceeding to Constantinople, and not losing sight of Palestine and Egypt, if convenient opportunities offered of visiting these likewise, within the limits of the time above mentioned.

When travellers are of such rank, as to visit the different courts they may have access to, it should by no means be omitted, and the way of doing it, through the recommendation of the different ambassadors or residents, in each of these, will be very easy, if properly planned before they set out, and letters of credit obtained, in the usual way, for getting what sums of money may be wanted, in those places where their residence is like to be longest, and from which they can easily get bills on other places of less general resort, where they may happen to pass. Want of foresight and exactness in this way, may occasion much inconvenience not easily remedied afterwards.

Thus have I thrown together such remarks as appear to me most material, on the subject
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of EDUCATION; they are no more than what experience and common sense suggest to me, not knowing how far they may agree with those of many others, who have wrote large treatises * on the same subject, of which I scarce know any more than their names; nor have I access to see any of them at present, except Mr *Rousseau's Emilius*, a new system of Education, which I have perused; and cannot help admiring, first of all, the author's ingenuity and invention in making out four volumes on the subject, animated by some lively sallies of fancy, without any more of real solid instruction with respect to it, than might be contained in four pages. I must next admire the liberal disposition of my countrymen, who are friends to literature, in the metropolis of Great Britain, for encouraging and indemnifying a publication of such expence, translated from a foreign language, but affording so

VOL. II.

Y

little

* What would be particularly useful, and seems wanting, is some system of Education, that would enable us to discover the different dispositions and genius's of youth, and direct how to treat and regulate them in different ways accordingly; confirming right dispositions and habits, discovering and curing, or correcting the contrary; engaging their attention to that which is most important, and taking it off from little things; forming or improving their intellectual and moral faculties, and regulating their thoughts and practical opinions as to what ought to be most pursued or avoided by them, for, by these, their temper and affections, as well as actions, will, of course be regulated.

little, in a commercial light, to compensate the value paid for it. It is adorned, however, with a few excellent engravings; and the author's picture, in the frontispiece, is, to me, worth, at least, three of the volumes. His labour seems to be, to draw attention to himself rather than to his subject, and, to banish all other systems of education, rather than to lay down any regular judicious scheme of his own; allowing him the merit of a bold fancy, lively wit, and elegant diction, yet, in respect of the subject he professes to write on, he puts me in mind of a hectoring bully, pushing all around him off the stage, that he may strut upon it alone; or of a builder, continually employed in raising and clearing away rubbish of his own making, without ever laying down a stone of his edifice.

A great part of the third volume, indeed, is taken up with a profession of faith, which appears to be his own, and is mostly a collection of trite, common-place objections against the Christian revelation, which there is the less occasion to animadvert upon; that he has himself, in the three last pages of it, given as many testimonies in favour of this revelation, as are sufficient to overturn all that he had said before, and takes his leave of the subject as a skeptic; it would, perhaps, be prudent in me now to take my leave of him like-

wife,

wife, knowing how dangerous it is to draw on myself the vengeance of a writer, so lively, elegant, and indefatigable; and that of his numerous admirers, while my great distance from the press puts it out of my power to take any notice of the critical reprints which may be made upon me, and which, very probably, may never come to my knowledge. I have already, however, said too much to expect impunity; and, that every reader may be enabled, to form a just idea of the celebrated treatise now mentioned, I beg leave to point out to him a few passages in it, with the pages and volumes * in which they are to be found, that he may have it in his power to judge, how far the scope and connection of each passage may reconcile him to the author's singular way of expressing himself, and the *paradoxes*, which he professes himself at pains to collect. — Thus,

Vol. I. p. 135. " May I venture (says he) here to lay down, the greatest, most important, and most useful rule of Education; it is this, not to gain time but to lose it. The generality of readers will be so good as to excuse

* The edition here referred to is said to be translated by the translators of *Eloise*, and printed in London, for Messrs Becket and de Hondt in the Strand, 1765. — Whether there ever was another edition of it in English, I know not.

case any paradoxes, there is an absolute necessity for them in making reflections; and, say what you will, I had rather be remarkable for hunting after a paradox, than for being misled by prejudice.

Vol. I. p. 11. It must be observed, I do not esteem as public institutions, these ridiculous establishments that go by the name of *Universities*. I regard, just as little, the education acquired by an intercourse with the world, &c.

Vol. II. p. 58. "I hate books, they only teach people to talk about what they don't understand—P. 59, and 60. Since we must have books, there is one already, which, in my opinion, affords a complete treatise on natural Education. This book shall be the first *Emilius* shall read: In this, indeed, will, for a long time, consist his whole library, and it will always hold a distinguished place among others, &c.

Is it Aristotle, Pliny, or Buffon? No! It is *Robinson Crusoe*.

Vol. II. p. 121. "Since our errors thus increase with our knowledge, the only method to avoid error is to remain in ignorance."

Vol. II. p. 171. "The common people appear as they really are, and they are not amiable: If those in high life were equally undignified,

disguised, their appearance would make us shudder with horror."

Vol. II. p. 239. When speaking of quarrels. "I do not say Emilius ought to fight; that were madness: I say, he owes himself justice, and he is the only dispenser of it, &c. It is not in the power of the bravest man to prevent his being insulted; but it is certainly in his power to prevent the person insulting him from long making a boast of it."—What the author plainly points out here is *assassination*.

Vol. II. p. 257. "Emilius hardly knows, at fifteen years of age, whether or not he hath a soul; and perhaps it will not be time to inform him of it when he is eighteen; for if he learns it too soon, he runs a risk of never knowing it at all."

Vol. I. p. 137. "Exercise his corporeal organs, senses, and faculties, as much as you please, but keep his intellectual ones inactive as long as possible."

Vol. III. p. 96. "I praise God for his mercies, but never so far forget myself as to pray."

Vol. III. p. 123, and 124. "We have three principal religions in Europe: One admits of only one revelation, another of two, and the third of three. That which admits of only one revelation is the most ancient, and seems the least disputable; that which admits

of three is the most modern, and seems to be the most consistent; that which admits of two, and rejects the third, may possibly be the best, but it hath certainly every prepossession against it; its inconveniency stares one full in the face."—Had our author lived among Mahometants (to whom he here gives a preference) the love of singularity would probably have made him more a Christian.

DISSER.

DISSERTATION VII

ON DEATH

TO write on any subject, is the way of knowing, with some precision, what *ideas* we have formed with respect to it, and to make them more determinate; tho', therefore, I had no view of communicating my *thoughts* to others, I could not avoid having some desire, of considering a little, how they stand, with respect to two subjects so interesting as DEATH and IMMORTALITY; subjects apparently opposite, and yet the one naturally leads to examine what may be said on the other.

It is scarcely to be expected that any thing new can be said as to either of the important subjects now mentioned; nor can it be thought, that any one man, has light, or means of information with respect to them, beyond others, who have had the same advantages of reason and revelation to instruct them; tho' there

there is no doubt, but that some have, by reflection, gone greater lengths in improving these means or sources of knowledge, and have been thereby enabled to place them in different lights, or points of view, for the instruction and improvement of others.

DEATH puts a period to the manner of our existence in the present state, and might, therefore, be thought an argument against *Immortality*, was not this to be expected on any other footing than what we see at present: Hence it is that these subjects seem opposite; but, admitting another mode of existence to succeed, unlimited by time, and requiring such a change of being and faculties as is occasioned by *Death*, there will then be no doubt of its being not only connected with, but necessary to the *other*; and it is the *first*, in the order of our ideas, that falls to be considered.

After premising, therefore, some general considerations with respect to it, I shall consider DEATH, as to its *origin*, its *nature*, and its *effects*; taking each of these in a *physical*, as well as in a *moral* and *religious* view. —

The

First and most obvious consideration, of a general nature, that occurs with respect to *death*, is that of its *universality*; the instances are so few of any exemption from it, even in

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the way of God's sovereign and supernatural interposition, since the world began, that whatever appearance there may be of practical unbelief with respect to it; there is none speculatively; very few points, indeed, so much against the interest of many, have passed without dispute, but this will admit of none.

Not to avoid whatever may be the *immediate cause*, or rather *occasion* of death, so far as we can do it in a consistence with duty, would be unnatural, as well as unjustifiable; but to suppose (as some, by their being always so positive and particular in assigning second causes, would seem to do) that there may be a possibility, in some cases, at least, and by some lucky conjuncture of circumstances, to avoid these *second causes* commonly assigned, and the death consequent on them, is to suppose something that contradicts the universal experience of mankind; for, if such a case could happen, if it was not against the fixed laws of our present state, it is strange that it never should have happened, that, by no human power or invention, such *frivolous* or occasions of death have ever been escaped, and immortality, on man's present footing, attained.

What then is the obvious conclusion from this? What? but that it is not consistent with the present condition of our being, with the
 general

general law of nature, &c. the wise, uniform and sovereign appointment of its author, who has passed this sentence on every son of Adam, "Thou shalt surely die."

In consequence of this, *death* has reigned ever since the decree for it was pronounced. No man has ever been found proof against it, in his own strength; and the exceptions mentioned, that appear to have been made in the way of God's sovereignty, are (as was observed) so few, that they give no encouragement to look for exemption; one generation after another, yields to the empire of *death*; which, though it does not hinder one generation from being corrupted by another, yet it may be one mean, in the hand of providence, for restraining certain corruptions, which, at particular periods of the world, are or have been prevalent, and to prevent their further growth and continuance.

But, whatever are the purposes thus served by providence, certain it is, that *death* has hitherto reigned without interruption; that the *duration* of its empire reaches as far as the present state of things; and the same may also be said of its *extent*: Is it in this or 't'other corner of the earth alone; over this or 't'other kind only of creatures upon earth, that *death* reigns? are those who are powerful exalted by means of their power? the rich by their riches?

riches? or the poor by their obscurity? the skillful by their skill, or the strong and healthful through their natural vigour? No! none of them all have been thus distinguished or excepted; vain are all the labours of men to evade the power of *death*; whatever have been the inventions of art, or the improvements of science, none of them have ever availed to make man proof against it. Vain is it for him to implore the assistance of his friends; they can neither help him nor themselves; vain to fly from one society to another, from one clime or province to another; as the dominion of *sin* extends over all, so does also the empire of *death*, which (as we shall afterwards see) is connected with and consequent on it.

2. After what has been said of the *universality* of *death*, we may add this observation further with respect to it, that it shows an *universality* as to the *cause* and *end* of it; the *cause* and *end* that may be called *proximate* or *secondary*, must be considered as *evil*; in so far as, whatever is ungrateful to our view or perception, is so considered; but the same is not the case as to the *primary cause* and *end*; in respect of which, a view of the divine agency and interposition, leads us to consider every appointment of providence, particularly what is thus *universal*, without exception or distinction

distinction of characters, as conducive to the greatest general good.

3. It affords matter of further reflection with respect to death, that, as it puts a period to our present state of being, it does so with many before they have well entered upon it; with others before they could answer the ends of it (so far as we can judge) in the way of much improvement to themselves, or even, before they are capable of such improvement, and, they are by far the fewest whom it spares, till their capacities are fully unfolded and cultivated.

From the most accurate observations that have been made, it appears, that, of those who are born into the world, or breathe the breath of life, one third part dies before the expiration of the first year; one half, before they finish the fourth; and two thirds, before they reach what is commonly reckoned the age of manhood or maturity. In the early ages of the world, in order to its being sooner peopled, it is probable, that providence so ordered it, as to the constitution, diet, and other circumstances relating to the inhabitants, that few died in infancy, or at an age, which we, through ignorance, call untimely; but the case is otherwise now, as to those who taste of this life; and it stands pretty much in the manner we have here represented.

From

From this we may conclude, that the Creator has ends in animating, beyond what has respect to any enjoyments or improvements attained in the present state: These ends, particularly as respecting the numerous class now mentioned, of such as are removed from this state of being, before they have well entered upon it, it is not possible for us to assign at present, though it is not easy to avoid forming some general conjectures with respect to them; mine shall remain with myself, till I arrive at the region of certainty, when the connection of the present human system, with something before and after it, will, probably, clear up many particulars relating to it, that are at present involved in impenetrable obscurity, and fit for being the subject of silent conjecture, rather than of any noisy and fanciful speculation.

4. One other general observation that naturally occurs in contemplating death, is, that we see men so universally betray an inconsistency with respect to it; by believing its certainty and approach, and yet acting as if they expected exemption from it; believing the frailty of others, but incredulous as to their own; believing that the slightest accident may put a period to life, and that it is in the power of the meanest aggressor; and yet, every moment making light of what endan-

gets that, which (though owned to be so precarious) they generally hold so dear, valuing nothing more than life, and yet of nothing more prodigal; in so much that, scarce any passion can be named, however inconsiderable, that does not often conquer the fear of death.

All this seeming inconsistency, however, may be accounted for, and reconciled to his unerring wisdom who has thus constituted us. He would have us active and provident, which requires our laying schemes for futurity; but he would put us to the trial also, whether we will have this activity and foresight directed, to a nearer or more distant and important futurity; moderating the fear of death was necessary to the former, but a firm persuasion of its certainty and consequences to the latter; when we have it so much in our power to hurt others, there was the more need of our being impressed with a sense of their weakness and frailty, and our impression, at the same time, of the vanity of their pursuits, moderates envy towards them. The believing our lives to be in every man's power is a restraint from injuring and provoking others: And, as our present frame is such, that life is easily cut off, and the hour, though still approaching, concealed, there is the more room for the exercise of prudence and fortitude,

in the way of exposing or endangering it, the more incitement to wretchedness, and the less to iniquitous schemes for the support or accommodation of it.

Smith, in his excellent Theory of moral sentiments, observes, that the behaviour of a military man is reckoned to have most propriety, when he seems to have no thoughts of death, and that of a clergyman when he appears to have, though the former is much more exposed to it than the latter; and the reason he gives for this, from human experience, is, that, to encounter death often, it has been found easier to banish the thoughts of it, than to combat it by arguments. But, though this be so much the practice, it must be owned, that a proper view of death, and preparation for it, in the way that shall afterwards be mentioned, is a much better foundation for real fortitude and intrepidity.

After premising these general observations with respect to death, we promised to consider it a little more methodically in respect of

I. Its Origin,
II. Its Nature, and
III. Its Effects.

The exercise of prudence and fortitude

Taking each of these in a separate as well as in a general and aggregate view, we may have their effect, for hastening that death, to inquire into the *origin of death*, is to inquire into the origin of *natural evil*, of which death, and whatever leads to it, is reckoned to make a great part. This again leads to investigate the origin of *moral evil*, as the source of the other. These inquiries we shall now enter upon, no further than to observe, that every account of the origin of evil, will be found either fabulous or unsatisfying, which does not derive it from that one source, of man's departure from the law of his creation, by an abuse of the free powers of action given him: This departure, transgression or abuse, is what, in the language of divines, is called *sin*, in that of philosophers or rhetoricians, *vice* or moral turpitude; and of this, death is the *natural*, the *penal*, and the *medicinal* consequence.

1. The *natural* consequence. Man's first sin was such, that it poisoned his nature, the body as well as the soul was poisoned by it. Not to mention, what has, with some colour of reason, been said, as to the poisonous quality of the forbidden fruit, it is certain, that sin has laid the foundation of death, or paved the way to it, in a manner that may be pretty easily accounted for by us, in so much as,

from

from this original source of sin and corruption, many streams have issued, each of which have their effect, for hastening that death, which is the original fruit and demerit of sin. How many are there whose ambition has thus hurried themselves, and many others, to the period of life? witness the catastrophes which it occasioned in Europe not many years ago, and continues still to occasion: How many again, whom intemperance; or a boundless riot after sensual pleasures, hurries to their end? The same might be said of the effect of every ungoverned passion, of anger, avarice, with all these secret and open sins, by which many draw upon themselves and others, that death they so much dread, as a natural consequence of their offences.

2. It may be also considered as their *penal* or *judicial* consequence, *i. e.* in the way of judgment, for executing God's justice, and testifying his displeasure against sin; though we ought not to be rash in making the application, or determining, in what cases particular calamities are meant in the way of judgment for particular offences.

If certain trespasses, against the laws of men, be punishable by death, much more is this due, where the law of God, the supreme ruler, is transgressed. Well then might we intimate this as the penal consequence of sin.

to our first parents or representatives, "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." He, who gave life to man at first, had an unquestionable right, to continue or recal it, on his own terms; his threatening therefore being incurred, was in due time executed, man's innocence being forfeited, his life was forfeited into the hands of justice.

3. We may further add, that death is not only the natural and penal, but likewise the medicinal consequence of sin, i. e. in the present state of mankind, or the circumstances to which the world is reduced by sin, death may be considered, not only as its consequence, in the way of God's justice, but, likewise, as, in part, the cure destined for it, in the way of his mercy, as a change or operation necessary, before the poison of sin can be thoroughly expelled, and the soul fully restored to its primitive health and holiness. With respect to the wicked and ungodly, it cannot indeed be said, that the infection of sin is thus cured or expelled; for it seizes the powers and principles of their souls, and death itself, though it frees them from the fetters of the body, and the temptations it gives rise to, yet it leaves them in the chains of sin, and consigned over to punishment: but, with respect to the virtuous and godly, death is a salutary medicine, it carries their virtue and holiness

to perfection, given a full deliverance from the bondage of corruption, and opens their way to the regions of purity and joy. Thus much may be said of death in respect of its origin: but

II. When we make any thing the subject of our inquiry or discourse, it is expected that we should, if not explain, at least inquire into the nature of it: How then shall this be done as to our present subject, DEATH? What idea shall we form of it? A very imperfect one indeed, as in all cases of sensible impressions and perceptions, where experience is wanting, and imagination often employed to supply the want of it: Now death cannot be spoken of or wrote of, as the subject of experience, till we come to a condition of being, in which our thoughts of this and every other subject, shall be communicated otherwise than by writing, or any faculty now made use of for this purpose.

None of those, who have trod this dark path before us, can return, at our desire, to tell us their experience with respect to it; the laws of their state of separation, do not appear to admit of this, and, till the same experience enable us to judge of its nature, we can only form dubious conjectures. The wise

Author

Author of our being, has not seen it necessary for us, to be further informed on this head at present.

But though we are not enabled to know and judge of this, in a *physical* or *natural* way, yet we are enabled and called to do it, in a *religious* way, which is, to us, of much more importance. All our knowledge of nature, will not enable us, to avoid or secure against death, but the religion of Jesus teaches how to secure against any hurtful consequences of it. It is not, then, our knowing, that, to burst this or 'tother vessel, to break this or 'tother nerve, is death, which, to us, is of most importance to know; but our knowing, and being assured, that this or 'tother *sin*, will, most certainly, if un-repented of, and un-pardoned, be the *death* of our *souls*. The bodily tenement or cottage, must, no doubt, have certain breaches made upon it, before the soul forsakes it, but, in what part, or from what quarter these breaches may come, and, to what precise degree it must be broken or laid waste, before it shall be thus deserted of its spiritual inhabitant, is beyond the skill of the most knowing on this head to determine.

When the sentence of death was denounced against our first parents, it is very probable they had a much more imperfect idea of it than we have; that they considered it how-
ever

ever as the period of their state on earth, is highly probable, else Cain would not have taken this way to get rid of his brother. The death of Abel is the first that we read of, and some Jewish writers have endeavoured to embellish the history of it by fabulous additions, such as, that when Cain resolved on killing his brother, he knew not how to accomplish it, or what would effect it, till the same artful enemy of mankind, who had deceived his parents, taught him the art of murder, by bruising the head of a bird, while asleep, with a stone; be this as it will, the way to deprive of life has, since that time, come to be too well known.

But can any one tell precisely where the seat of animal life lies; is it the head or the heart, the arterial or the nervous fluids, nutrition or respiration to which it has respect? As to all these we are unable to determine; we cannot determine or describe the manner in which the soul and body are united, and operate on one another in life, we cannot therefore discover or determine, the precise manner in which they are separated by death, and as little can we form a determinate idea, of what is felt at dissolution*, there is no case

* Some have supposed the change or transition here, to be that of infants at their birth, and reckoned the pain of the

in which more of diversity takes place, from the agonies with which the furious soul of Calpurnius burst forth, to the seeming gentle slumbers or *deliquium* of a Seneca, or even of a Petronius Arbiter.

The suspension of our sensible powers by sleeping or fainting, is indeed what best enables us to form any idea of death, yet still the nature of it, in a physical way, is inexplicable by us: Its certainty, in a religious or moral sense, as formerly set forth, is enough for us to know; I shall, therefore, add only one observation more, as to its nature, which is that

Wherever the seat of animal life is, or whatever it is that constitutes the union between soul and body, we find that the continuance of it, depends so much upon a certain forward, and I may say involuntary, principle of motion,

the latter possibly greater; but, though this is what cannot be ascertained, yet the means of lessening the pain of natural death, as well as of protracting it, is justly considered as one of the desiderata in the Physical art.

† Whatever it is that naturally calls the *Animal Spirit*, this vital motion has particular respect to them; and, until there is an extinction of these, even the destruction of the bodily organs will not cause death: this extinction may be occasioned, not only by too great compression, but likewise by too great dilatation of them; and as their motion at the heart is three times quicker than in the lungs, whatever stops the *Systole* and *Diastole* of the heart, must bring on death three times more suddenly than whatever stops the *Systole* alone.

III. Having seen our insupportable pain to come, I shall

or circulation, that, wherever this intirely ceases, life ceases, whatever puts a period to this supreme vital function or energy, (if I may so call it) which operates independently on the will, puts a period to animal life; but while this internal principle of motion or circulation continues to operate, be it never so languid, life continues, even tho' sensation should be interrupted, as is the case in deep sleep and fainting.

Amidst this seeming dependence, however, on matter and motion, for the continuance of animal life, *i. e.* of the soul's union with the body, behold the triumphs of the former, of that which in us is spiritual and immaterial; that mode of action which is peculiar to it, still continues, when that which has respect to matter ceases: the action peculiar, but not essential, to matter is *motion*, that which is peculiar, and likewise essential to spirit is *thought*, or reflection, which continues amidst the ruins of all that is material in us, and around us. Hence arises its security and exultation, so well described by Mr Addison, in these well known but inimitable lines,

The soul, secur'd in her existence, smiles
At the drawn dagger, and defies its point;
The stars shall fade away, the Sun himself
Grow dim with age, and Nature sink in years;
But thou shalt flourish in immortal youth,
Unhurt amidst the war of elements,
The wrecks of matter, and the crush of worlds.

III. Having seen our inability to come at any distinct

distinct idea of death, from our knowledge of its *nature*, physically considered, let us see, what may be had from a view of its *effects*, the idea of which, we are in this, as in many other cases, apt to confound, with that of the nature and essential constitution of things.

What then are the effects or operations of this *King of Terrors*, in all the different views we are now taking of them, physical, moral, and religious?

What is it that death *does*? and,

What is it that it *cannot do*?

1. The effect of it that appears most obviously at first view, is, that it puts a period to life, it separates the *soul* from the *body*; they had been embarked together on the sea of life, but, this short voyage being ended, they launch into the ocean of eternity. Very closely were these two companions united before; many storms, perhaps, they weathered together; but death separates them, and thereby ends the condition in which they at present subsist.

As it was observed formerly, that we know not how many strokes our tenements of clay must get, before our removal from them, we may now further observe, that, though we are uncertain from what quarter these may come, or where the attack may be made, yet that this tenement must be forsaken at last, is undeniable.

deniable, you may spend as much time and pains as you please, in adorning, decorating and pampering it; it may possibly be the object of your own fond admiration, and you may think it meets with admiration from others, yet still it is but a cottage of clay, which you must leave; and how far inferior it is to the *soul*, which you perhaps shamefully neglect, you may see from its condition when forsaken of it; instead of being the object of admiration to beholders, it becomes the object of horror and disgust, even to those who are most nearly connected with us, and must lay their account with soon following us.

As the first and most obvious effect of death is its putting a period to life, by separating between the soul and the body, we must also observe,

2. As its effect, that it puts a period to all our enjoyments, prospects and pursuits in this life, it separates from all these, from all the objects with which we were connected only through the body, vain are all human efforts to prevent the separation. If we may believe the histories we have of some distant unenlightened nations, it was no uncommon practice, with those of most distinction among them, to have their treasures, and even some of their dependents, interred along with them, as if they could, thereby, prevent that separation from all outward persons and things,

which we are now speaking of; but the attempt was vain and impotent; they were as much separated from them as if dispersed to the utmost corners of the earth.

All the *distinctions* of honour and policy, are likewise hereby levelled; all *differences* from humour, interest, or passion, removed; those who entertained them do all mingle in the same dust; nor can their remains, when there deposited, be any more distinguished one from another. By this the various relations of life are likewise dissolved; death ravages our society upon earth; it separates from those who were most closely united to us, by the ties of blood or friendship; and the laws of their state of separation, do not appear to admit of their returning to mix again in the society of mortals.—We shall only observe further,

3. As to the effects of death, that, as it puts a period to life and its enjoyments, so likewise to our time of trial, and means of improvement; they extend no farther; death determines our condition for eternity.—

Our

Last, therefore, and most important enquiry with respect to death, shall be the *preparation* necessary for it; and the first step we shall mention of this preparation is, the keeping

our

our minds *disengaged* from any immoderate attachment to such things as have respect only to this life; and the accustoming ourselves to think seriously on these objects, which must be owned to deserve our most serious attention; such as, the end for which life, being, and faculties, were given us, the account we have to give of their improvement; how this stands, and how, amidst all our unworthiness, and misimprovement, we may, through the merciful offices of our Redeemer, be accepted in the sight of God.

If any subjects deserve our serious attention, it must be these; we must beware, however, of mistaking this *seriousness*, for a *gloominess* of disposition, which makes some men see only the dark side of things, and which is neither honouring to God, nor comforting and improving to themselves: Even death hath its bright as well as its dark side; and, tho' the preparation for it be inconsistent with levity of spirit, yet it by no means consists in that gloominess of soul spoken of, which is rather a bar to such improvement, and arises, either from a constitutional infirmity of temper, or from a distempered imagination, prying too much into dark and awful providences.

What we here mean to point out, as the first step of preparation necessary for death,

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is that, as a great part of our time in life, is often past in idleness, inattention, and amusement, dissipating all serious thought; these habits must be broke of, and a *serious attention* given to what respects our eternal interests; a retirement from this world will often be necessary, that we may turn our thoughts and meditation to that which is to come.

This habit of serious attention we have been speaking of, will naturally lead to some other steps, in the way of preparation for death, such as self-examination, repentance, and amendment, with a *humble, yet firm fiducial* reliance on the merits and mediation of the adorable REDEEMER of mankind.

I only name these different *steps* of the *preparation* necessary for death, and its awful consequences; being persuaded that there is none, who will read what I now suggest, but is, or can easily be instructed as to the particular import of each of them, and the diversity they require in the practice or application of them, according to our different characters, circumstances, talents, duties, and offences, or neglect of duty.

This, then, is a work, which every man, for himself, must apply to, and be supposed qualified for; if it has been long neglected, there will be the more time and pains necessary, before it is put on such a footing, as will

give peace and tranquillity of soul, on rational and scriptural grounds; but when this is once attained, and a habit of attention and watchfulness acquired in consequence of it, the work goes on easily and comfortably, and may all be comprehended in that one exercise, so often spoken of, with particular approbation, in scripture, *walking with God*: which indeed includes a variety of exercises, according to different circumstances, duties, and relations; but supposes, that, in all these, an uniform regard to God's will is maintained, and an impression of his presence and providence, leading to the different exercises of loving, fearing, trusting, and submitting to him; the *habitual preparation*, therefore, necessary for death, in this light, requires the following particulars:

1. An endeavour to be always found in the *way of duty*, to God and man, avoiding whatever is contrary to it, whatever wounds the conscience in life, and adds to the terrors of death, the view of which might be a good mean of combating temptation, and the considering what may then add to our hopes, or our fears, a good rule to judge of the nature and fitness of our actions.

2. The applying ourselves to acquire every *habit or disposition* that is ornamental to, or perfective of our *souls*, and must follow them

after death; and, for the same reason, to watch against what deforms, disfigures, and debases them.

3. The considering all our duties, services, and dispositions, in a *gospel-light*, as having too great a mixture of imperfection and impurity, to imply merit, or bear the scrutiny of unerring wisdom, and untainted holiness.

4. On every deviation from duty, the losing no time in returning to it, in breaking off our sins by repentance, and getting our *peace* made up *with God*, through the merits of his Son, as our Saviour and Intercessor.

5. In order to have our condition at *death*, not only *safe*, but comfortable, it would be our interest, even while necessarily employed about the things of this life, and endeavouring to have them properly regulated, to endeavour also to keep our minds so far disengaged from them, and to have our dependence on divine providence so firmly established, that we may be above being either disturbed or corrupted by outward things; conscious that we have chosen God for our portion, and placed our supreme happiness in his favour, the value of which will not be diminished, as that of all outward enjoyments will be, at death; but, on the contrary, a consciousness of having made him formerly the deliberate choice of our souls, will lay a foundation for the

highest comfort, in the more immediate view of appearing before him, and entering on *Immortality*.

IMMORTALITY is the subject of enquiry and contemplation, we are next to turn to; it naturally succeeds that which we have been considering. Would you have immortality on the terms now fixed by the Author of nature, you must pass to it through *death*; dark and gloomy as the vale of death appears, it is the only entrance to immortality.

By way of *transition*, therefore, to this last subject of enquiry, let us consider a little how far the power of *death* extends, and how it is limited? this is what was meant when we proposed, that, after viewing the *effects* of death, or what it does, we should likewise consider what it *does not*, what it has not power to do; the consideration of this begins to open to our view, such a prospect of *death* as is comfortable.

1. Then, tho' *death* be certain, according to God's appointment, yet it cannot come one moment sooner than he has ordered; be your distresses, dangers, and fears, what they will, yet, till the time arrive, which he has appointed for calling you hence, you are immortal.

2. Death

It is in this view that an eminent Latin Poet calls *DEATH*, "The Privilege of Human Nature."

2. Death will come *once, but no more*; you may therefore be the more easily reconciled to whatever appears in it disagreeable to nature, that the blow is not to be repeated.

3. Tho' death *changes* us, yet it cannot *destroy* us; the smallest grain, even of that dust to which it changes the body, will not be lost or annihilated, but will be found in due time. Much less will what appertains to the soul be lost. A change we must grant it to be, yea a very great one, and to us at present inconceivable, because of the difference betwixt the two states to which it has respect, that from which it takes us, and that to which it leads; yet still it is only a *change*, and, to many, a happy *exchange*.

4. Another thing, we may say, which death cannot do, is, that tho' it suspends the *sensible powers*, yet it cannot suspend the *spiritual powers*. These powers that depend, in any measure, on the body, we call *sensible*; these that depend more immediately on the soul, *spiritual*. That death suspends the first of these, *viz.* the powers of sensation, cannot be denied; the senses can no longer be exercised as formerly; in vain shall we endeavour to charm the ear with melody, to please the eye with colours and symmetry, to regale the taste with delicacies, or the smell with the most fragrant odours.

down, the powers of distinguishing or delighting in these, are now no more; these senses that have particular respect to the *body* only, such as the *taste* and *smell*, shall, we may well believe, entirely cease, and that of feeling, in a sensible way, likewise; but as for hearing and seeing*, they are so necessary, to our having any intercourse with others, that we are naturally led to believe there will be some powers of perception analogous to these, even after death; and we shall soon see that we have sufficient grounds to believe, that whatever effect it has on our *sensible* powers, it cannot reach our *spiritual* powers, of thinking and enjoying; these powers that are peculiar to the soul, and which we may rather suppose shall be enlarged, enlivened, and improved, as no bodily weakness or incumbrance shall remain hereafter, to clog or interrupt their exercise.

HAVING thus far made *Death* the subject

* Tho' we cannot pretend to follow the celebrated author of "The Elements of Criticism," in all his refinements, yet we cannot but approve of his distinction betwixt our perceptions by the Ear and Eye, and those of our other sense, as reckoning the former more refined and intellectual, and not so much seated in the organ of sense, but the latter more corporeal, and, as it were, organic; for our perceptions by them in the way of feeling, smelling, and tasting, seem to be seated more in the bodily organ, and to be thereby less refined and permanent.

of my thoughts and contemplation, it is natural for me to look forward; and consider what view I shall have of it when speculation shall give place to experience; but, tho' of this I can now have no idea, yet, as I read with pleasure and approbation what has been wrote on this subject by many (who were equally inexperienced) with views of general improvement to others, after their departure from them; one of my strongest engagements to add to what has been wrote on it, or, at least to represent it in different points of view, is that others may, in the same manner, have some benefit by my imperfect hints, when my life and my labours shall likewise have their period.

This consideration naturally leads to one reflection more upon the subject, which is, that

All the speculations, even of a Plato or Seneca, about Death, Immortality, and the Spiritual World, come infinitely short of the intuitive views and perceptions of the meanest peasant or infant, the very first moment of their entrance on a disembodied state. When, escaped from the prison of the body, the soul finds its faculties expanded; reviews with pleasure the toils it underwent, and bad accommodation in its former dark and desolate abode;

takes

takes in new ideas, ranges those it had, in better order; corrects its former views, and, instead of the parched Pierian springs, satiates its thirst for knowledge, from the exuberant sources of celestial knowledge and intelligence.

DISSER.

DISSERTATION IX.

IMMORTALITY.

DEATH is a *transition*; the view now taken of it from *observation*, (for some judgment of it there may be, in this way, previous to its being the subject of *experience*) proves it to be this and no more: It is a transition or migration from one state to another, from one mode or condition of being to another: The state or condition, *from which* it removes us, we all know. What that is, *to which* it leads, by the separation of soul and body, is a question that resolves itself into five different parts or branches, respecting

I. The *nature* of the SOUL.

II. The evidences of its *surviving the separation from the body*.

III. Its condition while thus *separated*.

IV. The

IV. The reasons we have to believe that they shall be reunited.

V. The consequences of this reunion, and its continuance or duration.

LET us see then what is the amount of our knowledge, as to each of these particulars, according to the light that reason and revelation give us with respect to them.

This will carry us farther in our enquiries, than would perhaps be expected, or at first thought necessary, in a discourse on IMMORTALITY; which is generally considered only according to the respect it has to the SOUL; but the other points mentioned are so nearly connected with this, and so interesting, that we cannot easily avoid offering a few hints with respect to them*.

I. As to the nature of the SOUL, we are apt to think that we know something of it, when we say that it is *spiritual* or *immaterial*; but when we consider the import of such expressions, we shall find that they carry in them no

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* Though *Immortality* be ascribed particularly to the *soul*, being considered as the necessary consequence of its *spiritual* nature, or as an original inherent property of it; yet it is also to be considered as awaiting the *body*; though on a different footing, viz. not as the consequence of its nature, nor as essential to it; but, by virtue of God's positive appointment and promise with respect to it, "that though mortal, it shall put on immortality."

idea of any thing positive, but only a negative description, as it were, of the *soul*, intimating what it *is not*, rather than what it really *is*. The word *spiritual*, and that which, in the Hebrew and Greek languages, (as well as in the Latin, from which, properly, it is taken) corresponds with it, is plainly metaphorical, that is, it expresses something mental by an image taken from what is sensible; for the words from which, in all these languages, it takes its origin, viz. נֶפֶשׁ דָּוָן, πνεύμα, *spiritus*, do all express much the same as Wind, Air, or Breath, in English: We would wish to express by them some high refinement of *matter*, something as remote as possible from what is grossly material, something that has not flesh and bones as we now have, *i. e.* something *immaterial*; which is the other term, or mode of expression here generally used, and indeed the only one that can be used, as our knowledge now stands with respect to the subject it relates to.

The plain case with us here, then, seems to be this: We have ideas of some qualities that must be ascribed to matter, such as solidity, figure, &c. and other qualities, that cannot be ascribed to it, as thinking, reflecting, &c. The *substance* or *substratum* itself, as divested of these qualities, we have no idea of in either case, and yet we cannot but believe

believe them to be essentially different from one another, in so much as the qualities of the one can, with no propriety, be ascribed to the other. We cannot say of a piece of *matter*, with any appearance of propriety, that it is mild, bold, fearful; that it grieves, hopes, rejoices, &c. nor of any *thought* that it is square, round, and the like; or that the sensible, the known properties of matter, *viz.* solidity, extension, figure, &c. are any way applicable to it.

Whatever, therefore, is the nature of that *substance* (for we have no other name to express it by) to which *thought* belongs, in all its different forms or exercises, of understanding, willing, &c. and however unable we are to conceive of, or describe it, as divested of these qualities, (even as we are unable to conceive of the *substratum* of sensible qualities) we must conclude, *negatively*, with respect to it, that it is not *material*, that it is something essentially different from *matter*.

But, what the wiser are we, you will say, of knowing this much? What the better of knowing as to any herb, only that it is not grass, if we know no more? I answer, that, even from this it follows, that there is one essential property of matter which we cannot ascribe to the mind, *viz.* *Divisibility*; a property that always supposes *extension*, and is therefore incompatible with our idea of these *spiritual* qualities and exercises now mentioned;

but, in a particular manner, incompatible with that idea which the *soul* has of itself as *one single conscious* indivisible principle; whereas the smallest particle of matter is rather a congeries or multitude of parts, and consequently of distinct *consciousnesses*, if it could be supposed *cogitative*.

Thus far, therefore, are we come in our enquiry, as to the *nature* of the human *soul*, that, from its exercises or operations and qualities, it appears to be something very different from *matter*, something *immaterial*; that consequently it is indivisible, and, in its own nature, incapable of dissolution.

This clears, in a great measure, our way for establishing the evidences of the *Soul's immortality*.

But, before we proceed to this, it might possibly be expected that we should pursue, a little further, the enquiry we have now entered upon, as to the *nature* of the human *soul*, according to the place which it appears to hold in the seat of existence and intelligence.

With respect to this, then, I must first of all observe, that, I hope, it will not be expected, when we must confess our ignorance, even of the essence and properties of *matter*, that we should be able to investigate, or explain those of *spirit*. If our sensible powers

and their perceptions fail us as to the *former*, which are their proper objects, much more must they do so as to the *latter*, which are not; and it seems certain, that it is through their perceptions, or the impressions made on them, [that we receive our first and simplest ideas, however much they come to be afterwards compounded, compared, differently arranged and improved upon by the *reflex* operations of the mind.

In all our enquiries, as to material and immaterial objects, as to the natural and spiritual world, we would be at *Theory*, and have no small help from it, when it can be had; but, as our sources of knowledge now stand, the progress towards it must be by various accurate and repeated experiments and observations. Without these we may form an hypothesis or conjecture, but no true *theory*; it is by collecting, comparing, and reflecting aright on such experiments and observations, that we are enabled to investigate any general *laws*, causes, and principles, on which such a *theory* may be built; and when once it is, in some measure, established, it gives great advantage in our future enquiries, or scientifick progress (if I may so call it) towards truth.

To take this method, therefore, here, let us see what is the amount and result of our observations, as to *vitality*, *intelligence*, and the

different ranks of beings to which they are found to belong.

1. We see a regular *series*, or gradation of beings *below* us, in the animal, vegetable, and mineral world.

2. From *analogy*, founded on scripture, as well as reason, we conclude that there is also a gradual ascent and continuation, in the *scale* of spiritual beings above us, from man, who is the lowest of them, to the highest orders in the hierarchy of heaven.

3. In the scale of beings below us, what forms the most essential difference, is *vitality*; in that by which we are related to those above us, the distinguishing property is *intelligence*.

4. Tho' in respect of these two, the different classes do sometimes approach very near one another, yet we must suppose there are insuperable *lines*, by which they are divided.

5. To the accurate enquirers into nature, it may be submitted, whether the three dividing lines as to the * vegetable, animal, and intellectual

* Were we to go farther back here in examining more minutely, and tracing the scale of beings below us, we might observe, that, as motion or action of any kind, is not essential to *matter*, whatever it appears to have of this must be derived from some other principle operating on it. It is, in itself, inert or inactive; in consequence, however, of the laws impressed upon it in the way of gravitation, attraction, cohesion, &c. it acquires a tendency to motion, regulated by these laws, and diversified according to

Intellectual orders, may not be reckoned *assimilation*, *perception*, and *reflection*; i. e. nothing can be called a *vegetable* without a principle of *assimilation*, by which it selects, and, as it were, imbibes and circulates its juices and nourishment, from such of the elementary homogeneous parts of matter, as best correspond, and are in contact with it. No being can be called an *animal*, or said to be endued with animal life, unless it appears to have *perception**; but, if it has this, tho' it has no loco-motive powers, it is more than a mere *vegetable*; it gives and receives impressions from a principle of life and action *internal*†

to the mixture or composition of its integral elementary parts; this is the first step of its ascent or improvement; the next is, that which is attained by *minerals*, as distinguished from other *fossils*, by a principle of *accretion* or *assimilation*. From *minerals* we rise to *vegetables*, reckoning *mosses* intermediate betwixt them, as the *strawberry* plants, *polypus* and *shell-fish* are between the vegetable and animal tribes; *subseas* and *changelings* between these and the rational.

* When Lord Bacon speaks of a *perception* common to all bodies, he certainly means by it the same as an *impression*. He asserts likewise, that if the law of gravitation did not take place, all bodies would attract what was homogeneous to them, viz. gold attract gold, iron, iron, &c. but of this there is not sufficient proof.

† It seems to be chiefly its not having this principle of motion and perception or sensation *internal* to it, that excludes the most *sensitive* plant, even what is called *Venus's Fly-trap*, from the class of *animals*.

to it, and not merely from external impulse or contact.

But what is still more difficult, yet more connected with our present subject, is to fix the boundary betwixt the *animal* and *intellectual* world, betwixt brutes and men; their near approaches to one another, in respect of memory, affection, sagacity, and the like, have afforded subject of much dispute; but we are not to enter upon this at present; we would only wish to fix the *line* by which they are divided, some where or other; and how can we fix it better than by saying, that it is *reasoning* and *reflecting* which distinguish them? meaning thereby, the powers not only of receiving and retaining, or recording, but also of arranging, examining, and comparing the impressions made on sense, so as to draw conclusions from them, with respect to objects which do not make an immediate impression on it. This power or principle of connecting, reviewing, and operating on its own ideas or perceptions, cannot have any name, more distinguishing of it, than *reflection*; and, if to this we add *devotion*, or an impression (however faint it may be) of a Deity, we have that which most distinguishes the rational from the brutal, the *intellectual* from the *animal* creation.

6. With

6. With respect to the affections of matter, in all cases where there is none of these internal principles, now spoken of, operating upon it, we cannot conceive of them in any other way, than as mechanical, *i. e.* one part of matter moving or acting upon another by impulse or contact: The various laws of motion and gravitation, and the various wonderful phenomena of chymistry, electricity, and the like, arising from the combination or contest of the different elementary systems, however subtle or refined, must be all either ascribed to the uniform influence and operation of an immaterial principle, or resolved into the effects of matter and motion, in an infinity (I may almost say) of different configurations, conjunctions and positions.

7. As in the different classes of beings, formerly mentioned, there are near approaches to one another, yet insuperable boundaries betwixt them; we need not wonder if the same should be the case as to *matter* and *spirit*, that they should also make near approaches, without ever meeting. But,

8. Notwithstanding their being essentially different, and never meeting, so far as to be transmutable, yet we see they may be closely united, and operate on one another, with this remarkable difference, that spirit can operate on matter, even when it has not an intimate

vital

vital union with it, but *matter* cannot be considered as operating, *i. e.* as making any impression (for no idea of activity has place here) on *spirit*, unless it has such an union with it.

9. As *matter* admits of so many different elementary principles, combinations, and degrees of refinement, we need not wonder if *spiritual* or immaterial principles, should be, at least, equally different; though therefore we should admit something immaterial*, as the cause of gravitation, attraction, &c. and, much more as necessary, wherever there is vitality, *i. e.* an internal principle of life and action, or self-motion; this, by no means, puts a reptile, or even the most sagacious brute animal, on the same footing with man, while the reflecting principle, formerly mentioned, is wanting; it is this that distinguishes man, that makes him an intelligent and accountable being, and constitutes him, as it were, the lineal heir of immortality.

10. Admitting some principle, very different from matter, to take place wherever there is vitality, even in the insect and reptile world, no inference can be drawn from it as to their duration, in the manner in which we reason with respect to the immaterial, and consequently the indivisible and immortal principle

* If the cause was material and mechanical, it would operate according to the extent or superficies of bodies, and not according to their solid contents, as is the case in gravitation.

principle in man, their natures being essentially different; and, whatever changes or migrations some may allow them, they still seem destitute, in a great measure, of that fixed and continued consciousness or recollection which man has, and which is necessary for connecting one period or condition of being with another *.

II. It is also observable, as to the principle of *life or vitality*, even in its lowest degree, that where it is once begun, it does not seem to be lost, through whatever transmutations it may pass, any more than the elementary parts of matter are lost or annihilated; and if, by such an infinity of transmutations and disseminations, all nature seems, as it were, to be animated, we need wonder the less at the generation of animals, in places where only matter was supposed to operate, as in the case of putrefaction, without supposing that there can, in reality, be any such thing as *equivocal generation*, from the mere influence of *matter*, whatever may be its configuration, motion, or position.

After throwing together these observations, with respect to the different orders of beings

below

* Hence it is that, among brutes, though the *individual* advances from infancy to maturity, yet there is no progress or advancement of the *species*, as there is with man, by one generation's building on the improvements of another. For this observation I am indebted to *The History of Civil Society*, one of the most animated performances in the English language.

below us, it may next be expected that the same should be done as to the subordinate beings *above* us, in order to see how far, by the help of analogy where experience is wanting, any *theory* can be established as to them, or any of the laws, by which they are governed, investigated. The amount of our knowledge, therefore, as to these, seems to be no more than as follows,

1. We can have no doubt of the *reality* of the spiritual world, *i. e.* of the existence of such superior intelligences, however different they may be from one another, in respect of enjoyment and perfection: We may as well doubt the existence of every place, person, and thing, that is not the immediate object of our sensible perception.

2. We have no reason to believe that it is any distance of place on their part, but a defect of faculties on our's, which hinders our discernment of, and intercourse with them.

3. This defect of faculties is the unavoidable consequence of our present condition of being, as it seems to arise from the present union of the spiritual principle in us, with matter, and its powers of perception being thereby debilitated or obstructed; but let this union once be dissolved, let its bodily fetters be struck off, and then the spiritual world, will, as it were, open to its view.

4. If

4. If, upon a minute inspection of the natural world, it may, with respect to the prevalence of life in it, be said to be all animated, much more may this be said as to the spiritual or intellectual world, in which the human *soul* must be considered as holding the lowest rank.

5. As we can judge of the circumstances and actions of inferior irrational animals, though they cannot of our's; in like manner may it be supposed, that our conditions and actions ly open to the discernment of superior intelligences, though their's do not so to us.

6. We cannot conceive of them, without supposing the ideas of space, or extension, and successive duration applicable to them, but how they really are so, or whether our supposing it arises only from an imperfection in our discernment or manner of conception, is a question, that will remain such till this imperfection be removed.

In any supernatural revelation from God, some might be apt to think, that very great discoveries would be made as to the spiritual world, but we behoved to have new faculties in order to their being communicated to us. With respect to the *Angels* who fell from their obedience, and those who stood and were confirmed therein, their difference of state and services, some hints are given us in scrip-

ture; but its silence as to many things, nay, almost, as to all that respects the planetary as well as the angelick worlds, seems plainly designed for checking all vain curiosity, and confining our thirst after knowledge to that which is most useful in this life, and most necessary for leading us to ampler views and discoveries hereafter.

This, however, is not to be understood as a restraint from investigating and contemplating the works of God, in such a manner as to afford us new grounds of adoring him at present, and, I may add, to lay a foundation for greater measures of happiness, in the life to come, from comparing its views and discoveries with those of the preceeding: and from having these desires of knowledge fully gratified, which formerly took place: Such as have less of these at present, may have happiness hereafter, but not that species of it which arises from a completion of these researches after knowledge, that are now begun: In the same manner as a man, who never desired or attempted much to know any thing of a foreign country and its inhabitants, will not have the same pleasure in his travelling through it, as one who endeavoured to form some ideas of them before.

But, to proceed with our observations on the spiritual world,

3. However

8. However manifest our condition and actions may be to superior intelligences, even of the lowest rank, and however possible it may be for them to assume corporeal vehicles, when specially impowered and commissioned to do so, yet the laws of their state, unknown as they are, seem to restrain them from revealing or manifesting themselves to us; and even from communicating impressions, in any other way than through the intervention of bodily objects and organs; some indeed have allowed them such immediate access to the mind in *dreams**, when the sensible powers are suspended, but this cannot with certainty be affirmed, in any cases, except such as are preternatural or miraculous, and from which, consequently, no general conclusion can be drawn. It is in the light now mentioned, that we must understand Satan's tempting Eve in a dream, if his doing

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* To prevent ascribing the phenomena of *dreams* to matter and motion, or mechanism, Mr Baxter has gone rather too far, in the way of ascribing this, and likewise some bodily indispositions, to the influence of invisible beings. Others seem inclined, to go a step farther, and ascribe to them likewise the impressions, made upon the mind when awake; but the most rational account of this matter seems to be what we have here endeavoured to explain. It cannot, however, be denied but that there is much room given for speculation as to dreams, from the mind's surprising activity in them; its seeming diversity of consciousness, and familiarity with persons and objects that might be thought new and surprising to it.

so at all, in this invifible way, be any more than a poetical embellishment; it would rather feem probable, that the influence of any fubordinate fpiritual beings on the human mind, is not in an immediate way, but by the ufe or application of fuch means, even fuch outward objects, as may have the moft remarkable effect on the bodily organs, and thefe powers of perception, which more immediately depend on, and are connected with them, particularly the imagination and appetites, and, by vitiating and mifleading, or improving and enlivening thefe, impreffions of pain or pleafure, fear or hope, comfort or terror, are diffufed into the foul.

9. Upon the whole, it may be faid, that the *foul* of man, in its prefent ftate of connection with matter, is the *nexus utriufque mundi*, the link, as it were, which unites the fenfual and intellectual, the material and fpiritual worlds. Its intimate union with matter is diffolved by death, and, whether it is from this inferred or not, that all manner of connection with inferior objects is thereby intirely cut off, yet it is certain, that the manner of receiving impreffions or perceptions from them, muft undergo an unfpeakable change; but, to prove that fuch a change, even tho' it fhould be fupposed to infer a total breach of its connection with material objects, to

prove,

prove, I say, that such a change, by death, does not destroy the vital and active powers of the soul; that these continue after death is the next thing we proposed to proceed to, after premising one other general observation, which is, that,

Our endeavouring thus (as is intended) to collect and set forth the principal arguments, from *reason*, for the *soul's immortality*, does by no means imply, the least dubiety or uncertainty in the testimony of *revelation* with respect to it: This alone would have been a sufficient and satisfying proof of immortality, as it is of the resurrection, though there had not been one argument from reason or nature to support it*. The authority of the gospel-revelation, is not the point we are now labouring to establish; but every fair and impartial inquirer will find it so well established, that he needs have no more doubt about the certainty of whatever is therein revealed, than about the clearest deductions of his reason. The allowing our thoughts,

C. 3 however,

* As the evidences and the authority of the Christian revelation are now so well established, I own it is, with some reluctance, and even with a kind of indignation, that I go about to prove, by arguments from Reason, any truths that are clearly revealed, and thereby put beyond all reasonable dispute; but I know that, by such additional reasonings with respect to them, they come to make a deeper impression upon the mind, even where a general belief of them, as being revealed, formerly took place.

however, to expatiate a little on the evidences we have of the soul's immortality, independent of revelation, may, by the blessing of God, be a mean of bringing this important subject more home to our minds, so as not only to gain their assent to it, but likewise, (which is a matter of much greater consequence) to make such an impression upon them as is necessary for influencing practice.

But when it is asserted, in Tim. i. 10. "That Christ has abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel;" does not this imply a supposition, that, before the gospel-revelation took place, there was no evidence or light as to immortality? for explaining therefore or reconciling this, we would beg leave to suggest the following observations.

1. It is plain, the meaning of this passage cannot be, that, before our Saviour's appearance upon earth, or before the New Testament dispensation took place, there was no proof of either the immortality of the soul, or resurrection of the body; for he himself brings a proof of one or both of them from the *Old Testament*, Mat. xxii. 31. 32. where God is said to be "the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob." We must, therefore, understand the Apostle's words, in such a sense as admits of there having been
some

some light with respect to *life and immortality*, even *before* the gospel-revelation, and the word which he uses here, *parisartec*, signifies properly to illustrate, to clear up, or remove doubts and darkness, from what was known in part formerly, and not to reveal what was utterly unknown. Let us see then,

2. On what footing this evidence of immortality was, *before* the gospel-revelation, and we shall find various proofs of it under the Old Testament, which shall be afterwards adduced, when we come to speak of the resurrection. We shall find also an opinion prevailing universally with respect to it, among the un-enlightened heathens, even the most illiterate of them: How came they by this? Was it from philosophers or poets they took it? No; philosophers and poets rather found it with them; they also appealed to it, in their proofs of immortality, and exercised their genius in accounting for it: Was it by tradition that the illiterate people thus had it? Yes, possibly, in part; but the most probable ground of their opinion seems to have been, some short plain reasoning of their own with respect to it; nice philosophical refinements would be much the same thing to them, as no proof at all; but very probably it was an inference they naturally drew in proof of a future state of retribution, from connecting their

their ideas of the divine justice, of men's accountability, and of their not being dealt with according to their merits or demerits in the present state: Agreeably to this we find, that, wherever the belief of immortality prevailed, there was likewise a persuasion of different conditions in a future state, in respect of happiness or misery, consequent on their different characters and conduct in the present.

It must indeed be owned, that the general belief of mankind, in favour of immortality, extends to the *whole* man, body as well as soul; but, as death plainly destroys the former, it accordingly breaks in, as it were, upon the common hopes and sense of men, with respect to this; so that philosophers thought it safest, to give up and even ridicule the argument, so far as it respected the *body*, by labouring to prove that it is no part of the man, and that, though the hope of the vulgar extended to it, yet, as *death* darkened and destroyed this general hope, by evidently destroying the *body*, there was a total end of it then made.

Here, therefore, it is, that our Lord, by giving assurances of the resurrection of the body, and its re-union with the soul, has abolished death, *i. e.* the effects of death, and the doubts and darkness arising from them, particularly

particularly in what respects the *body*, and brought life and immortality to light; but, when this is asserted, it by no means supposes a want of all evidence in this case, formerly from the light of nature, or reason, as well as from the Old Testament, nor does it supersede the use of them now, particularly, with the view that was mentioned, of representing the matter in every light, in which it can best strike or impress the mind.

We shall proceed therefore to what was proposed, as the

II. Part of our inquiry, *viz.* the evidences we have of the *soul's surviving* its separation from the *body* by *death*; evidences arising from its nature and exercises, and from the ideas we have of the divine government and perfections; the

1. And strongest rational evidence arises from what we were formerly considering as to the nature of the soul, that, being immaterial and indivisible, it is also incapable of dissolution; from which it follows, not only that it survives its separation from the body, but likewise that it is in its own nature *immortal*, for the being incapable of dissolution implies this: What the power of God can do, is not the question here; he who gave every thing a being from nothing, can also, not only dis-

solve

solve, but annihilate or reduce to nothing; but, as we have no reason to believe, that *matter* is, either in itself liable to annihilation, or, by any act of power, reduced to it, no more have we reason to believe, that the *soul* or spirit is liable to annihilation, or even dissolution, either at death, or in any period subsequent to it.

But, does this imply its surviving death? According to the order or union of my ideas it necessarily does; for I cannot conceive of the soul as existing, undissolved, and, I may say, indissoluble in its nature, without supposing vitality or activity, and likewise intelligence, *i. e.* that it acts, operates or is exercised, in the various ways formerly mentioned, of understanding, willing, reflecting, remembering, &c. Activity is of the essence of spirit, though not of matter, and the action essential to it is *thinking*, or operating in some of these ways now mentioned; so *essential* is this to the human soul, and inseparable from it, that we cannot conceive its having the same at any time suspended, and intirely obstructed, though there is not always a remembrance of its exercises; or, at least we may warrantably affirm, that its not thinking always is a thing that can never be proved from any consciousness or experience of our's in the present state; for a consciousness or remembrance of not thinking,

thinking, is one of these positions that confutes itself.

To this argument, from the nature of any cogitative principle, that it must be immaterial, and consequently indivisible and indissoluble, it is objected, that all the same conclusions may be drawn, in favour of many *brute* animals, from the evidences of thought and sagacity that appear with them: but whatever approaches some of them may make to men, in these respects, we have already observed that there is an insuperable boundary betwixt them, though in many cases, difficult to be fixed; allowing brutes, therefore, some kind of immaterial principle, yet, while they want the distinguishing criterions mentioned, they are on quite a different footing from men; there being no reason to suppose, that all spiritual or immaterial principles are of the same nature and dignity, but rather, that they admit of much greater diversity than corporeal beings; and that, according to their order and degree of distinction, they are more or less immersed in matter; nay even though we should admit the animating principles in brutes to be not only immaterial, but likewise immortal, and capable, as some maintain, of many transmigrations from one corporeal state to another; yet while they are incapable, as was formerly observed, of reasoning, reflect-

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ing, and connecting one act of consciousness, and one period of being with another, the continuance of their duration, by no means puts them upon the same footing with beings of superior rank, who while superior in respect of capacity and perfection, will also be so in respect of happiness or enjoyment. A

2. Argument, to prove that the human soul survives the dissolution of the bodily frame, is drawn from this consideration, that, as it is found to operate, even when the bodily powers are locked up or suspended by sleep, and, often, to exert itself then, with much more vigour and activity, we conclude, that it will also continue to operate, when these powers are suspended or even dissolved by death.

To this also the materialists object, that, as the soul is so much affected by the bodily temperament, and the various changes to which it is liable, in sickness and health; we must conclude it to be no more than a material system, highly rectified, which cannot survive the dissolution of the bodily frame. The answer to this is easy: The mutual influence of soul and body on one another, is through the animal spirits*, and as these depend upon the

* When some writers mention a *sensitive soul* in man, distinct from the *rational*, they can only mean by it the *animal*

the state of the body, and objects connected with it, no wonder if the soul should be affected accordingly; but there are instances enough of its not being always so, to prove that this objection is far from being general (without which it cannot here be valid) and that the soul may and does sometimes triumph over the decays and distresses of the body: Can I, therefore, ever allow myself to suspect its being similar to it in its nature and dissolution? Can I, for instance, when just now collecting and weighing the arguments, in proof of the soul's immateriality and immortality, resolve all the operations of my mind with respect to it (imperfect as they are) merely into the effects of matter and motion, or even imagine myself capable of reasoning on the subject at all, and rising to higher and clearer views of it, without having any other powers or faculties for this purpose, but such as depend upon the body, and are therewith dissolved? My mind recoils at the very thoughts of it; and you, who may happen to review what is here said of immortality, when I am removed from the society of mortals, can you believe that I cease to exist, to think, to reason,

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animal spirits; when some disorder in these, therefore, impairs the exercise of reason, it no more proves there being no immaterial spiritual principle in man, than any disorder in a clock proves that there is no law of gravitation, or that it ceases to exist and operate.

son, because I cease to animate that perishing material frame, or portion of dust, with which I am, for wise and good ends, so nearly connected or united at present?

3. The *hope* and *desire* of immortality are so inseparable from the soul, that they have always been considered as, at least, affording some presumption, or moral evidence of their not being implanted in vain, with a view to disappointment, and not to any object commensurate to them; or if, what is thus the object of hope to some, be that of fear to others, the argument loses none of its strength, in so much as it points out something anticipated beyond the present life.

This leads us to mention the arguments for immortality, that may be drawn from the *nature* of *God* and his government, which are fully as strong as those which we now found deducible from the *nature* of the *soul* itself, and its exercises.

4. From the *wisdom* of *God*, therefore, this is very justly argued; as it would be acting very inconsistently with it, to endow us with faculties and capacities of improvement, so far beyond what is or can be attained, in this short, imperfect, and seeming disorderly state of things, if there was not another state to succeed, more perfect and permanent, in which these faculties and capacities shall have their

their full effect and completion, or rise to higher spheres of action and enjoyment than here they can arrive at.

The same also is argued from the *justice* of God, which requires (as was formerly hinted) his making a greater distinction betwixt his friends and his enemies, betwixt the righteous and the wicked, than appears to be made in the common administration of his providence in this life, in which they share in common the same pleasures and the same calamities, and which is often *apparently* more unfavourable to the virtuous, than to the vicious and ungodly.

5. The universal belief of the soul's immortality, formerly mentioned, is another argument, that has been always urged in proof of it, or rather a consequence of the arguments from reason, now mentioned, as proving it; and, if to this we add the testimony of *revelation*, no doubt can remain with respect to it. Nay granting, that some instances of avowed infidels and scepticks as to this point, or of whole nations, grossly ignorant, may be brought in as exceptions from this universal belief, they will avail but little to weaken the argument; it rather shews that, where this universal belief or impression is wanting, there is some remarkable defect as to the other principles of our nature; nor

will all the arguments that have been or can be adduced, even when the testimony of revelation is added to them, be sufficient to engage or establish the faith of some obstinate practical unbelievers, with respect to this or any other doctrine. This testimony of revelation, with respect to it, is so clear, and so often repeated by our Saviour and his apostles, that nothing needs be said to enforce or illustrate it, further than may be necessary in touching a little afterwards at the doctrine of the resurrection.

But before entering on this, we are naturally led, as proposed, for the

III. Branch of our present enquiry, to consider the condition of the *soul* while *separated* from the *body*.

Here, if any where, it may be said, that we have got into the region of conjecture; where we have so little light, either from scripture or reason, to direct us, that imagination has taken great liberty in exploring it; nor is it the unenlightened heathen writers only, but likewise the Christian, who are chargeable with this.

Were I to recite all their different opinions, with respect to the various receptacles, exercises, enjoyments, and sufferings of departed

parted souls, tartarus, elysium, and the different limbo's of a state of purgation, it would give no rational satisfaction to an intelligent reader: Much less would it be proper to add to what has been conjectured on this head: There is rather danger, with some, that the indulging fancy too much, in the way of being wise above what is written, and determining too positively even in cases where scripture gives some light, but not enough to warrant our being decisive, and minute in our opinions, there is danger, I say, that indulging the flights of fancy and speculation too much, in these ways, may make some more unestablished in their faith as to points of greater importance. We cannot, however, pass over this part of our subject, without taking notice of what in it appears to us of most consequence, either in the way of comfort or of duty.

The opinions most necessary to be taken notice of, with respect to the state of separate souls, are these three:

1. That of their being in a quiescent state.
2. Their undergoing further trial and purgation.
3. That death determines their condition for eternity. — The

1. Of these opinions is so much against the whole tenor of scripture, and against all that has been advanced from reason, as evidences

of the soul's surviving death, yea, and so disagreeable to the principles of our nature, that we shall take up no time with refuting it; as it is supported by no kind of evidence, except what arises from the mere negative testimony of *sense*, (if I may so call it) because of its not being able to follow or discern the soul, on its leaving the body devoid of motion and sensation; as this opinion, I say, of the soul's sleep or quiescence, has no other evidence to support it, it must fall before the arguments that have been adduced, under the former head, to prove, not only the existence of the soul, but likewise the continuance of its active powers after death, and much more must it yield to the clear testimony of scripture, with respect to its *immediate* entrance upon happiness or misery.—The

2. Opinion we mentioned, is that of the soul's undergoing some further trial and purgation, in a disembodied state, before its condition is finally determined for eternity.

The poetical fictions of the heathens, some dark passages of scripture, and the acknowledged imperfection of the soul, during its union with the body, are brought in to support this opinion; the importance of which, as to practice, makes it necessary to take some further notice of it.

First of all, then, it must be acknowledged, that this is a point, in which we can come at no information either by the testimony of sense, by reasoning, or by experience; it is by scripture alone, by the Christian revelation, that it must be determined. That Plato should give it as his opinion, that men of a middle character were to undergo certain purifications after their death; that Homer and Virgil* should expatiate on this, and poetically describe their complaints in Erebus; or that even the ancient Jews should admit of such purgation for a year after death, tho' they would not admit that any of their nation perished finally†; that such opinions, I say, as these, should take place with some, can avail us little, while they are entirely destitute of proper authority to support them: They have indeed availed so far, as to pave the

* Ergo exercentur poenis, veterumque malorum
Supplicia expendant. Aliz pandantur inanes
Suspensæ ad ventos: Aliz, sub gurgite vasto,
Infectum cluitur socius, aut exurit igni.
Quisque suos patimur manes, cæinde per amplum
Mittimur Elysiū, et pauci læta arva tenemus:
Donec longa diēs, perfecto temporis orbe.
Concretam eximit labem: purumque reliquit
Ætherium sensum, atque anni simplicis ignem.

VIRG.

† It was, and is, a common saying with them, "Every Israelite shall have a place in the world to come."

the way for the Popish doctrine of *purgatory*, and its different *limbs*, introduced in the ignorance of the seventh century, and, since that time, converted into a profitable traffick of masses and prayers, for the pardon of some particular sins, or for limiting the time of their expiation.

But, if we consult scripture, which is the only sure guide here, we shall find, that the offers of pardon through a Redeemer, have no such limitations, of some sins reserved for temporal purgation, that the Old Testament, as well as New Testament saints, looked for an immediate entrance into blessedness after death, and that, immediately upon leaving the body, they expected to be present with the Lord. Our Saviour's words to the penitent thief on the cross, and his parable, or history of the rich man and Lazarus, are also express to this purpose; and if, in some passages, particularly of Paul's epistles, mention is made of a trial by fire, the context makes it plain, that they have respect to a fire of persecution, and to the doctrines, rather than the persons of those who underwent it.

I know there have been, and still are some writers, of ingenuity and acuteness, who, without intending to go all the length that the church of Rome has done, as to a future state of trial and purgation, allow their fancy rather

ther too much liberty, in determining as to the receptacles of departed souls; and, were they to go no farther than to maintain their passing into a middle state, in respect of enjoyment and perfection while disunited from the body, *i. e.* that the happiness of the whole man, soul and body, is not compleat till their reunion, we would easily fall in with them; but all their speculations as to a middle place, give it what name they will, either on the right or left side of Hades (as Bishop Campbell distinguishes them) are, we see, without foundation in scripture, and generally carried (as Origen's opinions of future transmigrations were) so far as to approach very near the doctrine of purgatory now mentioned; a doctrine of such pernicious influence on practice, that every approach to it must be dangerous; for let it be only allowed, that the time of our trial is protracted after death, we find most men disposed to trust to it, rather than submit to the exercise of self-denial, mortification, or any painful acts of repentance at present; being ready enough to suppose the strength of temptations (even tho' often such as are courted by themselves) sufficient to extenuate the guilt of these acts or habits of sin, which they are most unwilling to part with, and to make them of the venial kind; or, at least, such as may hereafter be soon expiated.

expiated, or compounded for ; in view of this, it is too natural for them, to venture the trusting to such a future trial, and thereupon to reckon it of less consequence, how they may acquit themselves in that which they undergo or are called to at present.

These considerations seem sufficient to establish the truth of the

3. Opinion mentioned, with respect to the state of the soul, immediately on its separation from the body, *viz.* that death, which occasions this separation, determines its condition for eternity. There remains no more sacrifice for sin, no more protraction of the day of trial, no more room for repentance, nor any such opportunities of improvement as in an earthly state: Death puts a period to these; it determines our final state as to the divine favour, and consequently as to happiness or misery.

Laying aside, therefore, all such groundless and imaginary suppositions as we have been mentioning, let us see what may warrantably be said, with respect to the state of the *soul*, when disunited from the *body*.

In the general it may be observed, and will easily be admitted, that we must have higher powers of conception and utterance than we have at present, before we can say much of the nature of this state, either as to its exer-

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cises or enjoyments; for those with which we are now versant, while connected with the body and things sensible, must be supposed very different from such as are purely spiritual, and have respect to a disembodied state.

We may, however, affirm, with certainty, that it is a state not only of *existence* but *intelligence*, i. e. that the spiritual and active powers of the soul, shall remain and continue to be exercised; and we must further conclude, that their exercise will not be liable to these defects, weaknesses, and decays, which arise from bodily connections and incumbrances.

We are not to suppose, that a total subversion of the present human constitution shall take place, but only the highest rectitude or improvement of it, in the way of conformity to the nature and will of the supreme Being; a conformity that has respect both to the intellectual and moral faculties of the soul, whose condition, as then determined, shall ly open *before him*, in a way very different from any of which it had experience in its former state.

To be a little more particular as to this, therefore, what should

1. Be observed, and is of most importance to be attended to with respect to it, is what was just now suggested, that, immediately up-
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on the soul's disunion or separation from the body, its state of trial is finally determined; it *appears before God*, stripped of all those outward advantages and acquisitions, which distinguish us in the sight of men; *before him*, who looks not on the outward appearance, but on the heart, its dispositions and affections, not on outward degrees of greatness, but on inward measures of holiness; *before him*, in whose sight humility is of more value than empire, sincerity of more value than the most refined earthly wisdom and policy.

The ends or principles from which we acted must *appear*; the full effects or consequences of our conduct shall *appear*; the improvement or misimprovement of our time, talents and advantages, as now put to the trial, shall *appear*; the reality of our profession, and the motives of our obedience, must all *appear before him*.

Not but that all these are as manifest to him at present, as at any future period, but, when the curtain of nature is drawn, he will make the manner of their *appearance* to him, more manifest to ourselves; hence it follows, that,

2. Tho' the *general judgment* is always spoken of in scripture as a solemn and public process, accompanied with such circumstances as make the view of it most awful and alarming

ing, but not to take place 'till the reunion of soul and body, that is, 'till the final consummation of all that respects the present human system, when the whole effects or consequences, which actions have drawn after them, shall be manifested; tho' the *general judgment* (I say) be thus spoken of as deferred, yet we must consider every *individual*, as undergoing a *particular judgment*, and entering upon their *final state* of enjoyment or suffering, immediately on death's concluding their trial in the *present*.

3. The *soul*, when disembodied, tho' divested of sensible organs and powers of perception, connecting it with material objects, retains these habits or dispositions, as well as impressions, received in such a state of connection with them; but in such a manner as suits the superior perfection of its spiritual or disembodied state.

4. In a future disembodied state, we are taught, both by reason and revelation, to believe that there will remain such a *consciousness* and *remembrance*, as is necessary to connect it with the present, and to enhance its enjoyments or sufferings; but not such as implies, or infers a continuance of this connection, by a communication of sentiments and offices, or by continuing to receive impressions of *pleasure* and *pain*, from what is here trans-

acted, however much they shall arise from that remembrance now mentioned, which implies a recollection of persons, events, and transactions, in the preceeding state.

5. The *soul*, when disembodied, cannot be said to receive ideas or perceptions by any sensible faculty, but by such faculties as are purely spiritual; retaining, however, as was now mentioned, and reflecting on the ideas, that had been formerly conveyed to it by sense, and having, possibly, still some powers similar thereto; so as that, in many cases, where long deductions of reason are now necessary, its knowledge may be by intuition, or by faculties of perception analogous to these which it has at present.

6. The enjoyments of the *soul* in a disembodied state, will bear proportion to its powers, both intellectual and moral; according as these are more or less enlarged and improved, so will be the enjoyments suited to them; even while the happiness of any individual is complete, it will be proportioned to its capacity, and consequently admit of different degrees, and of progression from one degree of perfection, and thereby of happiness, to another, in a way analogous to what we here see of the divine proceedings; and, as to which, we have no other grounds to go upon, in our reasonings, but *analogy*.

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From considering the amount of our present knowledge, as to the condition of the soul, while separate from the body, we proceed, as proposed, in the

IV. Place, to consider what reason we have to believe that they shall be reunited, tho' appearances make so strongly against it, when the *Body* undergoes such a total change and dissolution.

Whatever belief the immortality of the soul gained among the unenlightened heathens, they had no belief of the *resurrection* of the body, as thinking it impossible; they thought creation out of nothing impossible likewise, it being a maxim with the ancient philosophers, "*A priore totum ad habitum non datur regressus*:" their reason for this was, that they estimated things possible or impossible, according as they saw any effects similar to them in nature: But we are taught to judge of things as possible or impossible, by the power of God; so that we admit nothing to be *impossible*, unless it can be proved to be beyond his power, in one of two ways; either 1st, by implying a contradiction in itself, which infers a natural impossibility; or 2^{dly}, by implying a contradiction to some of the

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divine perfections, which infers a moral impossibility.

The last of these is never alledged here; and, as to the first, it cannot be affirmed in any other way, than by supposing a transition of the parts of one body into another, after death; so as that a question might arise, To what body they should belong at the resurrection? a question similar to that of the Sadducees, with respect to the marriage of one woman to seven husbands; and as easily answered, by distinguishing betwixt the solid, substantial, or permanent parts of the human body, and such as are accidental or adventitious. How these may circulate, from one body to another, does not signify, as they are not constituent, essential parts of any of them; but the former, those parts that are solid or constituent of the body, such as bones and nerves, may, by certain laws, unknown to us, be so ordered, as not to be transferable into the constituent parts of another body, even tho', as is told us of some Cannibals, one man should devour another.

As therefore this is the only sense, in which a contradiction or impossibility can be argued here, and that it can be so easily taken out of the way, it follows, that the resurrection is, at least, a thing *possible*; and, without its being so, it would be vain to attempt proving it
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from any authority, or from the consideration of Almighty power interposed; because it would not be the proper object of any power, nor would it be any limitation of infinite power, nor to work impossibilities.

But, a *possibility* being once admitted, no idea of *difficulty* in this case can make the resurrection of the body more *incredible*, than the first creation of it out of nothing; the same power that first created, formed, and animated it, can also with, at least, equal ease, restore or raise it up:—And,

Besides its being neither *impossible* nor *incredible*, some have argued its not being, in a natural or rational view of it, *improbable*; in so much as there are not wanting, even in nature, some variations and revolutions similar to *resurrection*: Thus there is a diurnal resurrection of the day, from the silence and darkness of the night; and an annual resurrection of the summer, from the seemingly dead and torpid state of nature in winter, when the juices descend; and are buried, as it were, in the roots, while the earth is covered over with snow, or congealed by frost. The grain is buried in the ground and corrupts; then revives and multiplies: Thus all things revive from death, and rise from the grave; and shall we suppose, that even the *body of man*, who is made the LORD of all, shall be detained there?

The consideration of God's remuneratory justice, may likewise be mentioned, as making such a *resurrection* of the body *probable*, in order to its being associated or united to the soul hereafter, in a state of retribution, as it is at present in a state of trial and probation.

But, it must be owned, that all this amounts to no more than a proof of its being neither *impossible*, *incredible*, nor *improbable*. It does not prove the reality or *certainty* of it. For a certain proof of the resurrection, we must have recourse to *revelation*; we must know the scriptures, how far they intimate God's will or promise with respect to it, and we must solve all the difficulties that appear, by the consideration of his power to accomplish it.

In the *Old Testament*, the two most remarkable passages to this purpose are, *first*, Job's declaration of his faith, "Chap. xix. ver. 25, 26, I know that my Redeemer liveth, &c." Those who understand this declaration, as respecting only Job's hope of a temporal restitution, seem not to consider his preface to it, in the two verses immediately preceeding, in which there is expressed, a solemnity and respect to a distant futurity, which makes it unlikely, that the declaration following them, was meant *only* of a restitution to his former temporal state.

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The only other passage we shall mention in the Old Testament is, "Daniel xii. 2. And many (i. e. according to the original, the multitude or all) of them, who sleep in the dust of the earth, shall awake, &c."

Porphyry, and likewise the Socinians, (who deny the resurrection of the wicked), would have this passage to refer to a sudden victory, that was to be obtained by those who groaned under the oppressions of Antiochus; but this will not explain the last part of the verse, viz. that some shall rise to shame and everlasting contempt.

We might also mention another plain passage from the Old Testament, in proof of the resurrection, "Isaiah xxvi. 19. Thy dead men shall live, &c."

The proofs of this doctrine, from the *New Testament*, are so many, and so clear, that they admit of no dispute, from any who believe the gospel-revelation. Our Saviour is explicit on this head, Matth. xxii. 31. from the argument of God's being the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob; and again, John v. 28. 29. "The hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, &c." Now we know that all that is in the grave is the *body*.

The Socinians find the same difficulty, in reconciling the whole of this declaration to their

their opinion; they would apply it to a spiritual resurrection, from the graves of ignorance and impiety, thro' the preaching of the gospel: But the last part of this declaration, likewise, will not suit their purpose, viz. that they who have done evil, rise to the resurrection of damnation.

What has been most the subject of dispute here, is, what the apostle Paul takes notice of, at great length, "1 Corinth. xv. 35. &c. But some men will say, How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come, &c." If we look only at the state of the body, in its dissolution, and various preceeding changes, we may form many objections of this kind, from what they call the *identity**, or *fameness*

* With respect to the *soul*, it seems plain, that, what constitutes personal *identity*, is consciousness and remembrance; but, with respect to the *body*, we know not so much of the essence of matter or refinements it is capable of, as to determine, wherein such corporeal identity consists, whether it is the original stamina, or some seminal principle, of which our present body is but the *exuvia*; and which the Apostle Paul compares to the like principle in corn, which unfolds itself, when the rest of the grain is corrupted. The Jews spoke of such an incorruptible part of the body; and it may, at present, be the seat of the soul, whose operations seem confined to narrow bounds. In respect of the animal or sensitive principle, indeed, we feel over all; but in respect of the rational, spiritual, or cogitative principle, our idea of that part of the body, which appears to be its seat or residence, carries in it something extremely refined, and approaching, as it were, as near as possible to the nature of its spiritual inhabitant. The Apostle's speaking, therefore,

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famefulness of the body which arises. But all this shows only our ignorance of what is not necessary to be understood by us here, namely, the *manner* of the body's resurrection: Now it is not the *manner*, but the *certainty* of this, that is the object of our faith; for, even in the present state, we cannot explain the *manner* of the existence of many things, which we firmly believe to exist; and, in what respects the resurrection of the *same body*, the consideration of God's power and of his promise, may silence all objections as to the *manner* of it.

We shall only further consider the argument for it from *Christ's resurrection*, which has a twofold respect,

1. A *general* one to all men, righteous and wicked, for as the dominion over them is given him, and the judgment of them committed to him; (of both which we are fully assured in scripture) there must be a resurrection of them, to be ruled and judged by him.

2. *Christ's* of a spiritual body at the resurrection, will, in this sense, imply no absurdity or contradiction: Consider only what refinement matter is capable of, in the case of the rays of light, from one small taper, extending to, and illuminating many miles around, though the minutest particle of it is still considered as material, and you'll not be so much surprised, at the mention made of the *resurrection-body*, as carrying in it an idea of purity, spirituality, and refinement, beyond description.

2. Christ's resurrection has a *particular* respect to his people, as their head or representative, from whose resurrection, the Apostle Paul infers that of all who are united or related to him.

His resurrection is also set forth, as having the same relation to that of his people, that the offering of the first fruits, under the ceremonial law, had to the harvest, being considered as a pledge of it. And finally, the resurrection of the body, is a necessary consequence of Christ's having obtained the victory over death. "Death (says the Apostle, 1. Cor. xv. 54.) is swallowed up in victory;" now it cannot be said, that death is fully conquered or destroyed, and the effect of Adam's sin fully taken away, without inferring the *resurrection* of the body, and the restitution of all that death had dissolved or demolished.

V. *Lastly*, The consequences, therefore, of this re-union, and its continuance or duration, is all that remains to be further considered, as the conclusion of our present inquiry: A conclusion indeed infinitely interesting, and having, so far as any light or information we have, leads us to speak of it, respect to these two awful and important subjects, the general judgment, and the different conditions

ons awaiting us in consequence of it*, with respect to which, as well as other subjects formerly mentioned, it must be remembered, that it is the *certainty* of these great events, that

* There is another remarkable event or period, that much has been wrote of, and which, in the order in which it is commonly introduced and considered, should be mentioned before the resurrection, and that is the *Millennium*, the doctrine of which (so far as I can recollect what I have read on the subject) seems to be this.

In the prophecies of Ezekiel, Daniel and others, mention is made oftentimes of great felicity, beyond any thing hitherto experienced, which were to take place before the consummation of all things, and sensible images or resemblances are used for describing them. This the *antient Jews* understood of the temporal reign and glory of the Messiah, and an opinion prevailed with many of them, that the earth was to continue in its present state for six thousand years, and after that a sabbatical period to follow for a thousand years more, in which this temporal reign was to take place, and therewith the highest enjoyments, both spiritual and corporal, that a terrestrial state will admit of.

In the first century of Christianity, some hereticks, particularly Cerinthus, adopted this notion, in the grossest and most literal sense, and arguments were brought in proof of it from the New Testament, particularly the xxth Chapter of the Revelations.

In the second century, the sensual notion of a millenary reign spread still more, and Papias Bishop of Hierapolis, an honest, but credulous man, is mentioned as the principal abettor of it, and said to have had it from the Apostle John himself, and the disciples of the other Apostles.

From general speculations of this kind with respect to it, the Chulists or Millenarians (for so they were called who espoused this doctrine) came, in a century or two more, to be very particular with respect to it, till Jerom and Augustine began to expose the fallacy of some of their conceits, and, ever since that time, they have generally been more refined and spiritual in their apprehensions of it, but still, in many particulars, extravagant and inconsistent.

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that is the object of our faith, and not the manner of them; even as to this indeed, the Christian revelation gives some account, which shall be afterwards taken notice of; but

They would bring the saints and martyrs from heaven, to pass a thousand years more upon earth, as if it would add to their happiness, yea and they would make them liable to another change similar to death and resurrection, and even to another contest with enemies among men; for the times of *Gog* and *Magog*, mentioned in the Revelations, are acknowledged to be after the Millennium. Doctor Burnet is so inconsistent on this point, that he would have, both the Millennium and the appearance of these enemies of Christ's kingdom, to be after the general conflagration: And Mr Mead is no less extravagant in deferring them till after the general judgment.

The only account of the matter, that seems to be most rational and scriptural is as follows.

The passages of scripture which we mentioned, and some others, cannot possibly be accounted for, or explained, without supposing, that, before the final consummation of what respects the present human system, there will be a period of order and felicity, far beyond any that has been hitherto experienced. Nor is it unreasonable to believe, that, even on this earth, where so much impiety and immorality, discord and misery, have long prevailed, God should, some time or other, even in a way that may appear natural and gradual, without any miraculous interposition, bring about such a change of circumstances, sentiments and conduct among men, as will more illustriously display his perfections, in the government of the world, and make the operations of his providence and grace to be more attended to, and have more efficacy, than hitherto they seem to have had.

For these purposes, however, no preternatural causes need be called in aid; no more seems necessary but that the doctrines and precepts of Christianity should, by the powerful operation of the divine spirit, have their full effect on the hearts and lives of men; that the Christian church should be raised to the highest purity, prosperity and perfection it is here capable of, and whatever oppo-

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but as to their *certainly*, it is a doctrine of natural as well as of revealed religion.

If it be certain that God rules the world, it is as certain that he will judge it; judgment

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for the progress and influence of true religion removed.

For this reason, therefore, many great events are mentioned in scripture, as previous to the happy period we are now speaking of; such as, besides the happy change now mentioned on the hearts and lives of Christians themselves, a conversion also of the Jews to Christianity, and (according to some) the restoration of their city and their return to it; the conversion of all the Gentiles likewise; the fall of Antichrist, whether understood of Popery or Mahometanism, or both; an universal language and intercourse among nations (which was originally broke off by sin) universal peace and righteousness.

But as to other extravagant suppositions, such as Christ's visible reign upon earth; the resurrection of those very saints and martyrs who were once upon it; corporeal delights and the like, we have not sufficient authority to assert them, but rather the contrary: Nor can we even determine, as to the precise time, when this happy period mentioned shall commence. Such as begin it with Constantine the Great in the fourth century, or Gregory the seventh in the eleventh century, and others later in their calculations have been all so far mistaken, and some of them so much disappointed and exposed, by living to see the falsehood of their own calculations, that, though we are not to be incredulous, we may learn also not to be incautious, in our judgment, with respect both to the time of commencement and other circumstances; let us be satisfied with knowing, in general, as we are told, Revelations xi. 15. that it shall commence when the seventh angel sounds his trumpet, re-echoed by the heavenly hosts, saying, "The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ, and he shall reign for ever and ever." The ancient Jews thought that they had as good reason for expecting the temporal reign of their Messiah, as the Millenarjes can have for their extravagant expectations; but the effect of that belief on the Jews, in marring their reception of him, when he appeared, gives no great encouragement to us,

is the natural and necessary effect or issue of government; but this judgment cannot be supposed final and universal, till the whole of the present scheme or system of government is finished or compleated. Some instances, indeed, there may be in the present state, of God's manifesting his judgment of particular persons or actions, but this is only in extraordinary cases, and only done so far as is necessary to bear some witness of his presence, and attention to the concerns of men; the whole tenor of his word and visible government, tends to shew us, that our present state is properly a state of trial or probation, and, that this must be ended, before a state of retribution takes place.

The whole of man's present life and conduct must be ended, before judgment can be past upon him, and though, upon their being ended, as to each individual at death, we must suppose judgment then past on every one in particular, yet the manifestation or publick discovery of this, cannot be supposed to take place, till the whole effects or consequences, which actions may draw after them, are manifested, and the present œconomy or state of

us, in any notions that respect an earthly kingdom, to raise our ideas or expectations too high, as we are ready to do, in whatever favours our desires, or flatters our hopes of any kind of temporal glory and felicity.

of things consummated; then shall such a judgment be past, as will bear witness, to the whole rational creation, of the adorable perfections of the supreme Governor, his unerring wisdom, his uncontrollable power, his unbounded goodness, his unspotted holiness, and his inflexible justice, mixed with patience and mercy.

As the consideration of God's government and perfections, leads us to the belief of such a future general judgment, so does also the consideration of what passes within ourselves, in respect of the hopes of the righteous and terrors of the wicked, arising from the workings of conscience within them, and foreboding some degree of happiness or misery hereafter, far beyond what can be enjoyed or suffered in the present state. Of this we have instances enough to shew, that, as by the intimations God makes of his favour in the consciences of his people, he testifies, in some measure, his regard to them at present, and gives earnest of what is to be bestowed hereafter, so also, the intimations of his wrath and displeasure against the wicked, in the natural workings or impressions of their own consciences, the stings of guilt, and horrors of impending punishment, are such as the worst of men cannot entirely banish, however

much they may seem for a time to smother or silence them.

But if such be the dictates of reason and conscience, if, from our natural apprehensions of God and of ourselves, we have such evidences of a future judgment, the testimonies with respect to it in scripture, are still more clear and express, and the solemn nature and process of it in some passages particularly described, as Dan. vii. ix. &c. Mat. xxv. 31. &c. also Acts xvii. 31. From these and numberless other passages we learn the universality of this future judgment, both in respect of persons, actions, and principles of action.

We learn also, and are called to give particular attention to it, that the second person of the adorable Trinity, he who, in respect of his ineffable relation to the first, is called the son of God, and who appeared and suffered in our nature, as mediator betwixt God and man, that he, I say, is appointed the supreme Judge of the world; being, by his assumption of our nature, peculiarly qualified for this office, and, by his sufferings on our account, intitled to it. The Saviour of the world shall be finally acknowledged, manifested, and revered as the judge of it, and, by his irreverfible decree, fix our condition for eternity.

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This is the *other* branch mentioned of the conclusion of our inquiry, *viz.* What are the different conditions of being held forth, as consequent on the general judgment now spoken of, and what their continuance or duration?

With respect to the different conditions of being that await us hereafter, we are warranted to make only one grand distinction, *namely*, that of the *righteous* and the *wicked*; the nature and ends of our present state require their being intermixed here, both for their mutual improvement and trial: They share in common the same outward comforts and calamities, nor could they be kept separate without a continual miracle; but the reasons for their being thus intermixed, shall cease with their present state, and there will be a much stronger reason, from the wisdom and justice of God and honour of his government, to make an awful and publick separation betwixt them.

It is the condition of the wicked and disobedient, in consequence of this solemn separation, that has been the subject of most dispute. It is plain that they must then be stripped of all those outward and transient distinctions, which do now dazzle and intoxicate them, stripped also of all those masks and shadows by which they may have formerly

imposed on men, and stand naked and guilty before the divine tribunal, to be tried by that law, by which they now refuse to be ruled, and condemned by that judge whom they now reject as their Saviour.

Their being condemned, so far as to be excluded from the divine favour, and from positive happiness, will not probably be disputed, nor any question made of its reconcileableness to our ideas of the divine goodness, as well as justice; but there must be supposed something more than this; for sinners would even run the risk of it, rather than forsake the present delights of sin and sense; yea more, though to this you add something in the way of positive suffering, through the feelings of conscience, and even some punishment of *sense*, or analogous to the perceptions of *sense*, (compared in respect of its severity to the operations of *fire*) though (I say) not only *negative* punishment in the way of *loss*, but even *positive* punishment, in the way of *sense*, should be admitted, yet, if you limit its duration, sinners will still hazard it, and grasp at the present ensnaring delights of sin and sense, in hopes of a saving bargain; and much more so if *annihilation* be supposed the consequence, a consequence inconsistent not only with scripture, as we shall afterward see, but likewise with all our former reasonings as to the
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nature of the soul, and which would make the punishment of all crimes equal.

These considerations prepare the way for our belief of a doctrine which meets with no small opposition of late, and yet appears to be plainly founded on scripture, *namely*, that the *future sufferings* of the wicked shall be endless in their duration.

The passages on which this is founded are many, particularly these two, Mat. xxi. 41, &c. and Mark ix. 43. &c. I know there has been much said to explain away the force of these and other passages to the same purpose, as if the original words might be understood, either of a limited duration, or of a total destruction; but it is certain, that words more expressive of an unlimited duration, could not be found; they are the same by which the duration of the supreme Being, and that of the happiness of his people is expressed; and they carry in them the idea of feeling, in as plain language as could be used, and which cannot be understood of any annihilation or destruction, nor admit of an after-restitution.

As this, therefore, is one of the most awful and alarming doctrines that ever was revealed, and yet our authority for asserting and believing it, however unpopular, beyond all question, we beg leave to add an observation

tion or two, for obviating the objections that are commonly brought against it, and shewing that it is more reconcileable, than is commonly imagined, to the dictates of reason, and to our natural notions of the divine government and perfections.

The whole strength of the objections here commonly adduced, will be found to depend on the two following suppositions.

First, That the justice and goodness of God requires, that the degree or measure of crimes should be the only measure of their punishment, or exactly proportioned to it. And,

Secondly, That there is no proportion between the sins of men, and endless punishment.

Now though, by the imperfection of our views and reasonings, in this, as in all cases where the ideas of eternity or infinity enter, we should be unable plainly to shew the falsehood of these two suppositions; yet, if we can even shew their doubtfulness and uncertainty, it will follow, that the doctrine we are considering, is not so contrary to the divine perfections, as to imply a moral impossibility, and thereby become an improper subject of proof; but that, on the contrary, it is capable of such proof, so that it is not necessary to wrest scripture, as some do, for reconciling it to these suppositions. To the

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First of them, therefore, it may be replied, that the rule or measure of punishment is not the measure or degree of guilt only, but that likewise, the end for which punishment (or rather we may here call it suffering) is inflicted is the rule of it, and that, if this end be just and good, no punishment or suffering can be reckoned unjust or improper, which is necessary for promoting it.

Let us see then what may be assigned, as the end of future punishment; it is not supposed by any to be reclaiming the offenders, for the view of this ceases with their present state of trial; it must therefore be, to support the authority of the divine laws and government, as extending to the whole rational creation, and to retain them in their duty and obedience.

If, indeed, we confine our views to the human system alone, it may perhaps be said, that no future punishment is at all necessary for this end, as its influence can avail nothing to men, when once their different states are immutably fixed: But, if infinite wisdom required the creating many different systems of free agents, whose beauty and perfection behoved, in a great measure, to arise from being retained in their duty, by motives of this kind, rather than by any that would imply violence and constraint to their faculties, although

altho' it would be a moral absurdity or contradiction, to suppose that the sufferings of good men should be necessary or conducive to this end, there is no extravagance in supposing it the end for which the eternal punishment, or rather the sufferings of wicked men should be appointed, and the same intimated to other systems of free intelligent beings, for a warning to them, as those of the fallen angels are to us in scripture; and, if this supposition is allowed to be consistent with wisdom and goodness, it will in some measure account for the appointment of such sufferings, without any impeachment of justice, more than in the case of human laws, when capital punishments are inflicted for slight transgressions of them, in order to be a warning to others.

For, in this view of future punishment, as regulated by the end of inflicting it, as much as by the measure or degree of the offender's guilt, we see it is not God's justice alone that is concerned, but likewise his wisdom and holiness, in designing and promoting this end; and if these require such punishment, we cannot suppose they will be counteracted by his *justice*, much less by his *goodness*, when considered as extending to his universal government, or requiring that, by his laws and their sanctions, he should consult, not the good of a few only, but of all his subjects; even
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tho' thereby, some of them should seem to be treated with severity.

In a word, if the glory of the supreme Governor, (taking it, not in the partial and corrupt sense in which glory is often taken among men, as unconnected with, or opposed to the general good) and the perfection of his universal kingdom, required his creating various systems of intelligent and fallible beings, endowed with free powers of acting; and likewise required his appointing them laws, suited to their natures, and fit for the trial and exercise of these powers; whatever is necessary for supporting the authority of these laws, must be conducive to God's glory, and the general good; and therefore it is, from its relation or tendency to this end, and not from the order or measure of offences, that the measure of future punishments or sufferings may be deduced.

Thus may the first supposition mentioned be, at least in a great measure, disproved.

2. *Again*, as to the other supposition, *viz.* that the sins of men bear no proportion to endless punishment; some have argued, that the guilt of sin must be infinite, because committed against a being of infinite perfection; but, tho' this may be questioned, as making the guilt of all sins equal, yet there is some reason to maintain, that there is in sin of any kind

kind, an infinite pravity or malignity, in so much that the sinner would continue or persist in it, was his life here to be infinitely prolonged, unless a supernatural aid (to which he has no title or right in himself) be afforded for reclaiming him.

Tho', therefore, infinite punishment should seem disproportioned to the guilt of sin, yet it may bear some proportion to this infinite evil or pravity of it; and that there is in sin, or moral evil, something more virulent and detestable * in the sight of God, than is commonly imagined, may be concluded from his awful and tremendous punishment of it in the case of the Antediluvian world, of Sodom and Gomorrah, and even of the Jewish nation; but still more from the infinite value of the satisfaction or atonement required for it, by the sufferings of his own son, the second person of the Godhead, in our nature and stead; so that the offers of grace made us through him, are sufficient to vindicate the divine justice and goodness, with respect to us.

To this we may add, that, tho' the future punishment of sinners, in a privative way, by their exclusion from the blissful presence and favour

* This is admirably well set forth by one of the most rational and acute philosophers of this philosophical age, in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*.—The conclusion of Part II. Sect. 2.

favour of God, be, on all hands, acknowledged eternal, and the testimony of scripture to express, as to an addition of positive sufferings or punishment, infinite (and which even the ancient Platonists supposed indefinite) in duration; yet while the scriptures have no where determined the degree of its intenseness, nor asserted this to be infinite, but suppose it accommodated to the circumstances and guilt of offenders, there is room enough left for vindicating the divine justice and goodness, without limiting the duration of their sufferings, which may be considered as a point of fact, so plainly asserted in scripture, that, whatever liberty we may have to account for it, and shew its reconcileableness to the divine perfections, it is vain to attempt the disproving it, without subverting the authority on which it is asserted.

Admitting, therefore, only a possibility of the truth of the fact now mentioned, what can be more dangerous than to weaken the belief of it, (as some do) by maintaining, that what is said of it in scripture, is only a commination or threatening, and that the justice of God does not require the fulfilling his threatenings as it does his promises? whereas, in the passages quoted, and various other parts of scripture to the same purpose, the account given of future sufferings, is in the way of description

or narration of a matter of fact, and not in the way only of commination or threatening. Would we indeed wish to have the matter so expressed, as to put it beyond all reasonable doubt, words could not be devised more plain and indisputable.

Nor is the influence of this doctrine on practice, a matter of so little importance, that we can, either with safety or innocence, labour to weaken the belief of it; for, tho' the fear of punishment be not a proper motive or test of virtue, because it does not rectify the heart, yet it is of no small use to society, as a restraint from vice; and, the more you limit its duration it weakens this restraint, even more than any limitation as to the degree, or intenseness of it, of which we cannot so easily form any distinct ideas.

We shall conclude what at present appears necessary to be said, on this much disputed subject, with observing, that tho' there are such difficulties now, in reconciling the origin of evil to God's holiness, and the duration of the punishment denounced against it to his justice and goodness, yet, when the awful period arrives, that this punishment must be inflicted, it shall be done in such a way as that the conscience of the sufferer (in regard particularly of the offers of grace now made him through a Saviour) shall justify every step of the

the divine proceedings with respect to him, as all reconcileable to these adorable perfections now mentioned.

From considering what has been most the subject of dispute, with respect to the future condition of the wicked and impenitent, we would now wish to carry our enquiry to the bright side of our prospect, in view of *immortality*; by considering what further may be said, as to the future condition of the righteous, and the eternity of bliss or happiness which awaits them, on that re-union of soul and body, already spoken of, which shall take place at the final consummation of all that respects the present system of things.

Let us carry our ideas of immortal felicity, of the purest and most perfect blessedness, as high as we are capable, yet still they must fall infinitely short of the reality of things, as they shall afterwards appear: *Heaven* would not be *heaven*, if it was within the reach of our present comprehension or description.

It may, however, be of no small advantage to us, to have our attention sometimes turned to this: If it be the great, the ultimate end now proposed to us, it is proper to enquire a little, What may be now known or said, with respect to it? An object may, indeed, be proposed to us as a prize or end to be pursued, even tho' it is not known, or comprehended;

if there is only a certainty that it is very precious and desirable; but if it is such as we know in some measure the nature and value of our desires after it will be still the more inflamed, and the bad effects of any gross or corrupt apprehensions of it prevented.

With respect, therefore, to the *nature* of that eternal life and happiness, which, both by scripture and reason, we are assured to be awaiting the righteous. One of the first views, in which we are apt to consider it, is that of *rest*, or deliverance from all the miseries and distresses of this life; but this is only a mere *negative happiness*, and applicable to the wicked as well as to the righteous. Let us see, therefore, what it is that may positively be asserted with respect to the prize here set before us, to that IMMORTAL HAPPINESS reserved for the people of God.

First of all, we may say of it in general, that it is *very great*; yea unspeakably great. This appears from all the accounts we have of it in scripture, it is called "an exceeding and eternal weight of glory;" and compared to every thing that may raise our esteem or value of it to the greatest height; to a kingdom, an inheritance, rivers of pleasure, fulness of joy, and a crown that fadeth not away: In a word, we are told, "That eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, neither hath it entered
"into

"into the heart of man to conceive" of it, as it is in itself.

This is the language of scripture, concerning the heavenly happiness, and is very consistent with what natural reason itself leads us to think of it. We may easily believe what God has in store for his people hereafter, to be such as will abundantly compensate all the toils they can undergo in pursuit of it. This we may naturally infer from our ideas of his all-sufficiency, and of his intinate access to our minds, which will then still more sensibly be felt, in the way of diffusing serenity and joy through all its faculties. Any faint experiences we have of this at present, and even the evidences of his bounty in the natural world, lead us, in the way of analogy, to draw conclusions, with respect to the greatness of that future blessedness he has in reserve for his people hereafter.

2. Its suitableness to their nature and capacities, is another general character that must be ascribed to it; for the subversion of these is by no means supposed necessary to it, but their highest improvement, and that in such a way as will appear *natural*. Our *natural* state here, may be said to be a state of imperfection and corruption; but then holiness and happiness shall be natural; they shall appear, as it were, to be the natural consequence

quence of our former progress, and the divine methods with respect to us; like a building, whose foundation was, in some measure, laid before, but looked like ruins, and shall then be reared up to the highest spiritual perfection it is capable of.

Here we have, as it were, only the ruins of human nature, yet it is more agreeable both to scripture and reason, to think that these shall be repaired or built upon, than quite subverted; tho', with God, this also would be equally easy; for it would have been as easy to him to have created a new set of beings, on man's fall, as to bring about our recovery; nay, (according to our ideas of things) rather easier, as having no obstacle or opposition to it.

Thus, in a state of higher improvement, there will appear to have been a gradual progress towards it. From this, however, it must not be supposed, that there shall be no change so great, as to appear new and surprising; for this is what may be naturally expected, on a transition from one state to another, so very different from it; such surprise, new appearances and discoveries may become occasions of the highest pleasure and happiness; and may very well take place, without subverting or counteracting the original powers implanted in the human mind. A

Third

Third thing that may be observed, in general, with respect to the future eternal happiness of the righteous, is, that as it will be unconceivably great, yet suited to their nature, capacities, and preceeding progress, so likewise, it will bring them *nearer* to God, the Author of their existence and happiness.

Not that they can be said, strictly speaking, in respect of God's essential presence, to be any nearer him in one state or period than another, but they will be nearer, in respect of resemblance and acquaintance, they will have nearer and clearer views of him. Here, tho', in respect of his natural presence, he always surrounds and supports his people; and, in respect even of his gracious presence, sometimes shines upon them, yet sin often clouds and darkens their views. Hereafter, this obstruction shall be removed; there shall be nothing to interrupt the beams of his love, the full communications of his favour.

To this it may be added, that, as we are taught in scripture to imagine some particular part of nature, in which God gives more striking manifestations of his presence, and the effulgence of his divinity; we may reasonably suppose, that, upon the removal of the veil of sense, God's people shall be admitted to a nearer view of his glory in this respect, to nearer access and communion with him,

him, particularly in the exercises of praise, worship, and divine contemplation.

It is, in respect of these views and exercises, that it may well be supposed, they shall be brought *nearer* to God, and reap the sublime fruits of *his mediation*, who was made *Man*, and dwelt among men, that he might in the end advance them to such a *nearness* to God, to the presence-chamber of the MOST HIGH.—But,

To be more *particular*, in giving some account of that future eternal state of happiness we are speaking of, we may presume to consider it as a state of the highest *perfection*, and of the highest *enjoyment*, our natures are capable of, *perfection* and *enjoyment* being the two great requisites to *Happiness*.

I. In respect of *perfection*, true happiness cannot be supposed to subsist without it; and, the greater the happiness is, the higher must be supposed the perfection of that being, or of those powers and faculties, to which such happiness belongs. With regard to that perfection, therefore, of the human nature and faculties, thus requisite to happiness, we may reasonably conclude, that, wherever any degree of it is found in this life, it shall be consummated in the next, or advanced to the highest degree that the human capacity will admit of; for the human capacity must always

ways be supposed the proper measure of human perfection.

The same may also be said of superior beings; so that, as the powers and capacities of *angels*, or superior spirits, differ from those of *men*, their happiness differs likewise; and, as the capacities, even of men among themselves, differ, so must also their perfection and happiness, as was formerly hinted; each may have as large a share as he can receive or desire, and yet not the same, in *degree*, with that of other beings like himself; nor, perhaps, the same in *kind* with that of other beings, of a different nature from himself.

That higher *perfection*, therefore, which may be supposed the foundation of the human happiness in a life to come, will best be understood from considering it, as it relates to the different parts or principles of the human constitution, which being, in a more general sense, composed of MIND and BODY, we shall consider,

1. That *future perfection* which the human mind may be thus endued with, or capable of hereafter: This is by far the highest of the two, according to our ideas of spiritual and corporeal natures, and the purer any spirit is, so much the more perfect and nearer to God, whom we are taught to consider, as that spirit which is of all the purest and most perfect, penetrating,

penetrating, and pervading every other substance, material or intellectual.

Since, therefore, we must consider the perfection of the soul as the highest that man is capable of, the clearest view we can have of it is, from considering its relation to the various powers and faculties of the soul; for tho', properly speaking, what we call *mind*, *soul*, or *spirit*, (which, so far as regards our present subject, have all the same signification) be but one single indivisible principle, yet, as it is variously exercised or actuated, we consider it as having so many different powers or capacities of action, each of which is supposed to have its distinct province, office, and degree of perfection.

Of these, therefore, we may here consider three or four classes: *First*, The *intellectual powers*, of reason and understanding. *Secondly*, The *recollecting and resembling powers*, of memory and imagination. *Thirdly*, The *moral powers*, of will and affections. And *fourthly*, The *reflex governing principle* of conscience, as supreme over all.

I. As to our *intellectual powers*, of reason and understanding, we may suppose, that any degree of these we are endued with in this life, shall be advanced to the highest perfection we are capable of, in the life to come.

Now,

Now, by *reason* and *understanding* are meant, the powers of discerning and discovering truth. This we must often do, in the present state, by a long chain of intermediate proofs, or tedious deduction of consequences from causes, so far as we can find out their nature and relation, or connection with one another. But, in the life to come, it may be supposed, that such discoveries shall be rather intuitive; that is, these truths, whose certainty or connection we cannot now see, without a long chain of discursive reasoning, shall then be seen at once, or with one glance.

The understanding is, as it were, the eye of the mind, and may then be so sharpened, as to pierce into the most abstruse corners of science, with as great ease, as it now sees that two and three make five, or any of the plainest axioms.

In this life, our reason is often clouded, by those mists, which sense and bodily attachments spread before it; but, in the life to come, none of these shall obstruct its views, nor impair its exercise. In this life, our reason is often disturbed by the prevalence of disorderly passions, so that it cannot consider many things calmly and attentively; but, in the life to come, it shall recover its empire over the passions, and have nothing to disturb or discompose it. In a word, we may suppose, that,

that, in the life to come, reason shall have its free and perfect exercise, without all these clogs and incumbrances; by which it is weakened and obscured, in this state of imperfection.

2. *Again*, As to what we call the recollecting and resembling powers, *viz.* those of *memory* and *imagination*, it may be supposed, that hereafter they shall likewise receive as much perfection as they can admit of. By the memory we mean, the power of recording and recollecting past events and perceptions; and by the imagination, as distinguished from this, the power of connecting, assembling, or associating these, so as to form to ourselves representations of what we have not actually felt or perceived:

Now that these powers are, in this life, very much impaired or corrupted, the experience of every one will sufficiently evince. How ready are we, to let the most important truths slip out of our memory, and to retain those that are vain, sinful and trifling? How ready to exclude or avoid all representations of spiritual and divine things, and to dwell in our imaginations, on those that are corrupt and sensual?

But, though this be so much the case with us here, yet, in the life to come, it may be expected, that these powers shall be raised to a purer and more perfect exercise; and, that their exercise shall be such, as will give the most

most refined pleasure, yet without any mixture of disorder and corruption. A

3. Class of powers which we mentioned, as belonging to the human mind, and which shall receive a much higher degree of perfection hereafter, is that of its *moral* and determining powers, or, what we commonly call the *will* and the *affections*, which are all but so many determinations of the mind, towards the different objects presented to it; and whose imperfection in this life arises from their being either determined to improper objects, or in an undue degree; *i. e.* from their not being exercised according to the direction of reason and conscience:

But, in the life to come, we may suppose, that this imperfection shall be removed, the divine will shall be the rule of our's, and every thought and affection brought into obedience to it. But, that which we may suppose, will most remarkably share in the future perfection of the human mind, is the

4. *Last* faculty we mentioned, by the name of *conscience*, or that principle within us, which necessarily determines us in our judgment of our own actions, by sometimes approving and sometimes condemning ourselves, reckoning one action good and another evil.

With those who shall be happy in the life to come, it may naturally be supposed, that its condemning power shall cease; being (as

we shall afterwards see) inconsistent with true happiness: But the *perfection* of this faculty shall be increased, in so far as it shall resume that authority which is due to it, as God's vicegerent in the soul, it shall no more be misled by temptation, nor silenced by passion, but shall recover its native rank and exercise, and keep every inferior power in due subjection to it.

Thus far we have considered somewhat of that *PERFECTION*, which the *human MIND* may, in the life to come, expect to arrive at, as consisting in the proper temper and disposition, order and regulation of all these powers and principles of which it is possessed, and which, in this life, appear to be so much dis-tempered in their nature, and disordered in their exercise.

But, in taking a view of the human constitution in general, we took notice of another constituent part of it, whose *future PERFECTI-ON* we must likewise touch a little at on this head, and that is

2. The *BODY*, the grosser or material part of our nature, whose diseases, infirmities, and corruptions are, so often, the subject of much complaint, and are, in this life, so much a clog to the exercise of our superior and intellectual powers, that, had we nothing but the discoveries of natural reason alone to direct us, we should be apt to think, any re-union

with

with our *bodies*, a thing not to be expected or desired, after the dissolution of our present frame, nor necessary for recovering and perfecting it;

But, as the life and immortality of the SOUL are brought to light by the gospel, so also is the resurrection of the BODY; we have already considered the proofs which we have of both these points from scripture and reason, and have endeavoured to solve the various difficulties, that may occur with respect to them: So that, what falls properly under our notice further, when considering the *perfection* of a future state of happiness, is, how far not only the *soul* (in the manner now described) but likewise the *body* may share in such *perfection*; and, as to this, we have no further light to direct us in our inquiries, but what arises from some hints with respect to it in the scriptures of the New Testament.

"We look (says the Apostle Paul, Philip. iii. 20. 21.) for the Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body." And 1 Cor. xv. 35, &c. we have this more particularly foretold and described: "It is sown (says the Apostle) in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory: It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power;

John 2. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

“it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. And as we have born the image of the earthy (*i. e.* the first Adam) we shall also bear the image of the heavenly” (*i. e.* Christ the second Adam) in respect of the *body* he assumed.

This is the only way in which we can form any notion of this future *perfection*, so far as it respects our *bodies*, by considering them as more spiritualized and refined, and thereby nearer the state of our Saviour’s on his resurrection and ascension, and agreeing, in some measure, with what we are told of those æthereal vehicles, assumed by angels and departed spirits, when, for delivering any messages from heaven, it was necessary that they should become visible to the eyes of mortals.

It is such a degree of refinement, and approach to the nature of spirits, that will make the *body* no more a clog to the operations of the soul, but entirely subservient to, and harmonizing with it: It is this spiritual and glorified texture, that will render it any further incapable of corruption, and relieve it from the many infirmities, diseases and decays, to which, by its present grosser composition, it must necessarily be liable.

From considering the future condition of the righteous, as a state of the highest PER-

FECTION.

SECTION both of *soul* and *body*, we proceed to consider it at

II. A state of the highest ENJOYMENT, that is, a state where the human faculties, when thus perfect (according to their nature, or sphere of-perfection) shall be exercised on objects agreeable and commensurate to them, for it is from such an exercise of our faculties, on objects suitable to them, that enjoyment or happiness of any kind, may be said to arise.

The *enjoyments* of the heavenly state might be considered, in the view now taken of its perfection, according to the respect they may be supposed to have to the different *faculties* mentioned; viz. the *understanding*, by its being employed in exploring and contemplating the most sublime *truths*, with new discoveries or measures of knowledge pouring in upon it; the *memory*, in recording and recollecting, and the *imagination*, in dwelling with delight, on such discoveries; the *will* and *affections* harmonizing, or operating in entire conformity to the *will* of the *Supreme Being*, the sovereign Author of all bliss and happiness; and the over-ruling faculty of *conscience*, reviewing, regulating and approving the whole.

But, that we may vary our view a little here, we shall rather consider this future hea-

venly enjoyment, as it respects the different SOURCES from which it may be supposed to arise.

With respect to any *new powers* of action and perception, or any *new sources* of enjoyment that may take place hereafter, we are utterly unable to judge; and our comprehension must be acknowledged very imperfect, even of such as are analogous or similar to what we have at present; but, so far as it extends to these *future sources* of *pleasure* or *enjoyment*, we may suppose

First of all, That no small pleasure shall arise to those who are admitted to share in the heavenly happiness, from a *review* of what they suffered and surmounted in an earthly state, in such a manner, as that all pain arising from such a *review* of past miseries, sufferings and follies, or apprehension of future liableness to the same, shall be removed, and the pleasure unspeakably increased, by the discovery of many snares and dangers formerly unknown, yet escaped, and many corruptions and temptations conquered; by seeing the end and effect of dispensations, formerly unfathomable; by tracing God's various dealings with their *souls*, and their consequent improvement or progress in every good habit or disposition, in every branch of virtue and devotion; how their trust in God was established, their

their love to him kindled, their humility increased, and their patience under many infirmities and afflictions confirmed, so that, the more of these they laboured under formerly, their complete deliverance and freedom from them shall be the more sensibly felt, and afford an unspeakable addition to their happiness.

Other sources of enjoyment may be supposed to take place by faith's views being perfected, promises fulfilled; hope completed; fear removed; new objects of enjoyment presented; and, above all, by the *soul's* being admitted into the more immediate presence, and enjoyment of GOD, returning, as it were, and being re-united to him, who is the primary source of all perfection and beatitude.

The enjoyment of GOD, therefore, as constituting the supreme felicity of the *soul*, though far above any thing that we can at present conceive or describe, may be considered as consisting in these two exercises,

1. Contemplation, and

2. Communion.

1. *Contemplation*, i. e. The exercise of our intellectual faculties, when perfected, on divine and heavenly objects; if, even here, such exercise is often pleasant, though soon interrupted by ignorance, and the intrusion of things trivial or hurtful, how much more delightful

lightful and transporting may it be supposed, when this ignorance shall be removed, when the views and field of *contemplation* shall be so much clearer and more extensive, and the objects of it much more striking, exalted and glorious, *viz.*

1. The *perfections* of God, which shall be *contemplated*, with ineffable delight; the beauty of his nature and attributes, his wisdom, his power, his goodness, his justice, his holiness, his truth, which are all so darkly discerned in this life, and often dreaded, shall hereafter more clearly be seen, and delightfully surveyed by all his happy subjects; as plainly appearing to be all engaged on their side.

2. The *works* of God do, even here, at present, afford a noble subject of *contemplation*; though our views be so dark and limited; must they not, therefore, much more afford this, when our minds shall be enlarged to see and to contemplate so much more of God's works, First of all

In the *natural world*; This, even now, is (according to the best founded conjectures and most accurate discoveries) a vast range or field of thought to the human faculties, and shall then be more fully laid open to our view; in all its laws and operations, the knowledge and contemplation of which at present, lays

lays a foundation for more exquisite pleasure from any future discoveries with respect to them, when our knowledge of them shall be made easy, the pain of acquiring it removed, and the pleasure arising from it unspeakably increased.

And, not only will this be the case as to the *natural world*, but likewise as to what we call the *moral world*, subject to the administration of an over-ruling providence, whose schemes and methods of proceeding, though now so dark and intricate, shall then be clearly unfolded, and made to appear reconcilable to unerring wisdom, impartial justice, and the most extensive goodness.

To this refer also the methods of his *graces*, in contriving and carrying on the *redemption* of mankind, now so mysterious and inexplicable, but which shall then be unveiled, completed, and contemplated with joy unspeakable, and full of gratitude and glory.

From considering that CONTEMPLATION of God's perfections and works, which will afford such a fertile source of happiness hereafter, in the *enjoyment* of him; we go on to consider, The

2. *Other branch* of this happiness, as consisting in COMMUNION with God; By this it is, that the happiness of his people shall be consummated, or carried to the greatest height.

height it can admit of; the more of it they have here, so much the happier are they, and nearer heaven; and it arises from a lively sense of God's love or favour, manifested to the soul, engaging its supreme affection to him, and giving a near access to him in every religious exercise and branch of devotion. If we extend this, therefore, to the life to come, we may conclude, that the *communion* with God which shall then be attained, and which must be considered as having respect to the different persons of the adorable Trinity, may be supposed to consist,

1. In those acts of *worship* paid him, where men and angels shall join in celebrating his perfections and works; the heavenly exercise of *praise* shall have new cause for it presented; and new pleasure annexed to the performing it.

2. *Obedience*, or executing the divine commands, not in the way of trial, as at present; but in such a way as will administer the highest pleasure and happiness; *God's will* shall still be the rule, but such as shall then be naturally and delightfully complied with.

3. *Converse*: By a nearer admission to the divine presence, to receive his law, as it were, from his own mouth, and to see him as he

4. *Mutual*

4. *Mutual complacency or delight*; God taking pleasure in his people, and they blessed with a sense of this; whatever were their doubts of it formerly, their evidences of it shall then be unquestionable. When God is thoroughly reconciled and pleased, he can and will make it known, he can command a lively sense of it in the soul, and bid every thing around to speak harmony and peace.

All that remains further to be said, with respect to the different *sources of enjoyment*, that await the virtuous and happy hereafter, is, that they shall have all the happiness that can arise,

From *reflection*, on what they feel within themselves, and

From the *society* of all around them.

1. From their *own review*; or reflection on what passes within themselves. So great is the pleasure arising from this, even in our present state when the mind can calmly bear its own review (which is far from being always the case with any) that some call it *heaven* in the soul, and it is so far true, that there can be no heaven or happiness without it:

By this is meant, a consciousness of the soul's being in a right state, all well ordered or regulated within, its various powers and principles in due subordination to one another,
and

and all conform'd to the will of the Most
 High: *and so on*

When such a state is in any measure attain-
 ed here, when there can be any such *self-re-
 nunciation* accompanied with *self-enjoyment*, even for
 a little, how delightful is it and desirable? How great a source of happiness, therefore,
 must it be hereafter, when it comes to be
 compleated and uninterrupted?

To this *source of enjoyment*, from their own
 review, we may add that which arises,

2. From the SOCIETY of all around them.

However much we differ from one another
 at present, in respect of our taste for the *so-
 ciety* of some rather than others, yet no desire
 seems more universal than that of some *society*
 or other; it gives a relish to all other plea-
 sures, nay there can scarcely be any enjoyment
 of them without it. In this life, however,
 the pleasures of *society* are much impaired;
 by mutual weaknesses and corruptions making
 mutual allowances and forbearance necessary;
 yet often preventing their being granted; by
 wrong ends in associating, in which case the
 union cannot be lasting and comfortable; also,
 by the interfering of humours and interests;
 but, in the life to come, there shall be none
 of all these drawbacks or alloys: The *society* of
 the blessed above shall be all harmony and
 peace:

peace: the divine presence shall banish all disorder, and divine love shall be the bond of union.

Besides what was formerly said of communion with God, the *heavenly society* may be said to comprehend that of *Angels* and superior spirits: If these now interest themselves in the concerns of mankind; if (as we are told in scripture) they rejoice over repenting sinners, and minister unto the heirs of salvation, how much more may they be supposed to rejoice, when all the heirs of salvation shall be assembled, from all cities, and kingdoms, and tongues, and nations!

Next to the *society of Angels* may be mentioned that of *fellow-mortals*, of those who underwent the same labours with them upon earth in tabernacles of clay. How *societies* shall be formed of these thereafter, or if all shall be joined in one society, we are left ignorant: but in whatever way they shall be associated together, we may reasonably suppose, that their intercourse shall be unspeakably more extensive, and any happiness they communicate to one another mutually increased, as their perfection is increased; that as all sin, disorder and deformity shall be removed, their grounds of love and affection to one another shall be unspeakably augmented.

We may, therefore, suppose, that such as were united upon earth, by the purest ties of virtuous *friendship* and affection, shall be no less so hereafter; rejoicing in the happiness of one another: Yea, and those who had the same views of glorifying God, and carrying on his wise and merciful designs among men upon earth, yet differed in their manner of prosecuting these great ends, and had therefore, perhaps, but little relish for one another's society formerly, may rejoice together, when better acquainted with one another's views, and both landed at the same haven of rest; looking back on any former differences of opinions and pursuits, as on the little quarrels of childhood, succeeded by the most perfect amity and friendship; when all, with one heart, and one voice, shall join in adoring and celebrating their Maker; and when (to the praise of free grace, of unmerited and unbounded goodness be it spoken) the few years of their preceeding trial, shall be followed by an eternity of blessedness.

It is this that will crown the felicity of the blessed above, their being assured, that, when millions of ages are elapsed, (if we may thus speak of their *duration* as successive) there shall be no diminution or interruption of their happiness; it shall continue, without being impaired, in every condition of being that a-

waits

waits them, through the unlimited periods of immortality.

The subject of this Dissertation, shews so much the importance of *improving* a-right our present opportunities, and has so much influence on this *improvement*, that I cannot avoid suggesting a few thoughts in relation to it, which may very naturally occur on this subject, in the view we have taken of it.

First of all then, from what we have seen of the nature of that *perfection* we are taught to look for hereafter, may we not receive some support under the many *imperfections* and frailties incident to us at present, and in some measure unavoidable by every mere man? These frailties and imperfections both of mind and body, are indeed, in this life, so sensibly felt by some, that, were it not for such future prospects of having them totally removed, nature would be apt to sink under the load; and to say, with patient Job, when complaining in the anguish of his spirit, "I loath life, I would not live always, let me alone, for my days are vanity."

When the *spirit* is oppressed with anxiety and care, or the *body* impaired by age and infirmities; when the *understanding* labours in its exercise, and the *will* refuses to be directed; when *corruption* ravages all within, and *disorder* lays waste without; what remains in

this life to support the soul? That desire of security and perfection, which is, in some degree, natural to every one of us, must here remain unsatisfied: But, if our views are extended to an *eternal state*, all these discouraging prospects vanish, and new scenes of bliss, harmony, and perfection, open on the soul: such as may well reconcile us to all these distresses and disorders, which we here feel, or are liable to; when satisfied (as often we may be) of their contributing, in any way, to ripen us for these higher enjoyments in our view.

2. Another inference which we may very naturally draw from what was said of our future perfection, is, that the practice of known sin, must be very inconsistent with the hopes of it.

The man who hopes for life and health, yet knowingly feeds on poison, is not more inconsistent in his conduct, than the man who hopes and wishes to be perfect hereafter, yet indulges himself in every corrupt habit here.

What, but the prevalence of sin, marks that degree of perfection, which is suited to our present state? Must it not, therefore, stand still

from about and good pleasure until of it.

If any should think that we have ventured to be rather too minute and particular in our description of *the blessedness*, let them consider how far it is necessary for assisting a little the contemplation of those who stand in need of comfort from the view of it, in such circumstances as are here set forth, and consistent with the experience of so many in the present life.

more in the way of that which succeeds it? Is it reasonable for any man to expect the being wise hereafter, while here he delights in folly, to expect having his passions and appetites in due subjection hereafter, if here he is at no pains to command them, or to expect having all his faculties enlarged and improved hereafter, if here he does all he can to misapply, pollute, and debase them? Whoever, therefore, would have his hope of future purity and perfection well established, cannot too soon begin to love and seek after them.

3. If we expect that any pleasure shall arise to us, in the life to come, from a *review* and *reflection* on what is past, let us apply ourselves to that which will give us most pleasure in the *review*: This is a good rule to judge of actions fit or unfit for us in this life, making acts of justice and charity highly conducive to our happiness; and may be extended to the life to come, by engaging us to apply to such pursuits, as have any apparent tendency to God's glory and the general good: These will always give pleasure in the review, whereas, every new indulgence in sin, may be looked on as a new source of misery and bitterness, felt in some measure here, but much more sensibly hereafter. And, on the other hand, the severest trials of our faith and patience, which are often so heavily submitted to at *present*,

present, shall be a source of the purest pleasure and delight, upon *reflection hereafter*, when all these trials are surmounted.—The

Last reflection I shall make upon this subject, is, That if nearness to God, in respect of favour and enjoyment, constitutes the supreme happiness of the Soul *hereafter*, we should be ware of keeping at an undutiful and uncomfortable *distance* from him *here*, by allowing him little or no place in our thoughts, or neglecting those *devout exercises*, in which any intercourse with him is maintained; for, besides that this must darken our hopes of being brought nearer him hereafter, it is a depriving ourselves of one source of the highest comfort and delight, even in this life, arising from an habitual sense of the divine presence and providence, an habitual regard to his laws and consciousness of his favour, through our adorable and divine MEDIATOR, by whom the blessings of heaven are obtained, and conveyed to the unworthy sons of men, and an earnest thus given of what may be expected in that *eternal state* of felicity, which we have been considering, upon being admitted to a nearer view of the divine presence and government.

CONCLUSION.

Thus have I endeavoured, with plainness and candour, to deliver my sentiments (with
the

the grounds of them) on a variety of disputed subjects, such as I thought of particular importance in relation to *Human Life and Happiness*; wishing, by exercises of this kind, to have my own attention, and that of others, the more engaged to subjects so deeply interesting; and, while conscious that this is my aim, I am not very anxious about the *critical* reception of my labours, unless so far as it may affect their *practical* influence. Tho' the *curious* Reader should be satisfied with my reasonings, their end is not answered, unless he sometimes becomes *serious*: I am not ignorant of the *general taste's* being thought against me in this; nor am I insensible of the respect due to it; but I have some reason to believe that there remains still much more of a *taste* for rational and serious inquiry than is commonly imagined; nor am I without hopes of some success and satisfaction in contributing to the *true HAPPINESS* of OTHERS, which, both as it has respect to this life, and to the next, I shall always consider as *intimately connected with MY OWN*.

F I N I S.

ERRATA. Vol. I. p. 8. l. 28. for *thuse*, r. *wish*. P. 276. l. 5. for *none to be of them*, r. *none of them to be so*. See also the Errata, last page of Vol. II. Vol. II. p. 101. l. 14. dele *et c.* P. 141. l. 29. for *contemplationis et actionis*, r. *contemplationi et actioni*.

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